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ABSTRACT
Judicialization is the process through which adjudi
catory institutions attain attributes of recognized courts.
In the American national government judicialization occurs
in the evolution of a tribunal from an administrative advi
sory panel into a constitutional court fully Incorporated
Into the Federal judiciary.

In theory, adjudicatory insti

tutions can be placed along a continuum ranging from execu
tive to Judicial adjudication.

Criteria for placement are

based on the extent of presence of acknowledged characteris
tics of judicial justice.

The continuum framework reveals

relationships among tribunals at a given time or the move
ment of a specific tribunal over time.
The evolutionary process is vivid in the trans
formation of intermediate appellate bodies in the American
military judicial system.

Courts of Military Review are

the contemporary institutional result of Judicialization of
appellate review in the larger of the two criminal justice
systems created by the national government.

A Court of

Military Review In each armed service— Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Coast Guard— examines automatically trial court
convictions resulting In severe sentences.
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These cases may

receive a discretionary review by the Court of Military
Appeals, a tribunal of three Presldentially appointed
civilian Judges.

Appellate examination of convictions is

an anomaly in the history of Anglo-American military law.
Only since World War II in the United States has Justice
replaced discipline as the objective of the military legal
system.
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that the
Courts of Military Review are evolving toward a status of
genuine judicial institutions recognized in law and fact
as legislative courts.

The hypothesis is substantiated

through (1 ) a critical survey of military legal history to
document the appellate transformation, (2) an analysis of
judicial and legislative decisions affecting the intermedi
ate appellate tribunals, (3) a comparison of judicial
behavior in military courts with that in courts of state
and other national jurisdictions, and (4) a normative
critique of proposals for future reform of appellate insti
tutions and procedures,

A descriptive methodology is used

to identify and analyze characteristics of the military
appellate tribunals for placement on the continuum of
adjudicatory institutions.

Limited use is made of tech

niques from the traditional and behavioral approaches to
judicial research.

The principal source materials are

legislative and Judicial documents, Interviews with

v

participants in the military appellate process, and pub
lished evaluations of the legal system by competent com
mentators.

A comparable analytical format is usable for

examining other adjudicatory institutions undergoing
j udicialization.
Evidence supports the conclusion that the Courts
of Military Review in the 1969-1971 period attained a
position on the judicialization continuum comparable to
that of recognized legislative courts, tribunals formally
declared by Congress to have been created under Article I
of the Constitution.

The Courts of Military Review have

not received that Congressional declarations in contrast,
the Court of Military Appeals and the United States Tax
Court have been declared by Congress to be Article I
courts.

Nevertheless, United States Supreme Court dicta

suggest the classification of the military intermediate
appellate tribunals as legislative courts, the absence of
a Congressional declaration notwithstanding.

Predictably,

the Courts of Military Review will continue to gain the
attributes of genuine courts.

Some of these features can

be acquired through statute only; others can be added
administratively.

vi

CHAPTER I
FROM EXECUTIVE TO JUDICIAL ADJUDICATION
In 1972 the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed the murder conviction of Jennie B. Griffin
because the trial judge improperly prohibited jury con
sideration of self-defense e v i d e n c e , I n 1972 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
murder conviction of J. D. Collier because the trial judge
gave insufficient weight to evidence of the defendant's
insanity at the time of the offense.2

In 1970 the United

States Air Force Court of Military Review reversed the
murder conviction of Albert V. Parmes because the trial
judge erroneously admitted certain psychiatric examination
reports which should have been classified as hearsay
evidence.3
The overriding significance of these cases from
the three criminal jurisdictions in the United States is
not simply the prevention of Injustice to these defendants;
1Griffin v. State, 273 So. 2d 478 (Ala. Crim. App.
1971).
2Unlted States v. Collier, 453 F. 2d 1173 (5th Cir.
1972).
^United States v. Parmes, 42 CMR 1010 (AFCMR 1970).
1

2
instead, it is the reality that within the American military
legal system intermediate appellate courts now exist which
are capable of Impartially reviewing courts-martial action.
This study analyzes the continuing evolution of military
appellate tribunals into counterparts of national and state
courts.

Specialized criminal appellate methods in civilian

Jurisdictions were developed in the late nineteenth cen
tury.

In contrast, military appellate tribunals were estab

lished more than fifty years later, in 195.1, In the first
effective Congressional action to reduce centuries-old exe
cutive control of the armed forces legal processes.

Trans

formation from executive into judicial adjudication has
resulted from the impact of public opinion, political leadership, and the acknowledgment by military officials of the
necessity of equal justice for all Americans.
Military judicial organization
Since enactment in 1950 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, adjudication of criminal offenses in the
four armed services has been accomplished in a three-tiered
court system.^

The structure corresponds to that of the

courts of general jurisdiction of the national government
and to that of twenty-three states.5

Trials are conducted

**10 U.S.C. secs. 801-940 (1970). The Uniform Code
was enacted May 5» 1950, 64 Stat. 108, and amended subse
quently, most significantly October 24, 1968, 82 Stat. 1335*
^The Council of State Governments, The Book of the
States, 1972-1973 (Lexington, Ky.: The Council of State
Governments, 1972), p. 125-

3
in a court of first instance; in the military this tribunal
is called a court-martial, while in the national and in
many state systems the typical term is district court.

An

appeal by a convicted defendant is heard, potentially, in
two appellate courts within each Jurisdiction.

Trial court

judgments in the military are examined first by the Court
of Military Review established in each service— Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Coast Guard.

Approximately 10 per cent of

these cases are reviewed additionally by the United States
Court of Military Appeals, the court of last resort in the
military judicial s y s t e m . ?

Equivalent courts in the regular

national judiciary are the eleven Courts of Appeals and the
United States Supreme Court.

Similar titles are common in

the states with intermediate and supreme courts.

A military

or a state case may be further examined in an infrequently
granted appeal to the United States Supreme Court.®

The

Courts of Military Review resemble most directly in Juris
diction and purpose the Court of Criminal Appeals of
610 U.S.C. sec. 866 (1970).
710 U.S.C. sec. 867 (1970).
^Appeals to the United States Supreme Court from
the state supreme courts and from the United States Courts
of Appeals can be initiated immediately after adverse deci
sions of those courts. In contrast, a military appeal must
be reframed and Introduced in the lowest Federal court.
Consequently, the number of military cases successfully
appealed to the Supreme Court is very small. See, below,
pp. 164-65*
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Tennessee and of Alabama.9

in these states separate inter

mediate courts exist for criminal and civil litigation; in
other states with a three-tiered structure intermediate
appellate courts hear both categories of cases.^
The Courts of Military Review receive cases within
their Jurisdiction automatically from trial courts; in con
trast, state and federal Courts of Appeals examine cases
initiated by the convicted defendant.

The military tri

bunals review convictions from two of the three classifi
cations of trial courts, the general and special courtsmartial.11

All cases must be reviewed in which the sentence

^Tennessee, Tennessee Code Annotated (1956 with
1972 cumulative supplement), secs. 16-441, 16-448, and
16-452; and, Alabama, The Code of Alabama, Recompiled,
(1959 with 1971 cumulative supplement, title 13, sec.
111(1). The Tennessee court was established in 1967 and
that of Alabama in 1969.
^ T e x a s and Oklahoma have a Court of Criminal
Appeals which reviews cases directly from trial courts;
however, this court's decisions are not reviewable by the
supreme court in either of the two states. The court
structure is three-tiered for civil litigation only.
Texas, Constitution, art. 5, sec. 4; and, Oklahoma, Con
stitution, art. 7, sec. 4.
11The third, and lowest, classification of courtmartial is the summary court, which corresponds to a jus
tice of the peace or magistrate court in many state systems.
Jurisdiction of this layman court is limited to trial of
enlisted men for certain minor offenses with a maximum pos
sible punishment of one-month confinement. Decisions of
these courts are reviewed administratively by the military
commander who convened the court-martial. Normally his
decision to approve the trial verdict and sentence is based
on advice from a military attorney. The commander's only
options are to accept the court judgment or to reduce the
sentence.
10 U.S.C. sec. 820 (1970)*
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(1 ) includes confinement for one year or more, a dishonor
able or bad-conduct discharge, dismissal, or the death
penalty, or (2) affects a general or flag o f f i c e r . A d d i 
tionally, a general court-martial not meeting a criterion
for automatic review may be referred to the Court of Mili
tary Review at the discretion of the senior legal officer
of each armed service, the Judge Advocate General.**-3

in

about 90 per cent of the cases the decision of the Court
of Military Review is final.

Controversial matters of law

in the remaining cases are resolved by the Court of Mili
tary Appeals upon the granting of a petition for review
initiated by the appellant.1^
The Courts of Military Review perform essential
functions of appellate tribunals of any jurisdiction.

The

1210 U.S.C. pec. 866(b) (1970).
A flag officer
holds one of the five highest grades in the Navy or Coast
Guard, the grades of commodore through fleet admiral. The
equivalent grades in the Army and Air Force are brigadier
general through general of the Army (Air Force).
■^10 U.S.C. sec. 869 (1970).
For clarification, the
General Counsel of the Department of Transportation performs
for the Coast Guard those functions assigned to the Judge
Advocate General in the other three services.
m

A comparatively small number of cases are heard
by the Court of Military Appeals under two other provisions
of the Uniform Code. A Judge Advocate General may order a
case forwarded to the highest court following a decision of
a Court of Military Review which contains new or contro
versial interpretations of military law. The purpose of
this procedure, called certification, is to obtain an
authoritative declaration on the issue by the Court of
Military Appeals. The remaining category consists of those
cases involving the death penalty or affecting a general
or flag officer.
10 U.S.C. sec. 867(b) (1970).
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Courts conduct an "independent and objective assessment"
of the procedure in and Judgment of trial courts to ensure
that Justice prevails.-*-5 Through a centralized examination
of trial records3 each Court determines and maintains con-•
sistent standards in courts-martial within its military
department.

In these tasks the Courts develop the military

common law through their authoritative interpretation of
■I/
T
statutes.
In accomplishing these functions, the military
courts have a distinct advantage over other criminal appel
late courts.

The military tribunals consider both law and

fact; other courts cannot evaluate questions of fact.1?
The military legal system is the larger of the two
criminal law Jurisdictions established by the national
government.1^

In Fiscal 1971 the United States District

Courts tried 39,582 cases involving violation of general
15Coppedge v. United States. 369 U.S. 438, 455-56
(1962) (Justice Stewart concurring).
(Boston:

■^Lester B. Orfleld, Criminal Appeals in America
Little, Brown and Company, 1939), pp. 32-34.

•^The Courts of Military Review evaluate facts con
tained in the transcript of the original trial based on
the appellate Judges1 own inquiry and on points emphasized
by appellate counsel. New testimony is not presented to
the appellate court, although certain post-trial facts can
on occasion be submitted to the appellate Jurists.
18
Of course, under the American federal system,
most crimes are violations of state, rather than national,
law and are tried In state courts. As an indication of the
number of state trials, 2,251,647 persons were charged In
1971 with violation of state criminal law, according to
data from 2,990 cities. U.S., Department of Justice,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports
for the United States, 1971, P* 110.

criminal law.1^

This total was only about 52 per cent of

the number of courts-martial— 77,31^— in which military
personnel were prosecuted for violation of specialized
criminal law contained in the Uniform C o d e . 2 ^

Appeals

from these trials established the Courts of Military
Review as the more active of the intermediate appellate
courts with criminal jurisdiction.

In Fiscal 1971 the

eleven United States Courts of Appeals disposed of 3,0^7
cases filed by individuals convicted in district courts.21
The four Courts of Military Review completed action on
7,123 cases automatically entered on their dockets.

pp

The

percentage of appeals from trials in each jurisdiction was
approximately the same in 1971.
Judicialization in theory
and practice
The Courts of Military Review as just described
represent the contemporary stage in the continuing trans
formation of military appellate tribunals and procedures.
19

U.S., Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, 1971, p. 317PO
U.S., United States Court of Military Appeals and
the Judge Advocates General of the Armed Forces and the
General Counsel of the Department of Transportation, Annual
Report of the United States Court of Military Appeals and
the Judge Advocates General of the Armed Forces and the
General Counsel of the Department of Transportation, 1971,
p. 5. [Hereinafter cited USCMA-JAG"'Annual Report.J
21Annual Report of U.S. Courts, 1971, p. 2^1.
22USCMA-JAG Annual Report, 1971, p. 5.
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The fundamental characteristic of the evolution is the
increasing replacement of potentially arbitrary executive
adjudication with independent Judicial adjudication.

Evi

dence suggests that this trend will affect many elements in
the military legal system.

The predictable next event in

the reform of intermediate appellate courts is uncontested
recognition of their status as legislative courts estab
lished by act of Congress.^3

present, the four Courts

of Military Review disagree on the nature of their creation.
The statute authorizing establishment of these Courts is
not as precise as are statutes pertaining to other legis
lative courts.

The issue is significant because further

enhancement of their judicial status depends upon favorable
resolution of this controversy.2 **
The process through which tribunals attain addi
tional attributes of genuine courts is termed judicializa
tion.

Implicit in the concept is the replacement of pro

cedures of executive, or administrative, adjudication with
those of judicial adjudication.

Two methods of adjudication

^Legislative courts are those tribunals established
by Congress to participate in the accomplishment of one of
the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of the Consti
tution. These courts are not elements of the judiciary, as
are courts established under Article III. The United States
Court of Military Appeals and the United States Tax Court
are unequivocally recognized as legislative courts created
under Article I.
pll

fcnThe issue of legislative court status for the
Courts of Military Review Is analyzed in Chapter VI* below.

9
are very evident in the evolution of military appellate
review.

According to Roscoe Pound, a leading American

legal theorist,
What differentiates administrative adjudication
from judicial justice is the lack of checks upon arbi
trary, biased, or extra-legal if not unlawful (in the
sense of lack of accord with the legal rights of indi
viduals) action in the one case as compared with the
numerous and effective checks in the other.25
Criteria for evaluating judicialization of the military
appellate system are based on Pound's comparison.

The

transition can be described in terms of movement along a
continuum from administrative toward judicial adjudication.
The former is characterized by the absence or inadequacy of
controls on arbitrary acts committed in the name of justice.
The latter is identified by the presence of effective checks
on extra-legal activity which impedes justice.

At any given

time the system can be described by determining the extent
of presence of the acknowledged attributes of judicial jus
tice.

A principal check against biased action is appellate

review performed by courts possessing essential independ
ence, i.e., freedom from any external coercion.
Beginning primarily in 1916, American reformers
have endeavored to eliminate "arbitrary, biased, or extralegal" procedures historically prevailing in military law.2^
25Just ice According to Law (New Haven:
versity Press, 1951), P- 79.

Yale Uni

p/T

°A detailed examination of the beginning of the
reform movement is presented in Chapter III, below.
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The difficulty in replacing administrative adjudication
with Judicial Justice arises from divergent opinions on
the purpose of military law.

Should the system promote

and ensure Justice as in a civilian criminal Jurisdiction?
Or* should it be an instrument of discipline for the mili
tary command hierarchy?

Adherents of the former objective

seek the maximum development of Judicial adjudication with
all its guarantees of impartial determination of an indi
vidual's guilt.27

Conversely, advocates of the latter

urge retention of the commander's traditional discretion
in using military law to compel obedience, although in
doing so the rights of the individual might be violated.2 ®
Not until the post-World War II period did Congress declare
the objective of American military law to be the promotion
of justice.2^
The distinction between administrative and Judicial
^The earliest complete expression of this debate
occurred in efforts to amend the Articles of War after
World War I. Both viewpoints are contained in U.S., Con
gress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Establishment
of Military Justice, Hearings, before a subcommittee of the
Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, on S. 64, 66th Cong.,
1st sess., 1919. Additionally, see, Samuel T. Ansell,
"Military Justice," Cornell Law Quarterly, 5 (November,
1919)* 1-17; and, Edmund M. Morgan, "The Existing CourtMartial System and the Ansell Articles," Yale Law Journal,
29 (November, 1919), 52-74.
? ft
In addition to Hearings on S. 64 (1919), see,
Enoch H. Crowder, Military Justice During the War (Washing
ton, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1919)*
29
The commitment to a goal of Justice occurred in
Congress' passage of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
64 Stat. 108 (1950).
[10 U.S.C. secs. 801-940 (1970)].
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adjudication, as expressed by Pound, can be applied to any
tribunal regardless of its placement in the United States
government.

Thus, a tribunal located outside the statu

torily defined Judiciary can conceivably possess attributes
of Judicial adjudication.

This circumstance in fact exists

in the military legal system.

Although the Courts of Mili

tary Review are presently organized within the military
departments of the executive branch, they are gaining
through judicialization characteristics of Article III
courts.
This analysis is supported by an 1887 United States
Supreme Court decision which emphasized the judicial nature
of military trials, although the Court acknowledged that
courts-martial have historically been separate from the
American judiciary.30
The whole proceeding from its inception is judi
cial. The trial, findings, and sentence are the solemn
acts of a court organized and conducted under the
authority of and according to the prescribed forms of
law. It sits to pass upon the most sacred questions
of human rights that are ever placed on trial in a
court of justice; rights, which In the very nature of
things, can neither be exposed to danger nor subjected
to the uncontrolled will of any man, but which must be
adjudged according to law.31
The Court pointed out, further, that "a court-martial
3°Runkle v. United States. 122 U.S. 5*13 (1887).
31lbid., p. 558. Emphasis In the original. The
excerpt is from an 1864 Opinion of the Attorney General
/
quoted at length and affirmed by the Court in its opinion./
,/

/

/
/
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organized under the laws of the United States is a court of
special and limited jurisdiction.11
Nevertheless, the Eunkle opinion did not diminish
traditional emphasis on administrative adjudication in
military law.

Separation of military and civilian criminal

legal systems had been affirmed by the Supreme Court in
1857s a decision not specifically affected by Runkle
although the two opinions represented opposite positions
on the purpose of military law.^2

Supporters of the dis

ciplinary purpose relied on Dynes v. Hoover as authority
for minimizing judicial safeguards and procedures in adjudi
cation.

Since the Supreme Court had ruled that military

courts were "entirely independent" of the Article III judi
ciary, military law traditionalists concluded that trials
should be conducted administratively.

The most influential

proponent of this view was William Wlnthrop, an Army legal
officer in the late nineteenth century.

His commentary on

military law was the basis for many objections to reforms,
even those proposed in the Uniform Code in 19^9*

Winthrop

wrote:
Not belonging to the judicial branch of the Govern
ment, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to
the executive department; and they are in fact simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
Congress for the President as Commander-in-chief, to
aid him In properly commanding the army and navy and
enforcing the discipline therein. . . .
32Pynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (U.S. 1857)*
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Thus, Indeed, strictly, a court-martial is not a
court in the full sense of the term, or as the same
is understood in the civil p h r a s e o l o g y . 3 3
Administrative adjudication endorsed by Winthrop institu
tionalized many of the disadvantages described by Pound.
Specifically, the military legal system before 1951 pro
vided only a few checks on arbitrary action.

Contributing

to the possibility of biased decisions was the absence of
an Independent Judiciary.

Because a court-martial was

commonly viewed as an instrumentality for enforcing dis
cipline, commanders considered appropriate virtually any
means to accomplish the desired end.

Moreover, their acts

were rarely examined by any other authority, certainly not
by a formal appellate Judicial tribunal.
Thus, the twentieth century development of a mili
tary Judiciary approaching Independence from executive con
trol corresponds with the growth of independent courts in
England in the seventeenth century.

A brief survey of

Anglo-American military and civilian Judicial history
illustrates common difficulties existing in administrative
adjudication.
Since the eleventh century English military laws
and tribunals have been separate from civilian courts and
laws.

The antecedent of the modern military trial court,

the Court of the High Constable and Marshal of England, was

D. C.:
p. 49.

^ Military Law and Precedents (2d ed.; Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1896, 1920 reissue),
Emphasis in the original.
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administered by two royal appointees as a tribunal apart
from the regular common law courts.

In the sixteenth cen

tury the court evolved into the Marshal’s Court, the origin
of the present term "court-martial.”

Over time the Marshal

was replaced by military officers, normally unit commanders,
empowered to judge and punish soldiers in the name of the
K i n g . 3^

The transition was officially, implemented in a

royal order issued by James II in 1687.^“* These arrange
ments were formalized in the Mutiny Act of 1689, the first
military criminal statute.
The first American military law was adopted by the
Continental Congress In 1775 in an almost verbatim enact
ment of the. existing British Articles of War.

Consequently,

the historical separation of military and civilian laws and
courts was established In America.

The early statutes for

governing the land and naval forces contained many elements
of administrative adjudication injurious to the rights of
the Individual.

For example, the accused received a form

of jury trial; however, the verdict and sentence were merely
advisory to the unit commander.

His disposition of the case

3**winthrop, Military L a w , pp. 46-47; and, William B.
Aycock and Seymour W. Wurfel, Military haw under the Uni
form Code of Military Justice (Chapel Hill:
University of
NortH— CarolinirTresspT955TT-PP • 4-5.
oc
William Holdsworth, A History of English L a w , ed.
by A. L. Goodhart and H. G. Hanbury (7th ed. rev.; London:
Metheum & Co., 1956, I, 577See, also, D. P. O'Connell,
"The Nature of British Military Law," Military Law Review,
19 (January, 1963), 143-44.
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was unreviewable, except In infrequent instances.36

Judicial subservience to royal authority existed
in the early history of civilian criminal procedure in
England.

Serving at the King's pleasure, judges were

dismissed from office for political reasons periodically
in the thirteenth through sixteenth centuries.

The con

flict between the judiciary and the monarchy Intensified
during the reign of the Stuarts in the seventeenth cen
t ury.

37

The theoretical justification for an independent

judiciary had been recognized at least since the fifteenth
c e n t u r y .

The Revolution of 1688 and the constitutional

adjustment thereafter resulted in statutory recognition of
judicial independence.

The Act of Settlement of 1701 gave

substance to the theory of judicial independence through
provision for appointment of judges for life during good
behavior.^9

"The judges exercised the royal power of

3^a detailed examination of the development of
appellate review in American military law is presented in
Chapters III through V, below.
37
Theodore P. T. Plucknett, Taswell-Langmead1s
English Constitutional History (11th ed. ; London": Sweet &
Maxwell Limited, 196'OJ, pp. 464-66.
38
W. B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of
Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine^ from Its Origin to
the Adoption of the United States Constitution, Tulane
Studies in Political Science, Vol.-9 (New Orleans: Tulane
University, 1965)s P. 5.
■^Geoffrey Cross and G. D. G. Hall. Radcliffe and
Cross, The English Legal System (4th ed.; London: Butterworths, 1964)7 p. 39oT
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keeping the King's peace and vindicating the King's
authority and it became settled that the King could not
administer justice in person nor sit in the courts.,,ii0
The increasing independence of English Judges
before the Revolution of 1688 was not reflected directly
in the plan of governmental organization espoused by the
leading political theorist of the period, John Locke.

In

his "Second Treatise of Civil Government," written in 1681,
Locke omitted a separate judiciary in his three-function
structure.2*1

Instead, judicial matters were included among

domestic executive functions.

The legislative function was

the predominant element in Locke's system, which included a
third function, the federative, related to foreign affairs.
Approximately fifty years later the French political
theorist Montesquieu reinterpreted Locke.

In examining

the contemporary English polity Montesquieu identified
three broad governmental functions accomplished by separate
entities— the legislative, the executive, and the judicial.2*2
Although critics now consider Montesquieu to have over
emphasized the degree of separation among the functions,
his approach was adopted by succeeding generations as a
2*°Pounda Justice According to Law, p. 84.
ill
Two Treatises of Government, ed. by Thomas I.
Cook (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1947), PP. 194-96.
^ The Spirit of Laws, trans. by Frederic R. Coudert
(rev. ed.; London:
Colonial Press, 1900), I, 151-56.
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prescription for restriction of governmental

despotism.

The doctrine of separation of powers was incorporated in
American national and state constitutions as a reaction to
many of the excesses of executive authority occurring during
colonial rule.
An assessment
Thus, the United States inherited from England the
concept of dividing the principal functions of government
among separate entities and an associated preference for
judicial rather than executive adjudication of civilian
^ A n example of the criticism of Montesquieu's
accuracy in analyzing the existing English constitution
is that by. an American political scientist of the early
twentieth century, Prank J. Goodnow.
"If, however, Montesquieu had carried his researches
further, he would have seen that the existence of his
third function of government, i.e., the judicial func
tion, could not be predicated from the mere fact of the
independence of the judges. A study of the powers of
the judges of the higher courts, and particularly of
the powers of the justices of the peace, would have
shown conclusively that English political ideas were
irreconcilable with the existence of three powers of
government."
Although Goodnow recognized only two functions, which he
called the expression of the will of the state [politics]
and the execution of the will of the state [administration],
he noted the existence in "any concrete government" of three
authorities engaging in administration. The Judiciary is
the first of these to become differentiated. He pointed out
that "the most progressive political communities" have estab
lished independent judiciaries.
Politics and Administration:
A Study in Government (New York: Russell & Russell, 1900,
1967 reissue], pp. 12, 17-18, and 39. See, also, Gwyn, The
Meaning of Separation of Powers, 100-107; and, Carl J.
Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory
and Practice in Europe and America (4th ed.; Waltham, Mass.:
Blaisdell Publishing Co., I960), pp. 176-77-
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crimes.

The preference, however, was not applied to mili

tary law because of the prevailing opinion that such law
was chiefly for the disciplining of armed forces.

Although

the military legal system has remained a component of the
executive branch, judiclalizatlon has occurred in the insti
tutions and procedures.

Progress in judiclalizatlon is

identified by the presence of those acknowledged attributes
of a true judiciary.

Among these are:

independence,

absence of authoritative review by a nonjudicial agency or
official, shielding of judges from improper political influ
ence, plus a number of specific powers, including the power
to summon witnesses and to compel their attendance in court,
to punish contempt, to issue extraordinary writs, to make
rules for the administration, of judicial affairs, to con
trol the admission of attorneys to practice in the court,
and to exercise other inherent authority necessary to the
accomplishment of the court's mission.
The four Courts of Military Review are presently
deficient in many of these characteristics.

Succeeding

chapters analyze the advancement of the military appellate
tribunals along the Judiclallzation continuum as various
characteristics have been added by statute or practice.

A

comprehensive assessment of the judicial nature of the four
Courts is impossible because disagreement exists among the
four tribunals on their actual powers.

For example, two

of the four have declared their authority to issue writs;
one has denied the existence of such authority; one has
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not ruled.

More certainty ex±3ts in evaluating other

characteristics.

For example, a nonjudicial official,

the President, is granted the right by statute to affect
the Judgment of the military appellate courts in specified
circumstances.
Despite these deficiencies, the Courts of Military
Review are the result of Judicialization, a process which
*

now enables the military defendant to receive equivalent
opportunity for impartial examination of his trial as is
available to his fellow citizen prosecuted in either of
the other criminal jurisdictions in the United States.

CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY:

ANALYSIS THROUGH DESCRIPTION

The larger of the two criminal law Jurisdictions
under the national government Is the American military.
Within this legal system the court of last resort for the
vast majority of defendants convicted of serious crimes Is
the Court of Military Review In each of the four armed
services.

Further, these Courts are undergoing a distinc

tive process of Judicialization which is continually
enhancing their stature as tribunals of judicial adjudi
cation.

These key facts, justify study of the Courts of

Military Review by political scientists.

Public law

scholars have conducted relatively little detailed analysis
of specialized courts, a category in which the military
intermediate tribunals are the most active.’*’ The lack of
previous examination of the history, Image, jurisdiction,
and judicial processes of the military courts necessitates
a departure in this work from the prevailing patterns of
1In addition to the military courts, examples of
specialized courts In the national government are the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Court of Claims,
the Customs Court, and the Tax Court.
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Judicial research.
The product of description
This study adheres to the general style of politi
cal science research suggested by Charles S. Hyneman, who
defined the purpose of Inquiry in the discipline as the
"full understanding of legal governments."2

Of the four

broad methods or approaches identified by Hyneman, the one
most relevant here is "description of legal governments."
Thus, the objective of this research is a comprehensive
description of one specific element of American government—
the Courts of Military Review.

A descriptive methodology is

appropriate because the significant point for analysis is
the Courts1 evolution from advisory administrative staffs to
the equivalent of genuine appeals tribunals in the national
and state judiciaries.

This transition is a notable demon

stration of Judicialization.

This work is an exploratory

inquiry into the development of four courts through judicial
and legislative processes.
In varying degrees, inferior courts undergo changes
in statutory characteristics and in procedures which
enhance their judicial status.

The transitions are greater

in specialized courts, many of which were originally estab
lished as Institutions with only limited judicial features.
^The Study of Politics: The Present State of Ameri
can Political Science (Urbana:
University of Illinois
Press, 1959)3 P* 2b.
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Among the specialized courts, the Courts of Military Review
are perhaps the tribunals exhibiting the most changes,
because the extensive evolution has occurred in a frequently
hostile atmosphere.

Within the military legal system, judi

cial review has historically been minimized.

Accusation,

trial, and punishment have until quite recently been the
prerogative of the individual unit commander in his task
of maintaining discipline among subordinates. ■Courts-martial
were among the devices for ensuring compliance with orders.
Formal judicial evaluation of the legal sufficiency of con
victions was nonexistent before 1951*

Even in the 19^9-

1950 period establishment of effective appellate tribunals
was opposed by traditionalist military elements.

Review

procedures were created principally through Congressional
responses to public demand for reform.

Only since 1969

have the intermediate appellate courts initiated improve
ment in their judicial status.

The significant landmarks

in this judicialization movement can best be identified
and analyzed through a descriptive rather than a behavioral
approach.
The hypothesis of this study is that the Courts of
Military Review are evolving toward a status of genuine
judicial institutions recognized in fact and law as legis
lative courts.

The hypothesis is to be tested through

Cl) a critical survey of military legal history to document
the transition from confirmation of military trial court
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verdicts by a potentially biased commander to Judicial
determination of the legal sufficiency of convictions and
appropriateness of sentences by independent appellate
courts; (2) an analysis of Judicial decisions and legis
lative declarations affecting the status of the inter
mediate tribunals;

(3) a comparison of characteristics of

these Courts with attributes of established appellate
bodies in the national and state Judiciaries; and (*0 a
normatively oriented critique of proposals for revision of
existing military legal systems.
Hyneman's statement of the objectives of descrip
tion forms the framework under which this broad analytical
approach will be used in this study.3

The organizational

structure of the military legal system must be described
at various times to determine the scope of its evolution.
The processes of decision-making within the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government are rele
vant to an appraisal of the progress of Judicialization.
Description of the politics of control of legal government
is necessary for an evaluation of the policy conflicts
affecting the structure and procedures of the military
legal system.

An examination of policies and acts of

governments and the resultant Impact on affected publics
Is essential to determine the interactions producing change.
3Ibid., pp. 36-39.
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The hypothesis will be tested in the format of
descriptive analysis; however, data for the inquiry will
be obtained in part from methods frequently identified
with the traditional and behavioral approaches to judicial
study.

Excessive reliance on either approach is insuffi

cient because of the necessity for data on the Courts'
evolvement in the context of existing statutes.

This

analysis cannot be developed from traditional methods
emphasizing study of legal doctrines enunciated by courts.
Nor can it be produced through behavioral methods concerned
with characteristics and activities of judges.

Beginning

in the late 1950's, the behavioral movement brought concen
tration
on public and institutional responses to judicial
decisions; interest group litigation activities; the
backgrounds, attitudes, and role perception of judges;
intracourt bargaining and strategic behavior; and the
development of mathematical models of decision-making
and of nonmathematleal models relating courts to the
political process.4
These behavioral inquiries have been directed almost exclu
sively toward the United States Supreme Court.

Many of the

studies provide no usable models for examination of other
courts.

Quantitative methods developed in Supreme Court

research are inapplicable to analysis of lower appellate
^Joel B. Grossman, "A Model for Judicial Policy
Analysis: The Supreme Court in the Sit-In Cases," in
Frontiers of Judicial Research, ed. by Joel B. Grossman
and Joseph Tanenhaus (New York: Joseph Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1969), PP. 405-406.
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tribunals, principally because of the comparatively few
dissents on such courts and the variable panel procedure
by which cases are heard.^

Unlike the Supreme Court which

always sits en. banc, lower appellate courts most commonly
divide into three-judge panels to hear all but the most
important cases.

The combination of judges on lower courts

is not fixed; therefore, relationships among the total
court membership on given policy issues cannot be as
thoroughly demonstrated by statistical techniques as is
possible on the United States Supreme Court.
During the 1960's research was extended to the lower
Federal and state supreme courts; however, very few in-depth
analyses of the specialized courts were published.

These

judicial Institutions typically have been excluded from the
development of models for examination of inferior courts.
This situation is evident in comments by writers of two
recent works employing systems analysis in evaluating inter
dependent processes of the Federal courts of general juris
diction.

For example, Richard J. Richardson and Kenneth N.

Vines recognize "considerable justification for focusing
upon the district and appeals courts," but they exclude
other courts of the national government as subjects for
^Kenneth N. Vines, "Judicial Behavior Research,"
in Approaches to the Study of Political Science, ed. by
Michael Haas and Henry S. Kariel (Scranton, Pa.:
Chandler
Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 136-38.

their research.®

"Lower courts other than the district

and appeals courts are 'special' courts and they deal only
with cases in certain restricted a r e a s . S i m i l a r l y ,

in

a work designed to demonstrate the applicability of systems
analysis to the Federal judiciary, Sheldon Goldman and
Thomas P. Jahnige reject consideration of specialized tri
bunals.®

Military courts are disposed of with a footnote

remark that "in this book the subject of military justice
is not t r e a t e d . Several explanations are possible for
the lack of scholarly interest in specialized courts.

As

noted, traditional concentration on the United States
Supreme Court has been modified recently with attention to
the next logical subjects, the lower Federal and state
supreme courts.

Consequently, the specialized courts have

been considered only tangentially.

Further, the military

legal system has been disregarded as a subject for judicial
research because of its nonjudicial image.

Military law

has been envisioned by the layman and the scholar as the
tool of an arbitrary, vindictive, and capricious commander
g
The Politics of Federal Courts: Lower Courts in
the United States (Boston: Little* Brown and Company,
19-70), p. 4.
7
Ibid. Interestingly, in the essay cited above,
n. 4, Vines urged examination of "different aspects of the
judicial system." p. 140. Both works were published in
1970.
g

The Federal Courts as a Political System (New York
Harper & Row, 1971)•
9Ibld., pp. 1-2, n. 4.
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rather than as a statutory system of courts designed to
preserve individual rights.

Ambiguity has existed in the

classification of military courts as judicial or adminis
trative tribunals.

This uncertainty and the persistence

of obsolete stereotypes have reduced political scientists'
interest in studying the military legal system.

The mili

tary courts are now evolving into a clear status as judi
cial institutions.

Consequently, the lack of research by

the mainstream of the political science discipline should
not now deter inquiry into the Courts of Military Review.
The Richardson and Vines work is a precedent for
use of a mixture of methodologies to attain the desired
scope of analysis.

10

Although emphasizing systems analy

sis , the two writers point out their use of a variety of
conceptual tools, methods, and materials to achieve "a
fuller picture of the lower judiciary."

Similarly, in

this work the descriptive approach will be developed by
using data developed from traditional and behavioral
methods.

The Richardson and Vines publication on the

Federal trial and intermediate appeals courts is somewhat
similar to this study of the Courts of Military Review;
examinations of legislative activity and of appellate
decision-making are comparable.

However, this work cannot

be structured parallel to their study because of differences
in the jurisdiction of the two sets of appellate courts and
10The Politics of Federal Courts, pp. 164 and 170.

28
lack of data on military Judges.

These are among the major

limitations on employment of the systems analysis model,
the most frequently used framework In judicial studies pub
lished since the mid-1960's .^
The product of systems analysis
Because of the common use of the systems model in
contemporary scholarship it is appropriate to outline
reasons for the limited applicability of systems analysis
in this study.

Systems analysis as a methodology in politi

cal science was developed by David E a s t o n . T h e

previously

cited works employing the model view the Federal judiciary
For examples of use of systems analysis in judi
cial research, see, Glendon Schubert, Judicial PolicyMaking; The Political Role of the Courts tChicago: Scott,
Foresman and Company, 1965), especially,PP. 104-30;
Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1964), especially, pp. 31-36;
Joel B. Grossman, "A Model for Judicial Policy Analysis";
Kenneth N. Vines and Herbert Jacob, "State Courts," in
Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis,
ed. by Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (2d ed.; Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1971)> PP. 272-311; Henry Robert
Glick and Kenneth N. Vines, State Court Systems (Englewood
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973); and, Sheldon
Goldman and Thomas P. Jahnige, The Federal Judicial System:
Readings in Process and Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, Inc., 19bb). M a n y o f these references are
cited in Goldman and Jahnige, The Federal Courts as a Politi
cal System, pp. 1-2, n. 4. For a critique of the methodology
see, Sheldon Goldman and Thomas P. Jahnige, "Systems Analysis
and Judicial Systems: Potential and Limitations," Polity,
3 (Spring, 1971), 334-59.
l2His principal works on the subject are The Politi
cal System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), and A Systems
Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 1965).
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as a complete system or cycle.

Additionally, the judiciary

is a component of the all-encompassing American political
system.

The four elements of a functioning system are

input, a conversion process, outputs, and feedback.

Inputs

are normally viewed as consisting of two segments, demands
(principally litigation in the judiciary) and supports
(favorable attitudes from the public and the legal profes
sion enabling courts to operate).

The conversion process

is the method by which conflicting claims in the litigation
are resolved by judges.

Numerous variables affect the

methods of decision-making occurring in each of the courts
In the Federal judiciary.

Outputs from courts are deci

sions, the means by which demands are met and policies are
made.

Feedback is the reaction in the Judicial system

environment which affects future Inputs through, for example,
increased litigation or reduced support for the courts as
institutions of government.
The full systems framework is unnecessary for the
study of a single kind of court, as Is the objective here.
Accordingly, this work concentrates on the conversion pro
cess of the judicial system.

Other systems analysis elements

are examined only in the context of the decision-making
procedures of the courts under study.

Research in the con

version process of the Supreme Court has occupied the atten
tion of behavioral political scientists.

Because compara

tively complete data are available on the Justices' personal
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backgrounds, attitudes, court behavior, and voting records,
many detailed analyses have been performed with quantita
tive techniques.

However, these models are inappropriate

for study of lower courts on which data are fragmentary
and most decisions are made by three-judge panels.

An

even great problem exists in applying these techniques to
the Courts of Military Review.

Here virtually no data are

obtainable on the judges as individuals.

Additionally,

the study of judicial selection and recruitment, a common
topic in behavioral research, cannot be developed with the
same effectiveness in this examination of the military
courts.

This limitation is caused by the method of assign

ment of military attorneys to the courts under criteria
frequently extending beyond an individual's qualifications.
Systems analysis is an inadequate methodology in
this study because of the limited policy-making role of
the Courts of Military Review.

This is part of a larger

issue of the degree of judicial policy-making resulting
from criminal litigation.

None of the previously cited

writers has approached the question in describing policy
as the output element of the judicial system.

Undoubtedly,

major social, economic, and political policies are enunciated
in criminal decisions.

The judicial response to a civil

liberties claim occurs in the prosecution of a person for
violating, for example, a trespassing law.

However, policy

declarations are an improbable output of courts dealing
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exclusively with the typical felonies and misdemeanors
punishable under the Uniform Code.

As long as justice is

administered within the range established by legislative
policy, little opportunity exists for policy outputs
affecting society.

Deviations from the acceptable range

are the instances of significant judicial policy-making.
The Courts of Military Review and their predecessor
tribunals have engaged in very little policy-making in the
sense of deviating from prevailing statutes defining crim
inal acts and from executive orders establishing procedural
requirements, such as rules of evidence and elements of
proof for each crime.

Since 1969 the Army Court of Military

has Initiated policy by declaring its authority to issue
writs for extraordinary relief.

As the Intermediate courts

continue evolving, as hypothesized, toward legislative
court status, they logically will exert greater policy
influence on military law.

The Impact of these policy

outputs on the military public is a subject for future
research.

Perhaps at that time the complete systems analy

sis model will be an appropriate framework for Investigating
the military legal environment
13a major topic for future research is an investi
gation of the cultural influences on judicial decision
making created by the unique military environment. The
Impact of political culture, generally, has been considered
by Richardson and Vines in The Politics of Federal Courts.
A modification of their concept is suggested in Joel B.
Grossman and Austin Sarat, "Political Culture and Judicial
Research," Washington University Law Quarterly, 1971 (Sum
mer, 1971), 177-207.
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For this study, a descriptive analysis method,
supplemented with other research techniques, will yield
maximum data for the objective— a complete examination of
the judicialization of the military intermediate appellate
courts.

This approach will be applied first to a critical

survey of the history of appellate procedures to establish
the rationale and justification for the judicial system.

CHAPTER III
ORIGINS OP APPELLATE REVIEW
The present Courts of Military Review are the
institutional result of judicialization' of the American
military legal system, in which appellate review of
court-martial convictions has been an anomaly.

Only since

1951 have military tribunals with even a semblance of
independent judicial power existed.

Examination of the

history of military law reveals the extent of change
toward meaningful appeals for the convicted defendant.
Traditionally military law has been justified as
an essential means of maintaining discipline.

As such,

law could be used by a commander to gain compliance with
frequently undesirable orders.

Consequently, the nature

of the legal system was predominately executive rather
than judicial.

Since World War I reformers have sought to

reduce executive control through creation of genuine judi
cial independence at both trial and appellate levels.
ponents of executive control and of command discretion
urged retention of the status quo.

A 1956 statement by

the Navy Judge Advocate General is a typical expression
of the traditionalist military viewpoint.
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[T]he armed services have got to accomplish more with
their criminal code, that is, the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, than do civilian jurisdictions with
their criminal codes. The criminal code of a civilian
jurisdiction is designed to maintain good social order
amongst the people. With our code, we must not only
maintain good social order but we must foster and pro
duce a dedicated fighting spirit.1
The policy of military law as a tool of command existed in
British statutes, precedents for the first American laws
governing the Army and Navy.

The usage was perpetuated in

the Constitution of 1787 by the omission of military courts
from the Federal judiciary in Article III.

Since military

law was an executive disciplinary device, post-trial review
expectedly became the prerogative of the unit commander and,
on occasion, his superiors.

Even in 1973 the commander who

convened the court-martial must exercise his statutory
options on the verdict and sentence before adversary prop
ceedings begin in an appellate court.
Executive, or command, control characterized the
separate statutes establishing criminal codes for the Army,
Navy, and Coast Guard.

Judicialization is more evident in

^Statement of Rear Admiral Ira H. Nunn in U.S.,
Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, To Amend the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Hearings% before a sub
committee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, on H.R. 6583* 84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956
[Committee Paper No. 110], p. 8446.
2 10 U.S.C. secs. 871 and 860-865 ( 1 9 7 0 ) .
The com
mander, upon the recommendation of a staff attorney, must
approve the trial court verdict or impose a verdict supported
by the evidence in the record. Similarly, he must approve
the sentence adjudged or impose a lesser sentence. He cannot
increase the severity of either the sentence or verdict.
Sec. 864.
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the Articles of War, which were amended more frequently and
substantively than were the laws of the Navy or Coast Guard.
A form of administrative appellate review was established
statutorily in the Army in 1920, but comparable development
did not occur in the other services until thirty years
later with the implementation of the Uniform Code.
Two principal kinds of appellate review have existed
in military law:

review by the commander who appointed the

court-martial and, depending upon sentence severity, an
additional review by the President, Congress, or a Cabi
net secretary; and more recently review by appellate tri
bunals. 3
sentence.

This review is a prerequisite to execution of a
A court-martial decision is without effect until

confirmed by some superior military authority.

In contrast,

the verdict of a criminal trial court in a civilian juris
diction is self-executing.

No authority apart from the

court must approve decisions of the judge or jury.

Because

the verdict and sentence of a military court must be approved
^Surveys of the history of military appellate review
are contained In several sources, including: William P.
Fratcher, "Appellate Review in American Military Law," Mis
souri Law Review, 14 (January, 1949), 15-75; Luther C. West,
"A History of Command Influence on the Military Judicial
System," UCLA Law Review, 18 (November, 1970), 1-156; Frank
Fedele, "Appellate Review In the Military Justice System,"
Federal Bar Journal, 15 (October-December, 1955), 399-435;
and, Robert 0. Rollman, "Of Crimes, Courts-Martial, and
Punishment— A Short History of Military Justice," United
States Air Force Judge Advocate General Law Review, 11
(Spring, 1969), 212-22. For complete citations of military
law statutes, see, John T. Willis, "The United States Court
of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operation, and Future,"
Military Law Review. 55 (Winter, 1972), 42-43.
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externally, this procedure led to a form of* automatic
appeal in the confirmation action.

Historically, manda

tory examination of the court decision did not always
benefit the accused because a commander dissatisfied with
the outcome could return the case to the court-martial
with a demand for a more severe punishment or reversal of
ii
an acquittal.
Military appeals— 1775-1918
The original American Articles of War and Articles
for the Government of the Navy were patterned after British
statutes.

In the Army law, sentences imposed by the two

courts-martial of restricted Jurisdiction required con
firmation by the convicted defendant's commander; but the
need for confirmation of general court-martial verdicts was
somehow omitted despite such a requirement in British law.
The deficiency was corrected in 1776 in amendments drafted
by a committee which included Thomas Jefferson and John
Adams.

These new provisions specified confirmation of

general court-martial convictions by Congress or by the
commander-in-ehief.

A 1786 amendment required Congres

sional confirmation of sentences of a general court-martial
involving death, peacetime dismissal of an officer or
affecting a general officer.
^Thls right was eliminated in the 1920 Articles of
War but was continued, although administratively proscribed,
in the Articles for the Government of the Navy until 1951*
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Acting under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitu
tion , the First Congress transferred confirmation respon
sibility to the President.

With reactivation of the Navy

in 1797 Congress adopted the naval laws prevailing during
the Revolutionary War.

Except for minor modifications

during the Civil War affecting specific sentences requiring
Presidential confirmation, the Articles of War were not
changed from the founding of the Republic through World
War I.

From 1775 to 1951 the Articles for the Government

of the Navy were revised extensively only once, in 1862,
with no change in confirmation procedures by the commander
and, as necessary, the President.5
The present system of appellate review resulted from
events over a ninety-year period.

Controversy over inter

pretation of a statute, an intense personal rivalry between
two Army judge advocates general, and increased public
awareness of the abuses of the legal system during wartime
all led to creation in the Army of the predecessor of the
Courts of Military Review.
In 1862 Congress defined duties of the Army Judge
Advocate General as Including "revision" of court-martial
records.^

In 1866 this section was reworded to read, "[t]he

Judge-Advocate-General shall receive, revise, and cause to
5Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 20H, 12 Stat. 605.
6Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, 12 Stat. 598.
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be recorded the proceedings of courts-martial,

. . .”7

The

language was retained in the Revised Statutes of I 874 as
Section 1199, the provision cited frequently in military
law controversy during and immediately after World War I.®
Before 1917 proponents of judicialization Insisted that
Congress intended Section 1199 to be authorization for the
Army Judge Advocate General to revise unsupported convic
tions already approved for execution by the field commander.
However, such positive judicial power was officially rejected.
The War Department position on Section 1199 was upheld by a
United States circuit court in 1882.^

The court determined

that in context the word "revise" meant the "discharge of
clerical duties."

Counsel for the petitioner, a military

prisoner seeking release by habeas corpus, "strenuously
contended" that Congress authorized the Judge Advocate
General to reverse court-martial verdicts.10

Thus, until

7Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 299, 14 Stat. 334.
^R.S., sec. 1199 (1874). This provision was not a
part of the Articles of War; rather, it was included in a
statutory description of the organization of the Army.

1882).

^Ex parte Mason, 256 P. 384, 387 (C.C., N.D., N.Y. ,

"It is urged that, because the statute makes it the duty
of that officer [the Judge Advocate General] to 'receive,
revise and cause to be recorded the proceedings of all
courts-martial,' the power to reverse is to be implied.
It is not reasonable to suppose that the exercise of
such an important power would be conferred in vague and
doubtful terms, or that it lurks behind the word ’revise.1"
10A similar conclusion was argued at Senate hearings
in 1919.
Subcommittee Hearings on S. 64 (1919). The prin
cipal drafter of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and a
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1920 the task of the few lawyers In the Army was merely to
advise the confirming authority, most commonly the field
commander, on legal sufficiency of convictions.

The com

mander was not obligated to follow the recommendations.
The role of the Judge Advocate General was even more
restricted in that his opinions were recorded only in
those few cases requiring Presidential confirmation.
Typically the field commander would have ordered the sen
tence to be carried out before the trial transcript reached
the Judge Advocate General in Washington.

Thus, his only

action in "revising" the record under Section 1199 was to
recommend clemency in instances of irregularities or
injustices.

Once a case had been closed by the field com

mander and the sentence officially announced, the only
recourse in correcting errors was for the same commander
to grant clemency.

A strong-willed officer was probably

long-time authority on military law, Harvard University
Professor Edmund M. Morgan, contended that "the legislative
history of the act [section 1199] tends to show that the
Bureau of Military Justice . . . was intended to be a court
of military appeals. . . . "
"The Existing Court-Martial
System," p. 65. The same interpretation appears in Morgan,
"The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,"
Vanderbilt Law Review, 6 (February, 1953), 171. Congres
sional Globe accounts of floor consideration of the section
are inconclusive in revealing legislative Intent. The sec
tion was read but not debated prior to Senate passage and
was passed by title on a motion for the previous question
in the House.
[32] Cong. Globe 3320 and 3397-98, 37th
Cong., 2d sess., 1862. The idea of reversal of convictions
by the Bureau of Military Justice was raised by Senators
four years later in debate over reenactment of the pro
vision.
[38] Cong. Globe 3672-76, 39th Cong., 1st sess.,

1866.
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reluctant to admit his own error in approving the unfair
ness.

Clemency was of little benefit to the person already

subjected to physical punishment.
Appellate review before 1920 was characterized by
the absence of authoritative participation by any person
competent in law.

Irreparable harm could easily occur

during trial and in the commander's review, in neither, of
which a lawyer had a formal voice.

Provisions governing

post-trial review in the Army during World War I became
sources of controversy from which emerged reform legisla
tion in 1920.

Article 46 of the 1916 Articles of War

required the commander appointing a court-martial to approve
the sentence before imposing punishment.

Article 48 spec

ified certain severe punishments requiring Presidential
approval before Imposition.

However, the same Article

defined wartime exceptions to Presidential confirmation.
For present purposes, only the exception In cases of death
for the crime of mutiny is relevant.

During wartime the

commanding general of an army in the field had statutory
authority to order execution of a person convicted of
mutiny and sentenced to death.13- Early In 1918 the War
Department directed field commanders to submit all records
of courts-martial In which the death sentence was imposed
to the Judge Advocate General for review before the sen
tence was carried out.
1:l39 Stat. 600.

Still, field commanders retained
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authority to confirm 95 per cent of sentences.12
The 1918 order was the Army's reaction to heightened
criticism of military Justice following the legal but seem
ingly summary execution of several soldiers convicted of
mutiny.

Shortly after American entry into World War I in

1917* Negro soldiers assigned to Fort Sam Houston, Texas,
demonstrated riotously against alleged racial injustices
by the Army and the local community.
tried for mutiny.

Some offenders were

Although not required to do so by law,

the commanding general in seeking to ensure fairness and
legal sufficiency assigned his staff attorney to review
daily the transcript of the just-concluded proceedings.
The court-martial returned death sentences against several
defendants.

Because a state

of war existed, the

commander

was authorized under Article

of War 48 to carry out death

sentences for mutiny without

submitting the case for Presi

dential confirmation.

he had received the

Since

attorney's

daily assurance of the legality of the conviction, the com
mander ordered the executions to be conducted the morning
^2William M. Connor, "Legal Aspects of the Deter
minative Review of General Court-Martial Cases under Article
of War 50 1/2," Virginia Law Review, 31 (December, 1944),
121. The author was an Army lawyer and former member of
an Army board of review.
Connor and Major General Enoch H.
Crowder, the Army Judge Advocate General from 1911 to 1923 »
each estimated that commanders refused to follow the advice
of the Judge Advocate General in more than 3 per cent of
the cases in which modification was suggested and that the
President declined to follow such advice in 2 per cent of
the cases. Crowder, Military Justice During the W a r , pp. 9
and 49.

l\2

after completion of the trial.
A few months later at Port Bliss, Texas, several
sergeants were convicted for mutiny in disobeying an offi
cer's order which was admittedly contrary to regulations.
For complying with printed orders rather than the verbal
command, the men were sentenced by court-martial to dis
honorable discharge and imprisonment for terms ranging from
ten to twenty-five years.

Under his authority, the field

commander approved the convictions and ordered the sentences
carried out. J
When records of the Port Bliss trial reached Wash
ington, the Acting Judge Advocate General, Brigadier Gen
eral Samuel T. Ansell, endeavored to correct the injustices
by invoking Section 1199, Revised Statutes.

The case became

another phase in the long-standing conflict between Ansell
and Major General Enoch H, Crowder, the Judge Advocate Gen
eral under whom Ansell had served since 1912.

With the

declaration of war Crowder was assigned temporarily as Pro
vost Marshal General and administrator of the Selective Ser
vice System.

Ansell read "revise” in the disputed Section

1199 as enabling the Judge Advocate General to perform a
genuine appellate function.

In the Fort Bliss case Ansell

-^Accounts of these two trials are included in
several sources: Terry W. Brown, "The Crowder-Ansell Dis
pute: The Emergence of General Samuel T, Ansell," Military
Law Review, 35 (January, 1966), 7-8; Edward P. Sherman,
"The Civilianization of Military Law," Maine Law Review,
22 (1970), 15; and Connor, "Article 50 l/2," pp. 124-25*
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attempted to have the entire charge overturned.

Despite his

absence, Crowder still succeeded in having his restrictive
views of the Judge Advocate General's power endorsed by the
Secretary of War.
Although the Port Bliss sergeants lost their free
dom and the Port Sam Houston soldiers their lives, Ansell
gained the opportunity thereby to implement a form of appel
late review.

War Department General Order 7 > effective

February 1, 1918, directed field commanders to submit cases
involving a death sentence, dismissal, or dishonorable dis
charge to the Judge Advocate General before implementation.
To perform the review for legal sufficiency, Ansell organized
boards with duties "in the nature of those of appellate
tribunals"; however, opinions prepared by the boards were
merely advisory to the Judge Advocate General, who in turn
recommended disposition to the field commander.

Contro

versy existed over whether that officer was obligated to
accept the opinion from Washington.

As noted above, com

manders frequently declined to follow the Judge Advocate
General's opinion.1^

Ansell supported a much more formal

judicial examination of convictions.

He asserted that

General Order 7 was issued by the Secretary of War at
•^Opposite views on the legal effect of the Judge
Advocate General's opinion are given in: William P.
Pratcher, "Notes on the History of the Judge Advocate
General Department,." Judge Advocate General Journal, 1
(June, 1944), 5 and 11, cited in Bollman, "History of Mili
tary Justice," p. 219; and, testimony by Crowder, Subcom
mittee Hearings on S. 64 (1919) » P* 1206. See, also,
Connor, "Article 50 1/2," pp. 140-41.

Crowder's insistence to preclude Congressional investiga
tion of the Army legal system . ^
Articles of War of 1920
Despite their lack of Judicial power, the Ansellappointed boards of review emphasized the need for protec
tion of the accused's right for effective conviction review.
World War I caused increased public attention to military
law and brought demands for reforms.

Most criticized was

command Influence, Including alleged abuse of post-trial
confirmation.

However, little agreement existed on the

precise revisions to accomplish desired ends.

The leading

Senate reformer, George Chamberlain of Oregon, introduced
amendments to the Articles of War late in 1918.

During

hearings on his proposals the Ansell-Crowder dispute was
raised, particularly their differing interpretations of
Section 1199*

Senator Chamberlain's amendments were not

reported to the full Committee.

At the Senator's urging

the Committee asked Ansell to draft completely revised
Articles of War.

Ansell's effort was introduced by Cham

berlain as Senate Bill 6H on which subcommittee hearings
were conducted.1^

Simultaneously, the War Department Joined

1*5
^Brown, "Crowder-Ansell Dispute," p. 8, cites
correspondence from Crowder to support the view that Gen
eral Order 7 was not issued completely to enhance Justice.
The bill was introduced in the House of Repre
sentatives by Royal Johnson of South Dakota as H.R. 367.
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with the American Bar Association in a study of the legal
system, appointed an Internal staff to do likewise, and
in addition the Secretary of War assigned Ansell to prepare
a bill.1^

Because of divergent views before the subcom

mittee, Senate Bill 64 did not advance.

Nevertheless, the

appellate review system planned by Ansell was significant
as the first attempt to remove post-trial review functions
from the field commander who Initiated the trial.
Ansell*s draft provided a common law procedure
with finality attaching upon announcement of the verdict
and sentence by the court-martial.
as a reviewer was eliminated.

The commander's role

All sentences of six months

or more confinement would be examined by a court of military
appeals, unless the convicted person waived the appellate
hearing.

The new court was to consist of three judges,

probably civilians, appointed by the President with con
firmation by the Senate.

They were to have the attributes

of other Federal judges, including the same salary and a
lifetime appointment.

Interestingly, the Ansell draft did

not specify that the judges would be civilians.

That con

clusion is reached because the bill provided that military
attorneys could be assigned temporarily to the court.
17

According to Edmund M, Morgan, the Secretary's
assignment to Ansell was "an attempt to render Ansell harm
less." "Background of the UCMJ," p. 172. The Intensity of
Ansell's criticisms of the existing Articles of War and of
procedures used in the Office of the Judge Advocate General
is evident in his article published at the time of hearings
on S. 64.
"Military Justice," pp. 1-17.
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Despite the court's judicial features, its statutory stand
ing among Federal courts was compromised by its location in
the Office of the Army Judge Advocate General.

Although

the bill pointed out that such a location was "for admin
istrative convenience only," the direct relationship with
the War Department created the possibility of infringement
on the court's independence.

Under Ansell's plan the

single appellate court would have performed all review
functions.

No .intermediate courts were to be established;

the boards of review which Ansell created were to be dis1R
continued.
Significantly, this court would have exer
cised appellate review of Army cases only; no considera
tion was given to creation of a unified judiciary for the
entire military.
The War Department's study committee proposed no
comparable appellate tribunal in its draft legislation.
Instead, the field commander as confirming authority
would grant a new trial if he disapproved the findings or
sentence of a court-martial.

Further, the President, upon

recommendation of the Judge Advocate General, could vacate
guilty verdicts and all or part of sentences.

The Presi

dent could order a new trial or restore rights to the con
victed person.

The Departmental proposal can be interpreted

as an attempt by military traditionalists to retain control
of the legal system.

Provisions for numerous Presidential

■^S. 64, 66th Cong., 1st sess., art. 62, 1919.
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decisions gave senior military officers opportunity for
their views to gain implementation because probably only
infrequently would the President not accept War Department
recommendations.
Opposition to the abrupt change in military legal
procedures;— particularly in the commander’s role— caused
the Senate Committee on Military Affairs to abandon Senate
Bill 6*1, the Ansell

p l a n . -*-9

Consequently, the Committee

endeavored to compromise diverse proposals to accomplish
at least the most essential reforms of the Articles of War.
The revised bill was brought'directly to the floor and
approved as an amendment to a House-passed Army reorganiza
tion bill.

The section on appellate review, Article 50 1/2,

was the only portion discussed extensively during floor con
sideration.

Senator Chamberlain described Article 50 1/2 as

the gist of the whole proposed amended Articles of War,
because it gives to the proposed board of review and to
the Judge Advocate General powers which the Judge Advo
cate General claims he has not heretofore had and which,
it seemed to me and to the committee, are absolutely
essential to do full Justice to men convicted by courtmartial. 20
The principal feature of Article 50 1/2 was creation
of a board of review, the first statutorily established
^ F o r quotations of statements in opposition to
the Ansell draft, see, Sherman, "Civillanization of Mili
tary Law," pp. 25-26. For example, the legal scholar. John
Henry Wigmore, asserted:
"The prime object of military
organization is Victory, not Justice."
2059 Cong. Rec. 5844 (1920).
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panel to determine legal sufficiency of court-martial con
victions.21

The Army Judge Advocate General was directed

to organize in his office a board of three or more mili
tary lawyers.

The board was to examine mandatorily two

categories of general courts-martial:

those requiring

Presidential confirmation (sentences involving a general
officer, dismissal of an officer, or the death penalty,
the latter with certain wartime exceptions) and those
with sentences of penitentiary confinement or dishonor
able discharges.

In cases requiring Presidential confirma

tion, questions of both law and fact were considered.

In

all other reviews the board examined only questions of
law.

For cases requiring Presidential approval, the board

submitted its written opinion to the Judge Advocate Gen
eral who, in turn, attached his own recommendations for
forwarding directly to the President.

Since final deter

mination rested with the President, opinions of the board
and of the Judge Advocate General were advisory.

Despite

this lack of finality, the Judge Advocate General ruled
that when both the board of review and he found a convic
tion unsupported the case would not be transmitted to the
21

The Senate amendment attaching the revised
Articles of War to other legislation was passed without
debate In the House. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 4l
Stat. 797- The title "board of review" was not capitalized
in the statute. Perhaps this implied that the board was
not considered a judicial Institution meriting designation
with a proper noun.

President.

Instead, the entire record would be returned to
pp
the field commander for rehearing.
The effect was to
accord to the opinion of the board of review and of the
Judge Advocate General a distinct judicial character.

In

reality, the action barred execution of a sentence, a cir
cumstance heretofore nonexistent in military

law.2^

Cases in the second category (involving confine
ment and dishonorable discharges) were examined by the
board for the purpose of recommending disposition to the
Judge Advocate General, who also reviewed the same cases.
If the board and the Judge Advocate General agreed the
record was legally sufficient, then the sentence was exe
cuted.

If both found that a conviction was unsupported,

then the verdict and sentence were vacated, and the record
was returned to the field commander for his decision on
feasibility of conducting a new trial.

If the Judge Advo

cate General did not concur with the board’s decision,
then the case was submitted to the President for disposi
tion.

Thus, the board of review could never by its own

authority cause its opinion to prevail over that of the
Judge Advocate General, yet the board opinion was not
subject to veto by the senior legal officer.
One other method existed whereby cases were heard
2?

Manual for Courts-Martial, 1928, Article of War
50 1/2, cited in Pratcher, "Appellate Review," p. 7^^Pratcher, ibid.

by the board of review.

The transcript of all remaining

general court-martial convictions, with sentences involving
fines or confinement for less than one year, were examined
by a lawyer in the Office of the Judge Advocate General.
If this officer found the conviction unsupported, the case
was sent to the board.

If the panel agreed that an Injus

tice had occurred, the procedure followed was that for
cases requiring Presidential confirmation.

Prior to its

revocation In 1949, Article 50 1/2 was amended twice with? li

out substantive effect. n

Thus, the compromise statute

enacted in reaction to World War I injustices governed
during World War II.

Inadequate power in the Army boards

of review, combined with no comparable statutory tribunal
in the Navy, led to criticism of the entire legal system
during and after World War II.
As described above, the Presidential confirmation
cases enabled the board of review to exercise broad powers
to examine questions of fact and law.

But in all other

cases— numerically the great majority— the board inter
preted Its power very narrowly.

The board and the Judge

Advocate General did not weigh evidence, judge the credi
bility of witnesses, determine controverted questions of
fact, or make inferences from testimony.2** The boards did
oil
^10

U.S.C. sec. 1522 (1946).

2^Court-Martial No. 145791 (1921) and Court-Martial
No. 192609 (1930) cited In Maurice F. Biddle, "A Brief Look
at the Air Force Boards of Review," United States Air Force
Judge Advocate General Law Review, 8 (May-June, 1966), 1 3 ,
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adopt procedures patterned after Federal appellate court
rules.

Counsel for appellant and for the Government appeared

before the board.

Formal written opinions, with dissents if

any, were prepared in all Presidential confirmation cases
and in others involving major questions of law.

The accumu

lation of opinions created a body of precedent which was
observed according to stare decisis.

However, opinions

were not published or made accessible outside the Army
headquarters.

Thus, the actual precedent value was

diminished because appellate defense counsel encountered
difficulty in researching previous board decisions.
Navy appellate procedure
Criticism of World War I Naval legal procedures
was insufficient to cause major efforts to reform the
Articles for the Government of the Navy.

Several explana

tions are possible for this lack of public attention to
the nature of legal affairs in the Navy.

Presumably a

proportionate number of injustices occurred in the Navy
as in the Army.

These instances probably did not attract

public notice because the Navy drafted fewer civilians than
did the Army.

The Navy’s regular personnel were accustomed

to summary and frequently harsh methods of discipline.

The

draftee did not adjust readily to the abrupt change from
civilian to military criminal procedure; consequently, he
was more likely to call attention to his plight than was
the full-time member of the Navy.

Additionally, the Navy

had no high-placed agitator for military law reform com
parable to the Army's General Ansell.

Articles 53 and 54

of the Navy statute provided post-trial review.

Sentences

of general courts-martial were carried out on confirmation
by the fleet commander or by the officer who convened the
trial.

As in the Articles of War, confirmation by the

President was required in sentences involving the death
penalty or dismissal of an officer.

The Secretary of the

Navy was empowered to vacate the verdict and sentence
Imposed by any of the three levels of Navy courts-martial.

P

The Secretary received recommendations on granting relief
from the Judge Advocate General after review for legal suf
ficiency and from the Bureau of Naval Personnel or the
Marine Corps Commandant after consideration of the dis
ciplinary effect of the punishment and any mitigating
circumstances.
Appellate procedures similar to those of the Navy
existed in the Disciplinary Laws of the Coast Guard.
Because of the comparatively small size of the Coast Guard,
any problems in the administration of its criminal code
attracted little public interest.

Further, during wartime

the Coast Guard operated as an element of the Navy and was
thus governed by Naval laws.

No landmark decisions in

military law through World War II were derived from Coast
Guard precedent.
2634 U.S.C. sec. 1200 (1946).

An assessment
Appellate review by authentic judicial institutions
did not exist during the first 175 years of the organiza
tion of the American military.

This survey of the legal

history through World War II has revealed only one statutory
advance along the continuum of judiclalization.

Boards of

review created by the Articles of War of 1920 were not judi
cial tribunals; nevertheless, the boards did represent a
recognition by Congress of the need for formal appellate
review In the military criminal law system.

In terms of

the Roscoe Pound framework, the boards performed a kind of
executive adjudication.

Their most significant deficiency

was the absence of power to rule with finality.

The court

of military appeals proposed in Senate Bill 64 by General
Ansell Is further evidence of an awareness of the need for
judiclalization and of a commitment by reformers to develop
remedies.

If enacted as written, Senate Bill 64 would have

moved the military legal system toward judicial adjudica
tion.

But as was to occur in future reform efforts, com

promise reduced the degree of advancement.

Another war in

which millions of nonprofessional military members were
subjected to administrative adjudication was required to
rouse Congress sufficiently to enact reforms.

The appel

late system proposed and, in part, Instituted by General
Ansell served as a model for what became the United States
Court of Military Appeals and the Courts of Military Review.

I

CHAPTER IV
JUDICIALIZATION IN THE UNIFORM CODE
During World War II approximately 16 million Ameri
cans In the armed forces were governed by military legal
systems only slightly different from those prevailing in
every prior war.

The more than 1.7 million courts-martial

resulted In a conviction rate of almost 90 per cent and
imposition of punishments, including 141 executions, com
monly more severe than those for comparable crimes in a
civilian jurisdiction.

In the Army approximately 90,000

persons were convicted by general court-martial.

The

harshness of punishments is indicated by two statistics:
Army boards of review recommended sentence reduction In
75 per cent of the cases examined; and a special War Depart
ment clemency board, headed by retired Justice Owen J.
Roberts of the United States Supreme Court, reduced sen
tences in more than 85 per cent of the 25*000 cases con
sidered.1

The informal administrative examination of trial

R o b e r t J. White, "The Uniform Code of Military
Justice: The Background and The Problem," St.. John's Law
Review, 35 (May, 1961), 20.0; and, testimony by Under Secre
tary of War Kenneth C. Royall in U.S., Congress, House,
Committee on Armed Services, To Amend the Articles of War
to Improve the Administration of Military Justice, To
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records in the Department of the Navy did not yield as
great a rate of reduction of trial court sentences.

The

review procedure in the Office of the Judge Advocate Gen
eral resulted in full reversal of convictions in only
0.21 per cent of the cases considered in Fiscal 1945.2
Even before the end of the war both the Navy and
War Departments reacted to growing criticism of military
legal affairs.

Internal opposition came not only from

persons directly affected by the unfamiliar systems but
also from attorneys and jurists whose wartime service was
in administering the two criminal law statutes. With the
increasingly widespread effect of trials as the war con
tinued, Congressional and public complaints heightened.
The Navy In 1943 and the Army In 1944 began the first of
Provide for More Effective Appellate Review, To Insure the
Equalization of Sentences , and for Other Purposes, Hearings,
before a subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, on H.R. 3575, 80th Cong., 1st
sess., 1947, [Committee Paper No. 125], P* 1916. A summary
of statistics was cited by Representative Carl Vinson of
Georgia In House floor debate on the Uniform Code. 95 Cong.
Rec. 5724 (1949). For additional data on World War II
courts-martial, see, Delmar Karlen and Louis H. Pepper,
"The Scope of Military Justice," Journal of Criminal Law,
Criminology, and Police Science, 43 (September-October,
1952), 285-98; and, Austin H. MacCormick and Victor H.
Evjen, "Statistical Study of 24,000 Military Prisoners,"
Federal Probation, 10 (April-June, 1946), 6-11.
2Statlstlcs cited, without contradiction, by John J.
Finn representing the American Legion in U.S., Congress,
House, Committee on Armed Services, Uniform Code of Military
Justice, Hearings, before a subcommittee of the Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives, on H.R. 2498, 8lst
Cong., 1st sess., 1949, [Committee Paper No. 37], P. 681.
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many investigations of the criminal Justice problem.

Prom

this research, the Administration in 1947 proposed amend
ments to the Army and Navy statutes.

Only the Army reforms

were enacted; the Navy proposals fell victim to Congres
sional demands for a unified legal code.

The related

objectives in the proposed amendments were creation of
effective appellate review procedures and elimination of
command influence in adjudication.

Wartime experience

demonstrated that the Army’s statutory boards of review
and the Navy's administrative examination of trial records
were insufficient methods of ensuring justice to the con
victed serviceman.

The chief deficiencies were lack of

finality in board decisions and absence of authority to
consider errors of fact in both services' review systems.
These shortcomings, in turn, created the opportunity for
improper actions by individual commanders.
The period 1946 through 1950 brought the greatest
concentration of executive and legislative action on mili
tary law in the nation's history.

The major events were

a Congressional inquiry into adequacy of the legal systems,
Administration amendments to the Navy and Army statutes,
enactment of the Articles of War of 1948, and preparation
and enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice of
1950.

The product of these actions was the first military

appellate tribunals with any degree of judicial independence.
Because of the significance of this five-year period in the
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history of American military law, the actions will be
analyzed in detail under the following topics:

background

of reforms, the Navy amendments, the Army amendments and
the Articles of War of 19*18, and the enactment of the Uni
form Code.

Provisions of the 1950 act relating to appel

late institutions and procedures will be evaluated in depth
because they continue to exist.
Background of reforms
In the atmosphere of widespread dissatisfaction with
the wartime administration of the military criminal systems,
numerous governmental and private study groups recommended
revision of the statutes.

Particularly significant was the

report of a special subcommittee of the House Committee on
Military Affairs.3

Because separate committees still existed

for cognizance of the Army and the Navy, the panel examined
Army problems only,

Its first two proposals centered on

increasing the effectiveness of appellate procedures.

The

Representatives did not urge the judicial enhancement of
the boards of review; rather, they recommended that "the
Judge Advocate General's Department be vested with judicial
power It does not now possess."

Such phrasing implied com

mittee concurrence in the essentially executive, instead of
o
JU.S., Congress, House, Judicial System, United
States Army, H. Rept. 2722,. pursuant to H. Res. 20, 79th
Cong., 2d sess., 19*16.
^Ibld., p . 1.
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judicial, review of court-martial convictions.

An important

change suggested by the panel was the elimination of the
field commander from any post-trial review.

Confirmation

of the verdict and sentence was to be the responsibility
of the Judge Advocate General's Department exclusively.
The legislators did not specify if confirming power would
exist in the board of review.

In all likelihood existing

arrangements under Article 50 1/2 would be retained with
the Judge Advocate General and the boards sharing power
in final confirmations.

Under the proposals the boards

possessed authority to examine facts as well as law in all
convictions resulting In confinement for more than six
m o n t h s . L e g i s l a t i o n based on the report was introduced
in the House in 19^6, but no hearings were conducted.
The House report added impact to growing demands
for military law reform expressed by privately sponsored
groups.

Positions on the merits of amendments were taken

by the American Bar Association, many state and local bars,
the principal veterans organizations, and ad hoc public
interest groups.

Very few of these recommendations were

significant advances toward judiclalization of the military
legal systems.

Similarly, only a few advocated unification

of the criminal statutes into a single code to apply to all
services, although In 19^6-19^7 emphasis was developing for
a form of consolidation under the forerunner of the
5Ibid., pp. 1-3-
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Department of Defense.

The military leadership also per

sisted in retaining separate legal systems by preparing
amendments to existing statutes rather than attempting to
merge the laws.

No effort was made even to standardize

common procedures or descriptive titles.

This failure of

the services to work toward a uniform statute almost pre
vented enactment of any reform in 19^8.
The Navy amendments
The Administration endorsed the separate legisla
tive programs of the Navy and Army for updating their indi
vidual criminal statutes.

The Army's proposals were

received earlier than those of the Navy by the newly
reorganized House Armed Services Committee, a product of
the movement toward military unification.

Despite the

continuing Administration support for separate statutes,
the chairman of the House subcommittee, Charles H. Elston
of Ohio, expressed hope that "we will be able to write
some legislation applicable to both the Army and Navy, so
that the entire system within those branches may be
revised."

However, two months later during consideration

by the full Armed Services Committee of the Army legisla
tion Representative Elston acknowledged the complexity of
merging the two quite diverse statutes.?

The task was

^Subcommittee Hearings on H.R. 2575 (19^7), p. 1903.
^"We thought for a time we might consider both the
Navy and the Army bills together, but after finishing
the Army bill and receiving the Navy bill from the Navy
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indeed formidable and was accomplished only after six months
of intensive work by a Department of Defense task force and
after lengthy hearings in both the House and Senate. .
Although the amendments to the Articles for the
Government of the Navy were never enacted, the proposals
merit examination here because of the progressive reforms
advanced.

As described above, appellate review in the Navy

before 1951 was organized and conducted entirely adminis
tratively.

All general court-martial cases were submitted

to the Office of the Judge Advocate General for examination
initially by a legal specialist officer.

Cases involving

controversial issues of law or fact and one in which the
reviewing officer doubted the legal sufficiency were
referred to a board of review.

The board was a randomly

selected panel of lawyers from the Department headquarters.
The assumption was that their collective experience and
Judgment would ensure a higher degree of justice than if
the questionable case were evaluated solely by one officer.
The board's recommendations were not binding upon the Judge
Advocate General, whose opinion was in turn merely advisory
to the Secretary of the Navy.

The Cabinet official ruled

Department, we came to the conclusion that the situa
tion was so' entirely different in the two Departments
that we better proceed with the Army bill and take up
the Navy bill at a later date,"
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
gull Committee Hearings on H.R. 77** and H.R. 2575, Hearings,
before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Represen
tatives, on H.R. 2575, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 19^7 [Com
mittee Paper No. 177]a p. *J160.
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finally on legal sufficiency and appropriateness of punish
ment .®
Under the Navy’s plan, po3t-trial authority of the
field commander was to be reduced significantly in general
courts-martial.

In contrast, authoritative judicial tasks

of the Office of the Judge Advocate General were to be
9
increased.
The field commander was to review the trial
records for the single purpose of granting clemency.

All

legal evaluation was to be performed by qualified lawyers
in Washington.

Two boards appointed by the Secretary of

the Navy were to have full power to set aside all or part
of the verdict and sentence of any court-martial.

A board

of appeals was to examine trials upon petition by the con
victed person.

The board was to function as an element of

the Secretary’s office.

Number and qualification of board

members were not specified In the bill; however, a member
of the drafting panel wrote that the board was intended to
"have as members civilians, or officers, or both" and that
"three [members] are contemplated."10

The second board

^Robert S. Pasley, Jr., and Felix E. Larkin, "The
Navy Court-Martial: Proposals for Its Reform," Cornell
Law Quarterly, 33 (November, 1947), 223.
9u.S., Congress, Senate, A Bill To Amend the
Articles for the Government of the Navy To Improve the
Administration of Naval Justice, S. Y 33F, 8Qth Cong..1s t
sess., 1947. The same bill was introduced in the House as
H.R. 3687. Appellate matters were in Article 39* sections
(e) through (h).
■^James Snedeker, "Developments in the Law of Naval
Justice," Notre Dame Lawyer, 23 (November, 1947), 27.
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was to hear petitions for clemency; it was to possess inde
pendent power to remitj mitigate, or commute the sentence
imposed by any Navy court-martial.

Appointed by the Secre

tary, its members were not designated in the bill by number
or qualifications.
The significant feature of the Navy appellate system
was independence of the board of appeals from the adminis
trative military organization.

The bill specifically pro

vided that the appellate tribunal would "serve in his [the
Secretary’s] office."

In contrast, the existing board of

review in the War Department was appointed by and subordinate
to the Judge Advocate General.

Unfortunately for the cause

of Independence of appellate tribunals, the Navy bill was
not enacted to serve as a statutory precedent for future
legislation.

The present Courts of Military Review are

components of the command structure of the Office of the
Judge Advocate General in each service, thereby providing
an opportunity for compromise of their judicial character.
Timing rather than merits caused the failure of
the Navy amendments in 19*17.

The House-passed Army legis

lation encountered considerable opposition from Senators
insistent upon development of a uniform code.

In reaction

to this demand the Department of Defense agreed to begin
drafting such legislation.

Consequently, the House Armed

Services Committee did not conduct hearings on the proposed
amendments to the Articles for the Government of the Navy.
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The Army amendments
The Army's proposed amendments to the Articles of
War contained few of the guarantees of independence for
11

appellate panels present in the Navy bill. ^

The Admin

istration plan was a deliberate compromise between the
advocates of continued military control of the legal system
and the reformers, principally outside the Department,
urging infusion of civilian procedures.

Consequently, the

revisions were only a slight advance toward Judicialization.

The Department's position in endeavoring to counter

public criticism of its handling of legal administration
was outlined in an article by the Under Secretary of War
published at the time of the House subcommittee hearings
on the Army amendments.

The civilian official praised the

quality of appellate procedures under the existing Articles
of War and described processes in the Office of the Judge
Advocate General as being "as thorough and efficient as
the appellate process of the civil courts."12

He asserted

that "there has been little, if any, criticism of this
part of the military Justice process."

Among the reasons

cited for the efficiency of the boards of review was that
11H.R. 2575* 80th Cong., 1st sess., 19^7*
Article 50 contained provisions for appellate review. For
the first time in statutes the titles "Board of Review"
and "Judicial Council" were capitalized. Nevertheless,
the Boards attained little new stature with their name.
12Kenneth C. Royall, "Revision of the Military
Justice Process as Proposed by the War Department," Vir
ginia Law Review, 33 (May, 19^7), 269-88.
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"officers carefully selected on the basis of legal skill,
training and judicial experience" performed appellate
functions.

They were described as "entirely independent

and . . . not subject to superior influences or pressure
intended to affect their judgment.

The Department pro

posed to "perpetuate and strengthen" the appellate review
system created in the highly complex Article 50 1/2.

The

1947 amendments were in the tradition of Major General
Crowder in the comparable debate in 1919-1920.
The key feature of the Army plan was the continua
tion of the Judge Advocate General's power to rule with
finality in practically all cases and the corresponding
advisory role for the Boards of Review.

Appellate pro

cedure was complicated by the insertion of a Judicial
Council between the existing Boards and the Judge Advo
cate General.

A critical interpretation is that the War

Department sought to create a new appellate level to pre
clude establishment by Congress of a civilian appeals
court as was being urged by many interest groups.

Offi

cial justification for the new panel of officers, who
were to hold the grade of brigadier general, was centrali
zation of the confirmation function for the majority of
general court-martial cases.

The new Council held con

firming power essentially in all circumstances, except
•^Ibid., pp. 280-81. The same members of the
Army Boards were not so highly complimented by the Judge
Advocate General in testimony to a House committee. See,
below, p. 74.
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in courts-martial involving the death penalty or trial of a
general officer.

However, the Judge Advocate General still

was required to concur in the Council’s opinions.

Dis

agreements were referred to the Secretary of War for final
disposition.^
The Boards of Review, with members ranging in grade
from captain through colonel, had no final confirmation
power.

The reasoning for such policy was explained in the

House subcommittee hearings by the Assistant Judge Advo
cate General.

"It is not intended that the confirming

power be exercised by these boards of review.
heavy a responsibility.

It is too

The confirming power must be

lodged In a small body which can be made responsible for
what it does.''^-^

This statement reveals the lack of judi

cial character of the Boards of Review.

The Boards’ task

was essentially the administrative sorting of cases by
legal sufficiency for future consideration by the pre
sumably more mature and qualified lawyers of the Judicial
Council and by the Judge Advocate General himself.

Under

the Army legislation the only new powers granted to the
■^In criticizing the complicated appellate struc
ture In the Army plan, Edmund M. Morgan, the principal
drafter of the Uniform Code, wrote:
"It would not be
profitable to go into detail. It is sufficient to state
the system within the office [of the Judge Advocate General]
was elaborate and the control by military officers was almost
complete." "Background of the UCMJ," p. 181.
15

Statement of Brigadier General Hubert D. Hoover,
in Subcommittee Hearings on H.R. 2575 (1947)* p. 2070.
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Boards were the right to consider questions of fact, to
weigh evidence, and to Judge the credibility of witnesses.
Under the 1920 Articles such powers existed only in the
examination of cases for forwarding to the President.
Relatively little consideration was given to appel
late sections of the Army bill during hearings by the
House subcommittee and full committee.^

War Department

officials did not explain in detail procedures for the new
Judicial Council.

Spokesmen for two veterans organizations

criticized the appellate procedures for denying civilian
review of convictions.

One witness urged creation of an

appellate court with civilian judges appointed by the
17
President. ' The other suggested that either of two plans
be enacted:

a civilian board of appeals appointed by the

Secretary of War, or authorization for a writ of certiorari
to a Federal court of appeals by the convicted military
1 ft
p e r s o n . 0 The bill was reported without significant change
to the House in June, 1947; however, it was not voted on
•^Subcommittee Hearings on H.R. 2575 (1947) >
pp. 565-1307, passim; and, Full Committee Hearings on
H.R. 774 and H.R. 2575 (1947), PP. 4155-71. passimT
•^Statement of William A. Roberts representing
AMVETS in Subeommittee Hearings on H.R. 2575 (1947),
p. 2144.
•^Statement of Justin N. Feldman representing
the American Veterans Committee, ibid., p. 2089.
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until the following January.1^

After debate on two dates,

the House passed the amendments with few alterations, none
of which affected the substance of the appellate provi20
sions.
Appellate matters were discussed briefly during
floor action.
Meanwhile, the Senate Armed Services.Committee
took no action on either the 'Army or Navy legislation,
principally because the chairman, Chan Gurney of South
Dakota, opposed any statute applicable to one service
only.2**- On May 3* 1948, Senator Gurney wrote to Secre
tary of Defense James Forrestal urging preparation of a
uniform code of military justice, with "defense establish
ment proposals ready for the convening of the Eighty-first
Congress."

Secretary Forrestal announced on May 14, 1948,

appointment of a committee to draft the first American
statute of criminal law and procedure applicable to all
military personnel.22
IQ
^U.S., Congress, House, Amending the Articles of
War to Improve the Administration of Military Justice, To
Provide for More Effective Appellate Review. To Insure the
Equalization of Sentences, and for Other Purposes. H. Kept.
1034 to Accompany H.R. 2575, 80 th Cong., 1st sess., 1947.

2094 Cong. Rec. 157-217* passim (1948).
21
An additional reason for Senate stalling on the
Army bill was Increasing opposition by the War Department
to a provision added by the House to create a separate
Judge Advocate General's Corps. The Corps would have been
an administrative element for assignment of personnel com
parable to other professional corps.
2?

(1948).

The letters are printed in 94 Cong. Rec. 7520
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Alarmed at the prospect of Senate rejection of the
House-passed amendments to the Articles of War, Interest
groups lobbied to bring the bill directly to the Senate
floor.

House Resolution 2575 was introduced by Senator

James P. Kem of Missouri as a rider to the first peacetime
Selective Service bill.

Floor debate centered on the

supporters1 contention that no American should be drafted
without protections of military law reforms.

Senator

Gurney objected to the bill because it pertained to the
Army only and urged delay until legislation from the
Forrestal committee was received.

Advocates of immediate

reform prevailed by a five-vote majority.

The House con

curred, and revised Articles of War were enacted to become
effective February 1, 1 9 4 9 . ^

At the time confusion existed

over applicability of the new act to the Department of the
Air Force created in 1947-

Nevertheless, the Air Force

complied with the amended Articles.

The Navy and Coast

Guard continued to be governed by nineteenth century laws.
During the slightly more than two years of its
existence, the appellate system of the Army and Air Force
was not particularly distinguished.

Boards of Review and

the Judicial Council functioned essentially as administra
tive elements of the Office of the Judge Advocate General.
The Air Force did provide a judicial attribute to its tri
bunals by publishing Council and Board opinions in a
23Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 635.
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reporter series similar to those, for Federal and state
courts.22*

Only a week after the effective date of the

19^8 amendments, legislation was introduced to repeal all
existing military law statutes.
Enactment of the Uniform Code
The new criminal code to govern all military per
sonnel was prepared in a six-month drafting project headed
by Edmund M. Morgan, a Harvard University law professor and
supporter of military law reforms initiated in 1919-1920 by
26
Brigadier General Ansell.
Defense Secretary Forrestal
undoubtedly knew of and, at least, did not oppose Morgan's
frequently expressed criticism of military law.

Appoint

ment to direct the drafting committee gave Morgan the
opportunity to advance authoritatively his concept of
judicialization of the legal system.

Similar reform views

were held by another influential member of the committee,
Felix E. Larkin, the panel executive secretary who had
participated in inquiries into the Naval legal system in
24u.S., Department of the Air Force, Court-Martial
Reports of the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force:
Holdings and Opinions of the Judge Advocate General, Judi
cial Council, and Boards of'Review, Vols. 1-4.
25h.R. 2^98 and S. 857, 8lst Cong., 1st sess., 19^9.
Biographical data on Morgan are contained in
Arthur E. Sutherland, "Edmund Morris Morgan: LawyerProfessor, Citizen-Soldier," Military Law Review, 28
(April, 1965), 2-6; and, Felix E. Larkin, "Professor
Edmund M. Morgan and the Drafting of the Code," ibid.,
pp. 7-11.

19^5-19-47-

As the principal Department of Defense spokes

man during Congressional hearings, Larkin influenced the
legislative history of the new code through his explana
tions of the provisions.

Other members of the drafting

team included fifteen lawyers— ten military officers and
five civilians— from the four services.
Sources for the code included recommendations from
the numerous Departmental and private groups which had
evaluated military law, particularly after World War II;
previous legislative proposals; and existing civilian and
military criminal statutes and Judicial institutions.

In

reality, the code draft contained few original provisions,
especially In appellate structure and process.

Existing

boards of review were retained and given powers to resolve
cases with finality as a genuine Intermediate appellate
court.

Previously the boards' decisions were subject to

confirmation by another authority.

A counterpart of Gen

eral Ansell's civilian appeals court was organized as a
single tribunal of last resort on questions of law.
As Introduced, and passed with only minor amend
ment, the appellate system for all services consisted of
three p h a s e s . First, the field commander who convened
the court-martial reviewed the trial results on points of
^Articles 64, 66, and 67 of the bill provided
elements of the appellate process. The drafting committee
reversed the capitalization style of the 1948 Articles and
printed the title "board of review" In lower case letters.
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both law and fact.

This officer could approve verdicts and

sentences he determined justified.

Second, all but minor

cases were examined by a board of review in the Office of
the Judge Advocate General.

The board corresponded to that

previously organized in the Army, with the addition of judi
cial powers to rule finally on all questions of fact.

Third,

the most significant and controversial cases could be
reviewed further by the new civilian appellate court for
errors of law.

Practically all cases before the new tri

bunal would reach it through the court's granting of
petitions by appellants.

The Judge Advocates General

could certify cases to the highest court after a board of
review decision, and designated categories of cases would
be heard automatically.
Hearings on the code legislation produced little
information on the decision-making process in the Morgan
committee.

It is known that initially the Army and Navy

each insisted on retaining existing appellate procedures.
Since the two approaches were opposite In degree of for
mality, the Morgan panel endeavored to compromise on what
was described as "useful and practical for all services
and . . . consonant with the plan of unification." Morgan
testified that the committee unanimously created boards of
review within each armed service in preference to a single
intermediate appellate body to adjudicate cases from all
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services. °

However, he did not explain the committee's

reasoning in reaching the decision.

The legislation as

introduced omitted, probably intentionally, details of the
civilian appellate court.

The tribunal was originally

called the Judicial Council, as was the panel of three
general officers established by the 1948 Articles of War.
No provision was made in the draft for tenure for the judges
or for Senate confirmation of their Presidential appoint
ment.

The House subcommittee changed the name to the

Court of Military Appeals, added Senate confirmation, and
provided lifetime tenure.
The Morgan committee’s plan for operation of the
boards of review was contained in Article 66 of the draft.
Because the substance of the plan was enacted and continues
in effect, a detailed analysis thereof is appropriate.
Each Judge Advocate General was directed to con
stitute in his office one or more boards of review.

This

language coincides with that in the 1920 and 1948 Articles
of War.

As will be examined below, the boards of review

were created without any relationship to the Federal judi
ciary.

This matter was never considered by the Morgan com

mittee— a conclusion based on the absence of any reference
to relationships in House and Senate hearings and in
28u.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Ser
vices, Uniform Code of Military Justice, Hearings, before
a subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Senate,
on S. 857 and H.R. 4o8o, 8lst Cong., 1st sess., 1949,
pp. 36 and 42.

73
publications by committee participants.

The number of

boards was to be determined by the Judge Advocate General,
presumably based on case load.

Significantly, the boards

within each service and among the four services were organ
ized entirely independently of each other.

There was no

statutory method for coordination and development of con
sistent interpretations of law.

Because of this fragmenta

tion, the boards were created with a significant nonjudi
cial image.

No procedure was Included in the draft to

enable eri banc hearings by the separate boards of a mili
tary department.
Membership on each board was specified as not less
than three officers or civilians.

For the first time in

statute, qualifications were prescribed— each member must
be admitted to the bar of a Federal court or of the highest
court of a state.

Other appointment criteria were omitted,

thus adding administrative discretion to the Judge Advocate
General.

No characteristics of a civilian judgeship, such

as judicial title or designated tenure, were specified.
More importantly, each military board member remained a
subordinate in the command structure.

His performance in

judicial duties was rated by his military superior, fre
quently the senior officer on the three-man panel.

Periodic

ratings provided the basis for promotion and desirable
assignments.

Because a junior member was dependent upon

his immediate superior for favorable ratings, conceivably

the member's judicial options could be restricted.

He

might refrain from active dissent from the opinions of
the senior member.

This potential compromise of the inde

pendence of board members was not discussed in Congres
sional hearings.

The provision for civilian membership

was included in the Morgan committee draft at the request
of the Coast Guard.

The Navy urged that authority to

appoint civilian attorneys should be unrestricted by armed
20
service.
The apparently low regard in which members of
the early boards of review were held is evident in dis
dainful remarks by the Army Judge Advocate General.

In

opposing the right of boards to rule with finality on
questions of fact, Major General Thomas H. Green commented,
"I believe it unwise to entrust such sweeping powers to
such relatively young officers or civilian employees (as
authorized by the code).

I must use younger officers on

these boards, because I can't concentrate all my older and
wiser heads in Washington."3°

Presumably, such a remark

would not have been made if senior officers considered
board members as counterparts of civilian appellate judges.
Further, the military traditionalists probably thought the
boards to be administrative case-sorting panels in the 1918
tradition.
Jurisdiction of the boards Included all cases in
^ Subcommittee Hearings on H.R. 2498 (1949), p. 1189.
3°Subcommittee Hearings on S. 857 (1949), p. 259.

which the sentence, as approved by the officer who convened
the trial, prescribed confinement of more than one year, a
bad conduct or dishonorable discharge, or affected a gen
eral or flag officer.

The board had authority to affirm

guilty verdicts and sentences as it found supported in law
and fact.

For example, a defendant might have been con

victed of murder and .sentenced to life imprisonment; how
ever, the board could determine that all the elements of
proof to sustain a murder conviction were not met.

If suf

ficient evidence were introduced at the trial to warrant a
manslaughter conviction, then the board could rule that a
guilty verdict was justified on that lesser charge and
could assess an appropriate sentence.

If evidence pre

sented at the trial was Insufficient to sustain any charge,
the board was obligated to dismiss the entire matter.

As

in the 19^8 Articles of War, the board was authorized to
weigh evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, and deter
mine controverted questions of fact.

All these actions

were final upon the board's action; concurrence by the
Judge Advocate General was unnecessary.

Reversal of a

board decision could occur only in those cases success
fully appealed or certified to the highest court, the
Court of Military Appeals.31
The Morgan draft authorized the Judge Advocate
General, within ten days following a board decision, to
^ l O U.S.C. sec. 867 (1970).
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refer the case for reconsideration to the same or another
board.

This portion of the appellate plan attracted the

most opposition from nonmilitary witnesses at Congressional
hearings.

The authority was included in the legislation to

permit an additional evaluation of a controversial question
of fact.

Since only questions of law could be examined by

the Court of Military Appeals, the drafters sought to pro
vide for further examination of facts.

Critics insisted

that the Judge Advocate General could "shop around" until
he found a board which would give the decision he wanted.
"[T]his provision destroys the Independence and integrity
of boards of review and . . . should be stricken," a bar
association spokesman told the House subcommittee.32
Representatives did delete the subsection.33

The

Nevertheless,

the Army and Navy Judge Advocates General tried unsuccess
fully in both House and Senate committees to have the pro
vision reinstated in somewhat revised form.34

Unless

further consideration by the Court of Military Appeals or
the President were necessary, decisions of the boards of
review were sent to the field commander for imposition of
the sentence.

If the board ordered a rehearing, the local

32Statement of Richard H. Weis, representing New
York County Lawyers Association, Subcommittee Hearings on
H.R. 2498 (1949), p. 642.
33ibid., pp. 1191-1207, passim.
3^lbid., pp. 1303-07, passim; and, Subcommittee
Hearings on S. 857 (1949), pp. 285-67.
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commander had the opportunity to determine if a new trial
were feasible.

If not, his only act was to dismiss all

charges.
Administrative subordination of the boards was
evident in the final paragraph of Article 66.

The Judge

Advocates General were directed to prescribe uniform rules
of procedure for the boards.

This function is performed

by judges themselves in many civilian jurisdictions.
As noted above, the relationship of the military
legal system to the Federal judiciary was not considered
in either House or Senate hearings on the code legislation.
The assumption throughout testimony was that criminal acts
by military personnel should be adjudged in a special system
of courts.

Yet, legislators and civilian witnesses often

expressed concern that the military system provide constitu
tional protections accorded defendants in the Federal
civilian jurisdiction.

The chief division of opinion among

witnesses concerned the ever-present problem of balancing
justice and discipline.

Persons with a strong traditionalist

military orientation urged deletion of proposed restrictions
on the Individual commander's hitherto broad discretion in
administering the court-martial process.

Spokesmen for

civilian legal groups typically argued that elimination of
command control and Influence was the highest priority
reform.

Chairman Morgan of the drafting panel explained

his belief that the boards of review with their increased

powers "to handle law, fact and sentence , . . eliminated
a great part of the evils of command control."35

Conversely,

the Army Judge Advocate General and the chief of the
National Guard Bureau decried the loss of the commander’s
disciplinary power.

"This makes possible an unwarranted

invasion of the command prerogative and would authorize
the board of review to substitute its judgment on military
policy for that of the commander in the field," complained
the Army's chief legal officer.36

The National Guard gen

eral opposed the board's "extremely wide discretionary
powers which will enable them to overrule, with or without
legal reasons, the actions of courts and of all the appoint
ing authorities." Equally objectionable to him were the
Judge Advocate General's loss of decision-making power and
the provision for civilian membership on the boards of
review . ^
A view at the opposite extreme was expressed by
Arthur J. Keeffe, a Cornell University law professor and
chairman of a 1945-1946 official study committee on Naval
legal problems.

He recommended abolition of the boards of

review in favor of a single court of civilian judges to
^ Subcommittee Hearings on S. 857 (1949), P- 45.
•^Statement of Major General Thomas H. Green,
ibid., p. 258.
37statement of Major General Kenneth F. Cramer,
Subcommittee Hearings on H.R. 2498 (1949), p. 772.

79
hear all military appeals.

His objection to the Morgan

plan was that judicial independence could not exist in
tribunals subordinate to the Judge Advocates General.
Keeffe insisted, further, that every court-martial con
viction be appealed to a civilian j u d i c i a r y . 38

Under the

uniform code the vast majority of cases would terminate
upon the decision of either the unit commander or the pre
dominately military boards of review.
As in committee, floor debate on the bill in each
house of Congress produced no normative discussion of
appellate review.

Although the legislators expressed con

cern over the opportunity for improper command influence
in the trial court, none criticized comparable potential
improprieties at the intermediate appellate level.

Pre

sumably, they did not envision any interference in the
boards' Judicial duties by the Judge Advocate General or
others in the military hierarchy.

There were no calls

for the boards to be independent of military control and
38lbld., p. 84l. Keeffe's arguments against the
code were expressed vigorously in a legal periodical article
published in the Pall of 1949, the period between favorable
reporting of the bill by the Senate Armed Services Committee
and consideration of the legislation by the Senate. In the
article Keeffe made clear his objective of creating suffi
cient doubt about the desirability of the new statute to
cause its defeat on the Senate floor. Keeffe and Morton
Moskin, "Codified Military Injustice: An Analysis of the
Defects In the New Uniform Code of Military Justice," Cor
nell Law Quarterly, 35 (Fall, 1949)* 151-70. During the
final floor debate Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon Included
the full text of the article in his speech opposing por
tions of the legislation.
96 Cong. Rec. 1430 (1950).

8o
influence.39
A few Senators attempted to defeat, or amend exten
sively, the bill once it reached the floor.

When intro

duced in February, 1949, the bill was referred without
objection to the Committee on Armed Services.

On June 19,

19^9* that Committee reported the bill favorably, and it
was made the order of business on June 21, 1949.

However,'

Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon objected, and the bill was
deferred.

Similar parliamentary delays occurred on Sep

tember 27 and October 17, 1949.

Morse's objections were

based on his contention that the bill as offered contained
insufficient reforms to eliminate biased command control.
Morse expressed many of the same objections previously
argued by Cornell Professor Keeffe.

Meanwhile, the chair

man of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Pat McCarran of
Nevada, attempted to persuade the chairman of the Armed
Services Committee to agree to assign the bill to Judi
ciary for additional hearings.

Senator Millard Tydings of

39After completion of hearings on H.R. 2498, the
House subcommittee incorporated all amendments into a new
text numbered H.R. 4080, under which the legislation was
enacted.
Relevant documents are:
U.S., Congress, House,
Uniform Code of Military Justice, H. Rept. 491 To Aceompany H.R. 4080, 8lst Cong., 1st sess., 1949i Senate, Estab
lishing a Uniform Code of Military Justice, S . Rept. 486
To Accompany H.R. 4o8o,. 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949; and,
House, Uniform Code of Military Justice, Conference Report,
H. Rept” 1946 To Accompany H.R. 40fJ0, 8lst Cong., 2d sess.,
1950. The House passed the bill on May 5, 1949, 95 Cong.
Rec. 5719-44. The Senate, passed the bill on February 3 ,
1950, 9 6 Cong. Rec. 1353-70, 1412-17, and 1430-46. Effec
tive date of the legislation was May 31, 1951-
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Maryland, the Armed Services head, refused; seven months
later the full Senate sustained his action.

This dispute

arose principally as a Jurisdictional struggle between the
two committees.

McCarran contended that the uniform code

was a criminal statute and, therefore, should be heard by
the .Judiciary Committee, a panel probably less willing to
ratify Department of Defense proposals as was the Armed
Services Committee.
Senate action on the legislation was not delayed
appreciably by the only floor amendments presented to the
bill.

Senator Charles W. Tobey of New Hampshire was

defeated in his efforts to restore military domination of
the legal system.

In appellate matters, the Tobey amend

ments would have applied the review system of the 1948
Articles of War to all the armed services and would have
authorized the Judge Advocates General to certify to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum
bia cases involving varying interpretations of law by
boards of review and Judicial

c o u n c i l s .

The only significant dispute between the two houses
on appellate provisions was resolved to the detriment of
the new Court of Military Appeals.

The House approved

life tenure for the three civilian Judges; the Senate sub
committee reduced the term to eight years.

The conference

committee compromised on fifteen-year terms, thus depriving
1,096 Cong. Rec. 1303 (1950).
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the highest military court of an essential attribute of a
true Federal court.

Less-than-lifetlme appointment of

judges has prevented inclusion of the Court of Military
Appeals in the Article III judiciary.
An assessment
The Uniform Code of Military Justice was indeed
a compromise.

For the civilian reformers, the new text

provided insufficient restrictions on command influence.
For the military conservative, the Code destroyed the
field commander's rightful prerogatives in exercising
discipline.

A typical compromise view was expressed by

Representative Overton Brooks of Louisiana, chairman of
the subcommittee which considered the Morgan panel draft.
"The Code is not perfect; but it does represent a long
step forward in the slow and painful process of estab
lishing uniform and well-ordered justice throughout the
Armed Forces."^1

Presumably the legislation reflected

the collective judgment of the Morgan panel members on
the extent of revision of existing statutes which could
Letter from Representative Brooks to Percy N.
Browne, Shreveport, Louisiana, April 8, 1950, in Brooks
Collection, Archives, Library of Louisiana State Univer
sity, Baton Rouge. Other relevant materials are a letter
from Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, October 27, 19^9*
commending Representative Brooks on his subcommittee's work
on the Code; a second letter from Secretary Johnson, May 11,
1950, on the occasion of President Truman's signing the
Code into law; and a reply from Secretary of Defense
George C, Marshall, May 10, 1951 > to Brooks' inquiry about
Department preparations to Implement the Code. None of the
Brooks speeches in the Collection pertains to the Code.
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be expected to gain Congressional approval.

The framers

of the bill apparently believed that any significant depar
ture from previously accepted methods and institutions
would be rejected.

Certainly the opinion of many indi

vidual military officials was against extensive reform,
although their Department's policy might have been stated
in a milder manner.
Enactment of the Uniform Code did bring important
attributes of judicial adjudication to the appellate system.
Thus, the military legal system can be said to have moved
forward on the continuum of adjudicatory institutions.

The

greatest advancement was caused by the creation of boards
of review and the Court of Military Appeals to hear appeals
in serious cases.

In contrast with their predecessors,

the boards of review possessed power to decide cases with
finality.

Despite these advances, the boards did not

attain the equivalent of legislative court status.

This

next step in judlciallzation occurred with the first major
amendments to the Uniform Code in 1968, which were prompted
by continuing public discussion of the desirable balance
between discipline and justice in the military legal system.

CHAPTER V
JUDICIALIZATION IN THE AMENDED CODE
Events In the 1951-1968 period illustrate diffi
culties In the enactment of military criminal law and
procedure.

Disagreements among the armed services,

between the services and the Court of Military Appeals
judges, and within Congressional committees all prevented
major modification of the Uniform Code during the first
seventeen years of Its operation.

Eventually, persistence

of reform-minded legislators brought passage of the Mili
tary Justice Act of 1968.

As with previous twentieth-

century revisions, these amendments were enacted only
after extended study, interest group pressure, compromise,
and parliamentary maneuvers to ensure Congressional
approval.

Despite these handicaps, judieiallzatlon con

tinued during the period.

Although amendments did not

result immediately, Senate subcommittee hearings in 1962
and 1966 focused on appellate deficiencies and thereby
prompted administrative improvements.

Boards of review,

particularly in the Army, began to exhibit an awareness of
the need for judicialization.

The 1968 legislation provided

the statutory backing essential for the newly renamed

8i»
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Courts of Military Review to begin exercising judicial
independence.
Framers of the Uniform Code recognized the inevita
bility of divergent opinions on future reforms and the con
sequent delays in legislative remedies.

As a solution,

Congress directed the judges of the Court of Military Appeals
and the four armed services senior legal officers to confer
periodically on the operation of the legal system and to
report annually recommendations for amendments to the Code
to the Committees on Armed Services and to the Department
*1

secretaries.

However, the publication of a joint report

has not always produced agreement among the civilian and
military officials.

Throughout most of the first decade,

disagreement persisted over relative power of the Court of
Military Appeals and the military departments in legal
matters.

When unity of objectives did exist, concurrence

on methods was difficult to achieve.

Annual reports reveal

the extent of disagreementj in i960 a joint report was not
issued because of a very separatist policy advocated by the
Army-2

These interagency dissentions forestalled any com

prehensive, beneficial legislation, including measures to
enhance the judicial attributes of the appellate tribunals.
^lO U.S.C. sec. 867(e) (1970). The Judges, the
Judge Advocates General, and the General Counsel of the
Department of Transportation refer to themselves as the
Code Committee in their joint capacity under sec. 867(g).
2USCMA-JAG Annual Report, i960, p. 1.
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Unsuccessful amendment proposals
In 1953 the Code Committee presented seventeen
relatively noncontroverslal recommendations for amend
ment of the Uniform Code.

These same proposals were heard

regularly during the ensuing fifteen years of legislative
delays.

The only significant Item affecting the boards of

review was elimination of required review of cases In
which the defendant pleaded guilty to all charges and,
further, in which he specifically waived appellate exami
nation of his trial.

Military traditionalists frequently

argued that the Uniform Code procedures caused unnecessary
delays in the disposition of cases and thereby lessened
the deterrent effect of punishments.
The 1954 joint report repeated the seventeen amend
ments; however, disagreements arose as the Navy Judge Advo
cate General in his separate report urged restoration of a
greater military dominance of the legal system.

For

example, he recommended that civilian membership on the
boards of review be restricted to the Coast Guard, thereby
eliminating civilians whom he had appointed to the Navy
boards.3

But unexplainably the same officer omitted the

anti-civilian plan in his 1955 report.**

Equally threaten

ing to the judicial character of the boards was his plan
to revoke board authority to consider appropriateness of
sentences.
3lbid., 1954, p. 46.

^Ibid., 1955, P* 26.
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These extremist proposals did not appear in a 1955
Department of Defense-prepared bill ostensibly Incorporating
the seventeen agreed-upon recommendations of the Code Com
mittee.

However, additional amendments were Included which

challenged the autonomy of the Court of Military Appeals.
Most notable was a restriction on the tribunal’s power to
accept petitions.

These portions of the bill naturally

Incurred the vigorous opposition of the Court judges.

The

tone of the dispute was expressed in a statement to. the
House subcommittee by the Navy Judge Advocate General.

"It

[the Uniform Code] does not allow enough authority to the
officers who are ultimately and entirely responsible for
the success of military operations.
Civilian reformers again used the forum of the
House subcommittee, chaired as in the 1949 hearings by
Representative Brooks of Louisiana, to insist on removal
of appellate tribunals from the military hierarchy.

For

example, a military law lecturer from New York University
urged that the boards be organized as a single court
appointed by the Secretary of Defense.

Each three-man

panel of the new court would include at least one civilian.^
As Department of Defense manager for House Resolution 6583,
the Office of the Judge Advocate. General of the Navy quickly
^Statement of Real* Admiral Ira H. Nunn, Subcom
mittee Hearings on H.R. 6583 (1956), p. 8448.
^Statement of Bertram Schwartz, ibid., pp. 8509-10-
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submitted to the House subcommittee position statements
opposing a liberalized role for the intermediate appellate
tribunals.

The Navy insisted that the Department of

Defense, as an organization, was not created by Congress
to perform "operational" tasks.

That is, the Secretary

and his staff were to be concerned with policy and longrange planning rather than with day-to-day decision
making in military administration.

Further, "the boards

of review form a very definite part of the disciplinejust ice arm of each armed service and should remain iden
tified with each armed service."

The Navy countered the

plan for mandatory civilian membership on the boards with
the assertion that such criteria would improperly restrict
the discretion of the Judge Advocate General.^

The same

proposals and Defense responses were repeated ten years
later during Senate consideration of methods to enhance
the independence of the military Judiciary.

In a state

ment reminiscent of that by Cornell Professor Keeffe in
19^9, a spokesman for the American Legion proposed aboli
tion of the boards of review and transfer of their task of
examining questions of fact to the Court of Military Appeals.^
Presumably because of disagreements between the armed
^"Memorandum for Subcommittee No. 1, House Committee
on Armed Services from the Office of the Judge Advocate Gen
eral, Department of the Navy, May 2, 1956," in Ibid.,
p. 8649
^Statement of John J. Finn, ibid., p. 8603-
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services and the Court of Military Appeals judges, the
House subcommittee did not report House Resolution 6583
to the full committee.

Thus, the only effort at substan

tial reform of the Uniform Code during its first decade
failed without ever having much prospect for success.
In 1959 the judges of the Court of Military
Appeals, in a very rare attempt to promote Code amend
ments, recommended consolidation of the boards of review
into a single tribunal under the Secretary of Defense.
Their comments occurred amid increasing discord among the
services and the Court, principally caused by its deci
sions limiting military command discretion in legal admin
istration.

While the object of the judges' proposal was

not new, their support definitely added prestige to the
previously expressed plan of civilian reformers.

The

recommendation was among four changes the Court advanced,
in addition to several relatively noncontroversial amend
ments supported in the Joint report, to "increase discipline,
and enhance the stature of courts-martial as truly Judi
cial forums."

In the judges' recommendation, all boards

would be merged under the Secretary of Defense, who would
appoint the members— officers and civilians— for fixed
terms.

Sitting in panels of three judges, each from a

different service, the new court would perform Intermediate
appellate review as provided in the existing Article 66 of
the Code.

The judges of the highest court explained, "This
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modification will insure greater independence and accom
plish more substantial uniformity in the application of
the Code throughout the Services, as well as in uniformity
in the sentences finally approved,"9
Omission of the civilian judges' plan from the
legislative proposals in their joint report with the mili
tary legal officers must be interpreted as evidence of
rejection by the military departments of the unifiedcourt concept.

A form of dissent was recorded even among

the three judges of the Court.

Judge George W. Latimer,

the member with the most traditionalist military viewpoint,
indicated "certain reservations" regarding consolidation
of the intermediate tribunals.10

The substance of his

dissent was not published in the 1959 report, and even
his statement of reservation was omitted with the repeat
of the unification recommendation in the i960 document.11
The only additional reference to the plan occurred in the
1962 Senate subcommittee hearings when Judge Homer Ferguson
supported a single intermediate court.

His brief remarks

were in reply to a question from the subcommittee counsel
rather than having been volunteered.12
9USCMA-JAG Annual Report, 1959, PP* 34-35*
10Ibid., p. 3 5 *

11Ibld., I960, pp. 10-11.

12u.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judi
ciary, Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, Hear
ings , before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Eights of
the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, pursuant to S. Res.
260, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, p. 197*
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The low point In relations between the Court of
Military Appeals and the Judge Advocates General occurred
in I960 as a result of publication of an Army study of the
administration of the Uniform Code.

If implemented* the

recommended plan would have transferred decision-making
authority from judicial to administrative agencies.

The

boards of review were not affected drastically in the pro
posal* perhaps because the boards had never been Indepen
dent of the Judge Advocate General's control.
were advanced:

Two changes

the previously expressed plan to eliminate

examination of cases in which the defendant pleaded guiltyj
and termination of board authority to consider appropriate
ness of sentences.

This latter function was to be assigned

to a new "sentence control board" consisting of a minimum
of five military members.

More significantly* the Army

panel directly attacked the Court of Military Appeals with
a proposal to add two judgeships with four-year terms
reserved for retired military lawyers.

Presumably* the

Army's Intent was to halt future* if not actually reverse
previous* decisions adverse to the military's exercise of
discretion In administering the legal system. ^
The Court of Military Appeals judges and the Judge
^USCMA-JAG Annual Report * I960, p. 68. The Report
of the Committee on the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
Good Order and Discipline in the Army is an attachment to
the Annual Report of the Judge Advocate General of the Army.
The i960 Annual Report is the only one ever published with
out continuous pagination.
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Advocates General reconciled their differences sufficiently
to issue in 1961 a joint report in which they divided the
previously sponsored seventeen-point omnibus bill into a
number of segments.

Several of these were enacted in the

early 1960's; however, none affected appellate procedures.
The approvals showed that Congress would consider only
those noncontroversial amendments which the Court and the
military departments sponsored jointly.

The legislators

were unwilling to force the parties to compromise on the
necessary but debatable provisions.
The Military Justice Act of 1968
The decade of disagreement over military law
revision was ended as Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., of North
Carolina and his Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
assumed the initiative in developing legislation to bring
about judicialization.

Enactment of the Military Justice

Act of 1968 is attributable to more than six years of action
and advocacy by Senator Ervin.

His chairmanship of two

subcommittee hearings, preparation and sponsorship of
legislation, and reconciliation of the feuding parties
were all essential to passage of the first comprehensive
amendments to the Uniform Code.1^

As with the 1920 and

^ S e n a t o r Ervin's account of the legislative his
tory of the 1968 amendments, is in his "The Military Jus
tice Act of 1968," Wake Forest Intramural Law Review, 5
(May, 1969), 223-43-
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1948 amendments to the Articles of War, the 1968 legisla
tion was passed through abnormal processes.

By parlia

mentary actions in the concluding days of the session,
Senator Ervin succeeded in adding to House-passed amend
ments important reforms agreed to in informal conferences
with the Department of Defense.
Prompted by public and servicemen's complaints of
injustices occurring in the administration of the Uniform
Code, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary conducted in 1962 fact
finding hearings to prepare legislation.1^

Three topics

in a pre-hearing questionnaire to the military departments
pertained to the intermediate appellate system and to
operations of the boards of review.

The principal inquiry

concerned the boards' independence.

Expectedly, all three

services gave assurances of the complete judicial freedom
of the boards.1^

The Air Force reply was typical:

"Each

board operates as a completely independent appellate body,
and in no instance has any attempt ever been made to inter
fere with or compromise the integrity or independence of
their function."17

Secondly, the subcommittee raised the

^Notably, this was the first time that military
legal matters had been considered by any Congressional
committee other than that on Armed Services. These hear
ings were permitted on a one-time basis only.
^ Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of Military
Personnel (1962), pp. 8*1*1, 907, and 942.
17Ibld., p. 942.
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issue of the personnel rating procedure used in the Army
and Air Force as a potential Infringement on the freedom
of junior board members.

Unlike the Navy, the other two

services assigned the senior member the duty of period
ically rating the other two members.

He was, in turn,

rated by the Assistant Judge Advocate General, who con
ceivably could have Improperly influenced the entire board.
This latter possibility was not discussed.

Despite denials

of any compromise of judicial freedom, the Army changed its
rating system by assigning the Assistant Judge Advocate
General responsibility for evaluating the performance and
promotion potential of all board members.

The Air Force

did not alter its procedure until the prohibition on intraboard rating was enacted in the 1968 amendments.
The third subject pertained to the previously
proposed consolidation of all boards of review.

As noted

above, Judge Ferguson of the Court of Military Appeals
endorsed merger of the boards into a genuine court under
the Secretary of Defense.

Chief Judge Robert E. Quinn

of the Court recommended that "to some extent, the boards
of review should be made into intermediate appellate courts
i ft
with substantial tenure.t,J-° A Georgetown University law
professor with experience as appellate counsel before Army
boards commented that "these boards serve no useful func
tion, as they are presently constituted, except to reduce
1®Ibid., p . 186.
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sentences."

He, too, urged consolidation of the boards

into a single court with multi-service panels of military
IQ
and civilian lawyers. ^ Navy and Air Force replies to the
subcommittee’s follow-up questionnaire dismissed as imprac
tical any merging of the appellate tribunals.

They con

tended that the uniqueness of problems, regulations, and
traditions of each service made officers of that service
the best qualified judge of its court-martial convictions.
As a result of the hearings, Senator Ervin prepared
eighteen separate bills amending the Uniform C o d e .^0

The

theme of the proposals was elimination of legal decision
making by laymen; qualified attorneys would henceforth
administer the military legal system.

Two proposals were

designed to enhance the stature and emphasise the judicial
role of the boards of review:

the title would be changed

to "Courts of Military Review" with a civilian chief judge
and each three-judge panel consisting of at least one
^statement of A. Kenneth Pye, ibid., pp. 551-52.
on

U.S., Congress, Senate, S. 2002 through S. 2019,
88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963- Identical bills were intro
duced in the House as H.R. 8565 through H.R. 8582. A few
of the bills pertained to a matter not contained in the
Uniform Code, administrative discharges under which persons
were released for various grounds of unsuitability.
Com
plaints were ,raised that such discharges were being used in
a prejudicial and discriminatory manner. For a concise
summary of the 1962 hearings and resulting bills, see,
William A. Creech, "Congress Looks to the Serviceman's
Rights," American Bar Association Journal, 49 (November,
1963), 1070-74•
Creech was the chief counsel of the sub
committee.

96
civilian and military officers serving a specified minimum
tenure, and, secondly, preparation of performance reports
on one judge by another was forbidden.

As with the

revisions initiated by the Code Committee beginning in
1954, Senator Ervin'3 first attempt at reform failed
because Congress was reluctant to reconcile divergent
positions.

The intensity of opposition to portions of

the Ervin package was demonstrated by the Army Judge Advo
cate General in his 1963 annual report.

He attacked the

plan for mandatory civilian appointment as "an unwarranted,
unsubstantiated, and undocumented attack on the integrity
and ability of Army boards of review which are and always
have been composed entirely of officers."

He attempted to

prove that "Army boards of review are vastly and clearly
superior" to Navy boards which included civilian members.
The questionable comparison was based on rates of reversal
of the two boards' decisions by the Court of Military
pi

Appeals.

During the remaining eighteen months of the Eightyeighth Congress, the bills were "subjected to intensive
study by both military and civilian experts" and "alterna
tive suggestions and revised language were submitted from
many sources," but no Congressional action occurred.22
Pi

Report of Major General Charles L. Decker in
USCMA-JAG Annual R e p o r t 1963> P- 66,
22Ervin, "The Military Justice Act," p. 225.

At
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the opening of the next Congress, the same bills were intro
duced in the House and Senate.^3

Senator Ervin explained:

Although there was no disposition to have Committee
hearings on the bills, upon my urging the Committee
Chairman agreed to appoint a special subcommittee of
the Armed Services Committee to join the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights in joint hearings on the bills,
under my chairmanship, with the understanding, of
course, that the bills could be reported to the Senate
floor only by vote of the Armed Services Committee.24
Given the pro-military predilections of the Senate Armed
Services Committee leadership, presumably the bills would
have died but for Senator Ervin's personal intervention
based on his prestige and membership on both the Armed
Services and Judiciary Committees.

In preparation for the

new series of hearings in January, 1966, the Committee
solicited formal position statements from the Defense and
Treasury Departments on each bill and obtained additional
data from a questionnaire to each service.
The two bills on appellate review were opposed by
both Defense and Treasury.2-*

The plan to require the

appointment of civilian judges drew the principal opposi
tion, ranging from the prediction that an insufficient
23S . 745 through S. 762, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965.
2^Ervin, "The Military Justice Act,." ibid.
25
U.S., Congress, Senate, A Bill to Provide Addi
tional Constitutional Protection for Members of the Armed
Forces by Establishing Courts of Military Review, and for
Other Purposes, S. 74o; and, A Bill to Insure the Fair and
Independent Review of Court-Martial Cases by Prohibiting
any Member of a Board of Review from Rating Another Member
of A Board of Review, and for Other Purposes, S. 755, 89th
Cong., 1st sess., 19o5.
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number of qualified civilians were available to fill the
one-per-panel requirement to the detrimental effect on
military morale because of the civilians' higher salary.2^
The military departments insisted that they retain the pre
rogative of appointing civilians to the intermediate tri
bunals, as authorized in the Uniform Code.

The only ele

ment of the principal bill not specifically opposed by
either Department was the change in name from boards to
Courts.

Similarly, the two Departments objected to the

bill banning intraboard rating of members as a "legisla
tive incursion into an essentially administrative function."27
No significant new proposals or arguments on the
Ervin-sponsored amendments resulted from the 1966 hearings
by the joint Judiciary and Armed Services subcommittee.

In

Pfi

Letter from the Secretary of the Air Force to
the Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 17,
1965; and, Letter from the General Counsel of the Treasury
Department to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Ser
vices, March 24, 1965, both printed in U.S., Congress,
Senate, Committee on the Judiciary and Committee on Armed
Services, Military Justice. Joint Hearings, before the Sub
committee on Constitutional Rights of theCommittee on the
Judiciary and a special subcommittee of the Committee on
Armed Services, Senate, on S. 745 through S. 762, S. 2906,
and S. 2907, 89th Cong., 2d sess., 1966, pp. 503-507.
2?Letter from the Office of the Secretary of the
Navy to the Chairman, Senate. Committee on Armed Services,
April 7, 1965; and, Letter from the General Counsel of the
Treasury to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Ser
vices, April 22, 1965, both printed in Military Justice,
Joint Hearings (1966), pp. 592-93. The Department of
Defense position on S. 748: and S. 755 was repeated by the
Department's spokesman at the hearings, Army Brigadier
General Kenneth J. Hodson, Ibid., pp. 21-22.
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many respects the sessions merely consolidated the range of
previously expressed opinions into a few major viewpoints
on the merits of the amendments.

In questioning the Navy

Judge Advocate General the Subcommittee elicited facts con
tradicting the Defense Department Justification for oppos
ing civilian membership on the boards of review.

The Navy

legal officer reported that all the dire problems raised
in the Defense position statement had not in fact developed
in the Navy's experience with mixed memberships.

He cited

no morale or personnel problems and commented that "the use
of a civilian member on these boards has been satisfacPP
tory." G The hearings produced a restatement of the mili
tary traditionalists' objections to Judicialization advo
cated by Senator Ervin and civilian interest groups.

Con

sequently, the bills died in the Eighty-ninth Congress.
Nevertheless, the proponents did not desist.

Senator Ervin

consolidated all the proposals developed over the previous
five years into a single bill, a technique used by the Code
Committee in the 1950's.2^
Defense Department supporters on the Senate Armed
Services Committee prevented action on the bill.

Recog

nizing the impossibility of dislodging the bill from the
2®Statement of Rear. Admiral Wilfred A. Hearn,
ibid., p.
2^U.S., Congress, S. 200.9 and H.R. 226, 90th Cong.,
1st sess ., 1967•
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Committee,. reformers took a new approach by introducing in
the House a bill containing only those amendments acceptable
to the military departments.^

This bill affected no por

tion of the Intermediate appellate process; the long
standing disagreements prevented appellate system amend
ments from becoming noncontroversial.

As written, the

rather innocuous bill was designed principally to increase
the participation of military lawyers in courts-martial.
It passed the House June 3, 1968.31
When the legislation arrived in the Senate, Ervin
Immediately sought to use the House-passed bill as a vehicle
for adding "the minimum reforms necessary to any meaningful
military justice legislation."32

Because he wanted to

ensure complete Defense Department support,for his amend
ments, Senator Ervin gained concurrence of the Armed Ser
vices Committee and the Department for informal negotia
tions to identify acceptable additions from those contro
versial portions of the omnibus bill omitted from the
3°u.S., Congress, House, H.R. 12705, 90th Cong.,
1st sess., 1967.
■an
J U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Ser
vices, To Amend Chapter 47 (Uniform Code of Military Jus
tice) of Title 10., United States Code, Hearings, before a
subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, on H.R. 12705, 90t.h Cong., 1st sess., 1967
[Committee Paper No. 50]; and, Full Committee Consideration
of H.R. 578*1, H.R. 15971 . . •» Hearings, before the Com
mittee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, on
H.R. 15971, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968 [Committee Paper
No. 54]; and, 114 Cong. Rec. 15804-806 (1968).
32Ervin, "The Military Justice Act," p. 226.
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House-passed legislation.

Because of the lengthy history

of opposition to significant reforms by influential Con
gressmen and by the military leadership, it is surprising
that the negotiators agreed on several important provi
sions.

In fact, Senator Ervin described the informal

process as occurring "smoothly.”33

Precise explanations

for the success of the compromise effort are unavailable;
Senator Ervin did not elaborate on the process in his pub
lished description of the passage of the legislation.

A

logical interpretation of the event is that the Department
of Defense was represented in the negotiations by a legal
officer with obviously more progressive attitudes than
those prevailing in the military leadership in previous
years.

Major General Kenneth J. Hodson, the Army Judge

Advocate General, was a proponent of judicialization and
enhancement of the stature of the military tribunals.
Presumably, he recognized the merit of the Ervin proposals
and was successful in convincing other officials of the
Department of Defense to accept the legislation.
The Armed Services Committee accepted the amend
ments written by Senator Ervin after the informal negotia
tions and reported the revised bill.

Both chambers adopted

the new language without dissent on voice vote. late, in
33Ibid., p. 224.
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October, 1968.3^

Thus, the Military Justice Act of 1968

became the first substantive amendment to the Uniform Code
as the culmination of more than fifteen years of debate
among the persons and agencies responsible for ensuring
justice to the American serviceman.^5
The informal negotiations between Senator Ervin and
the military representatives produced essentially the appel
late process changes sought in the original omnibus bill.
The main deletions were the naming of a civilian chief
judge and mandatory civilian membership on each panel of
the new Courts of Military Review.

The outcome definitely

was weighted in favor of the reformers' objectives.

Senator

Ervin characterized the legislation as significantly enhanc
ing the prestige and independence of the intermediate courts
and promoting uniformity of decision
administration.3^

and sound internal

The act was probably the greatest

degree of judicialization attainable in the circumstances.
In the amended Article 66 of

the Uniform Code the

several boards of review in each service were unified as
34U.S., Congress, Senate, Increasing the Parti
cipation of Law Officers and Counsel bn Courts-Martial,
S. Kept. 1601 To Accompany H.R. 15971* 90th Cong., 2d- sess.,
1968j and, 114 Cong. Rec. 29.392.-402 and 30561-566 (1968).
^ P u b l i c Law 90-.632, 82 Stat. 1335. Signed Octo
ber 24, 1968, the amendments: became effective August 1,
1969. For citations of the. legislative history'of each
major element of the Act,, see the Department of Defense
sectional analysis printed in 114 Cong. Rec. 30565-66 (1968).
3^Ervin, "The Military Justice Act." p. 241.
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the Court of Military Review.

The single Court was defined

as consisting of one or more panels, with each panel com
posed of not less than three appellate military judges,
the latter a new title.

The Judge Advocate General was

authorized to designate a chief judge, who would be respon
sible for organizing the Court into working panels.

A

member of each panel was to be appointed as senior judge.
In hearing appeals the Court was authorized for the first
time in statute to sit either as a whole (en banc) or In
panels.

Two new subdivisions were added to the Article.

Senator Ervin’s objections to intrapanel personnel ratings
were enacted as a prohibition on one member of the Court
preparing or In any way participating in the submission of
an efficiency report on any other member.

The other new

portion prohibited any judge of the Court from reviewing
a case In which he had participated In any official capac
ity. 37

The 1968 amendments did not affect existing juris

diction or powers of the appellate courts.
"The Military Justice Act of 1968 represents
unquestionably the most significant advance in military
justice In almost two decades."3^

Since reforms had been

advocated by various individuals and groups during most of
37i0 U.S.C. sec. 866 (1970).. Note the capitaliza
tion of the new title "Court of Military Review" which
provided a form of distinction absent in the former boards
of review.
3%rvln, "The Military Justice Act," ibid.
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that period, why did the first significant enactment occur
in 1968?

The major explanation is the persistence of

reform-minded Congressmen, principally Senator Ervin, in
continuing to sponsor legislation advantageous to Judicialization.

Unlike previous amendments to the military

legal system statutes, the 1968 act was the result of
pressure initially from within the armed services.

Indi

vidual complaints led to field investigations by the staff
of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights.

When

the validity of the accusations was determined, the Sub
committee conducted hearings in 1962 and 1966 and attempted
to advance legislation.

In the early stages of the reform

movement, external factors In American society affected the
efforts only Indirectly.

Previous laws pertaining to the

military legal systems were enacted as the aftermath of
war.

In contrast, most of the decision-making relating to

the 1968 act preceded the decline in public support for the
American military involvement in Southeast Asia.

Passage

occurred In 1968 because of the fortuitous circumstance of
the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Department of
Defense reaching agreement on a workable compromise at the
personal Initiative of an influential legislator and a
progressive military legal officer.
An assessment
The history of appellate, review in American mili
tary law illustrates the overriding fact that genuine

105
judicial Institutions to consider appeals of court-martial
convictions are alien to the military legal systems.

Courts

of appeals totally independent of the military hierarchy and
its influence have never existed.

Included in this assess

ment is the present United States Court of Military Appeals
because of its omission from the Federal judiciary.

The

Court is vulnerable to military coercion because it lacks
many of the essential attributes of a constitutional court,
principally the complete severance of all relationships
with the executive branch.

Since 19&9 the Courts of Mili

tary Review have advanced measurably toward the greatest
degree of independence possible in their statutory setting.
Judicialization has occurred at the expense of the military
unit commander's discretion in administering justice and
discipline to his subordinates.

This uneven shifting of

authority from a potentially subjective individual to a
probably objective appellate court is indeed a major break
with military tradition based on the laws of Caesar's Roman
armies.
Reformers in the 1970's seeking to accelerate the
trend toward judicialization must recognize the extreme
difficulty, under which military law has been revised.

The

first three amendments in the twentieth century were
prompted by public criticism heightened during wartime.
Even In the 1968 enactment, Congressional supporters cited
circumstances arising from the Southeast Asian conflict to
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encourage passage.

As In the approval of practically any

kind of legislation, public and interest group backing must
be consistently strong.

Particularly important is unquali

fied support by the military leadership itself.

Legisla

tive hurdles frequently can be surmounted only■through the
personal efforts of influential committee members.

In each

of the four enactments since World War X, an individual
member of Congress provided the initiative and the parlia
mentary skills necessary for enactment.

Noteworthy in

these tasks were Senator Chamberlain, Representative Elston,
Representative Brooks, and Senator Ervin.

Even with their

efforts, the four bills passed as a result of "accidents."
The 1920 Articles of War, never heard formally in committee,
were added as floor amendments to unrelated legislation.
The 1948 Articles survived in the same manner.

The 1950

Uniform Code, the only legislation enacted in the standard
procedural sequence, was saved from extensive change and
delay by a five-vote margin.

The 1968 amendments were

prepared, after fifteen years of debate and numerous hear
ings, in informal compromise sessions between a legislator
and the military.
In terms of the judicial-executive adjudication
continuum, the Military Justice Act of 1968 brought the
intermediate appellate tribunals to a mid-point in the
progression toward unquestioned judicial status.

The new

amendments, plus an accompanying expanded sense of judicial

character in the military tribunals, have moved the Courts
of Military Review to the threshold of legislative court
status.

Because of the realistic impossibility of future

judicialization through legislation exclusively, attain
ment of desired attributes probably will have to occurthrough activism by the judiciary— the Federal courts and
the five military courts.

Their decisions may bring the

military intermediate appellate tribunals to a point of
judicial equivalence faster than will Congressional enact
ments.

Recent opinions by these tribunals provide evi

dence of this trend.

CHAPTER VI
JUDICIALIZATION THROUGH JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
In enacting the Uniform Code Congress did not
definitively establish the relationship of the military
tribunals to the Federal judiciary.

As evident from the

history of military legal statutes, the ambiguity reflected
the long-standing separation of military and civilian crim
inal litigation systems.

The imprecision was a predictable

outcome of the compromise between conflicting objectives of
the traditionalist military leaders and the Increasingly
Influential civilian reformers.

Congress ignored the ques

tion of whether the Court of Military Appeals was truly a
court or merely an administrative element of the Department
of Defense.

The boards of review were placed by Implication

in the latter category because of their historical adminis
trative role.

Although lacking Congressionally conferred

judicial character, the Court of Military Appeals and two
of the four Courts of Military Review have acted Indepen
dently to assert their eligibility for Inclusion in the
judicial fraternity.

This judicial activism, beginning in

1966 and 1969, respectively,- is the only significant selfappraisal by these military tribunals.
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Thus, these opinions
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reveal much about the nature of the contemporary military
legal system.
This analysis will proceed by examining whether,
and to what extent, the military courts in question are
indeed judicial in character or whether they remain pri
marily administrative adjudicatory agencies.

"Judicial"

and "administrative" correspond to definitions of terms
used in the continuum developed by Roscoe Pound based on
judicial and executive adjudication.

Judicialization of

the five military tribunals has created variations in
placement on the continuum at any given time . ^
Administrative adjudication is performed by many
elements of the executive branch and by most of the inde
pendent regulatory commissions.

Examples are the quasi

judicial activities of the Department of Agriculture and
of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Despite similarities

•^A variant approach classifies the military legal
system as unique— not subject to placement on the continuum
of the judiciary and administrative agencies. According to
United States Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas,
"Military proceedings are different. As we said in
0 TCallihan v. Parker . . ., ’A court-martial is not
yet an Independent instrument of justice but remains
to a significant degree a specialized part of the
overall mechanism by which military discipline is
maintained.'" Parlsi v. Davidson, ^05 U.S. 3^* 51
(1972), (concurring opinion).
This same interpretation is held by the military tradition
alists who seek to develop exclusive military command con
trol over the legal system. Nevertheless, it is the posi
tion of this writer that .the. military legal tribunals can
be related to the classification pattern of judicial and
administrative institutions.
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between the adjudicatory features of these agencies and the
military legal system, the latter has never been considered
in the study of administrative law.2
Since military tribunals are assumed to be sus
ceptible to analysis in the judicial-administrative adjudi
cation continuum, the issue is then to determine the rela
tionship of the military institutions to the Federal judi
ciary.

United States courts are divided into two classes—

constitutional and legislative.3

in the former are those

courts recognised in Article III of the Constitution,
namely, the Supreme Court and the inferior courts— the
Courts of Appeals and:the District Courts.

Specialized

courts created by Congress have been the subject of contro
versy regarding their status as constitutional courts.
However, their position as orthodox Article III courts has
been assured by statutes declaring them to have been estab
lished under Article III.

These tribunals are the Court of

2The distinction between the judiciary and admin
istrative agencies is examined in American Jurisprudence,
2d ed., vol. 20. p. 387 (1965)*
^For the constitutional history of the two kinds
of courts, see Charles Alan Wright, Handbook of the Law of
Federal Courts (2d ed.; St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing
Company, 1970 and 1972 pocket, part), pp. 26-34. Concern
over the classification .of Federal courts has been depre
cated by. two political scientists who advocate a behavioral
methodology.
"[T]he distinction between a constitutional
and a legislative court is. one of the type that would have
delighted those meticulous medieval scholastics who argued
about how many angels would fit on the head of a pin."
Goldman and Jahnlge, The Federal Courts as a Political
System, p. 24.
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Customs and Patent Appeals, the Customs Court, and the
Court of Claims.

Congress can transfer a court into the

constitutional classification by giving it all the attri
butes of an Article III court, including lifetime Judicial
appointments.**
Congress can create adjudicatory institutions to
participate in the accomplishment of functions enumerated
in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.

Thus, Con

gress established legislative courts, such as the United
States Tax Court under the power "to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises" and the United States
Court of Military Appeals under the power "to make rules
for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces."

However, Congress delayed until 1968 to declare

by statute that the Court of Military Appeals was in fact
a legislative court. 5

in 1969 the Supreme Court acknowl

edged the Article I status.^

The question remains whether

the four Courts of Military Review are legislative courts.
The Supreme Court has answered indirectly in two cases in
^Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
^Public Law 90-340». 82 Stat. 178 (1968) amending
10 U.S.C. sec. 867(a). See,, below, p. 114.
6Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969). See,, below,
p. 116. Many of the problems caused by the uncertainties
of the Court of Military. Appeals as a legislative, court
were foreseen quite early -in its existence. For example,
see observations by a former, commissioner of the court.
Daniel Walker, "An Evaluation of the United States Court
of Military Appeals," Northwestern University Law Review,
48 (January-February, 1954), 714-33.
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the affirmative.^

Congress has not legislated on the subO
ject nor has the issue been raised in hearings.
The Court
of Military Appeals has stated positively that it "expresses
no opinion" on the matter.9

The Army and Air Force Courts

of Military Review have declared themselves to be legisla
tive courts.10

However, the Coast Guard Court of Military

Review has interpreted the same data used by the Army and
Air Force Courts to reach the opposite conclusion. x

The

Navy Court of Military Review has, like Congress, remained
silent.12
Judicialization of the Court
of Military Appeals
A determination of probable causes for such diver
gent opinions by three of the intermediate appellate courts
must begin with actions by the Court of Military Appeals.
Principally at the initiative of Chief Judge Quinn, the
^Noyd v. Bond, ibid., and Paris! v. Davidson, 405
U.S. 34 (1972).
^Public Law 9°-632, 82 Stat. 1341 (1968) and docu
ments associated with the Military Justice Act of 1968.
lenders on v. Wondolowski, 21 USCMA 63, 44 CMR 117
(1971).
10United States v. Draughon, 42 CMR 447 (ACMR 1970),
and, Gagnon v. United States., H2 CMR 1035 (AFCMR 1970).
11Combest v. Bender, .43 CMR 899 (CGCMR 197-1).
12No decision concerning powers of the Navy Court
has been' published in Vols. 42 through 45 of Court-Martial
Reports. Further, no disposition of miscellaneous docket
cases has been reported in the Annual Reports of the Navy
Judge Advocate General.
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Court endeavored from the date of Its creation to enhance
its image as a genuine judicial tribunal.
ing its name and location are illustrative.

Actions affect
As passed in

1950 the Uniform Code did not include the words "United
States" in the title of the Court.

Nevertheless, the

judges added the prestige-carrying words to the title and
official

seal.

^-3

The Uniform Code provided that the Court

would be "located for administrative purposes in the Depart
ment of Defense."

However, Chief Judge Quinn vigorously

opposed relationships with the Department which might com
promise the Court's independence, either in fact or in
appearance.

The judges rejected permanent accommodations

in the Pentagon in favor of a court room and chambers in a
Federal court building in downtown Washington.^

Support

for the judges' efforts to increase Court prestige have
come from advocates of military law reform.

Among the

changes recommended was the granting of lifetime appoint
ments to the judges.

Chief Judge Quinn has written exten

sively in legal periodicals describing the qualities of
the military adjudicatory system.-*-5

Finally in 1968

1 3,,Rules of Practice and Procedure," July 11, 1951,
Rules 1 and 2, 1 USCMA xxiii (1951).
•^Frederick R. Hanlon, "Ten-Year Chronolpgy of the
United States Court of Military Appeals," in USCMA-JAG
Annual Report, 1 9 6 1 , pp. 47-61.
■^Examples of Chief. Judge Quinn's remarks are the
following:
"Despite all the changes that have taken place
in the military justice system during the past two decades,
some remain unconvinced that courts-martial are, or truly
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Congress enacted a noncontroversial statute designed to
clarify the Court’s Article .1 position.

Significantly,

the issue of Article III status was not raised.

The new

legislation included the simple declaration, "There is a
United States Court of Military Appeals established under
article I of the Constitution and located for administra
tive purposes only in the Department of Defense."^

The

Senate Armed Services Committee report on the bill rein
forced the affirmation of legislative court status.
The congressional intent was that the Court of
Military Appeals be a court in every significant
respect. Despite this clear intent, there have been
contentions that the court is not a court at all but
an Instrumentality of the executive branch or an
administrative agency of the Department of Defense.^-7
The 1968 act brought the Court of Military Appeals no
nearer to incorporation Into the Federal judiciary.

The

Court Is in the anomalous position of being a full component
can be, a part of the federal judiciary." "Courts-Martial
Practice: A View from the Top," Hastings Law Journal, 22
(January, 1971)> 201-12.
"Under the Uniform Code, the
courts-martial system can truly be regarded as an integral
part of the federal judiciary." "Some.Comparisons between
Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice," UCLA Law Review, 15
(June, 1968), 1240-59* Additionally, see Chief Judge
Quinn's dissent in United States v. Borya, 18 USCMA 259,
40 CMR 259 (1969).
l6Public Law 90-340.(196.8); 10 U.S.C. sec. 867(a)
(1970).
^U.S., Congress, Seriate, Establishing the Court
of Military Appeals as the: U.S. Court of Military Appeals,
S. Rept.. 806 To Accompany S.. 26.34, 90th Cong., 1st sess.,
1967, p. 2. See, also, House, U.S. Court of Military
Appeals, H. Rept. 1480 To Accompany S. 2634, 90th Cong.,
2d sess ., 1968.
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of neither the judicial nor executive branches.
Simultaneous with Congressional consideration of
the clarifying statute, the Court of Military Appeals began
asserting powers characteristic of courts in the Federal
judiciary.

These actions have, in turn, prompted the Courts

of Military Review to evaluate their own status.

The

statute under which this self-appraisal has occurred is
the All Writs Act which provides, "The Supreme Court and
all courts established by act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles
of law."*^

Generally termed "extraordinary relief," the

writs include habeas corpus, mandamus, and coram nobis,
all of which are actions outside normal appellate review.
The substance of the writs is immaterial here; instead,
the present concern is whether or not writs can be issued
by the military appellate courts.

That is, are the Court

of Military Appeals and the Courts of Military Review
capable of exercising powers invoked by Article III and
Article I courts under the All Writs Act?

This precise

18

The anomaly Is a characteristic of legislative
courts. For example, the Court of Military Appeals and
the Tax Court are theoretically Independent of the execu
tive branch; yet, their annual budgets are enacted In
executive appropriations and their statutory authoriza
tion is found in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
in the Internal Revenue Code rather than In the Judiciary
title of the United States Code.
*^*^28 U.S.C. sec. 1651(a) (1970).

Emphasis added.
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point was not considered by Congress In Its enactment of
any military law statutes nor In the passage of the various
versions of the All Writs Act.
In 1966 the Court of Military Appeals declared
unequivocally that "this Court is a court established by
act of Congress within the meaning of the All Writs A c t . "20
In at least three previous cases the Court Intimated that
It possessed writs power; however, it did not reach the
merits of the question in disposing of the cases under con21
sideration.
In 1969 the military court’s activism was
endorsed by the United States Supreme Court.

"[W]e do not

believe that there can be any doubt as to the power of the
Court of Military Appeals to issue an emergency writ of
habeas corpus in cases . . . which may ultimately be reviewed
by that court."22

Although its position as a legislative

or Article I court Is now confirmed, the Court of Military
Appeals still exhibits a sense of Inferiority because of
90

United States v. Frischholz, 16 USCMA 150, 152-53
and 36 CMR 306, 308-309 (19-557I
21United States v. Buck, 9 USCMA 290, 26 CMR 70
(1958); United States v. Tavares, 10 USCMA 282, 23 CMR 356
(1959); and, In re Taylor, 12' USCMA 427, 31 CMR 13 (1961).
22Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695, n. 7 (1969). See
p. 119, below, for facts from which the Supreme Court made
the declaration of legislative court status.
Interestingly,
Justice Harlan's opinion essentially favorable to the mili
tary tribunals followed by less than two weeks Justice
Douglas' opinion In O'Callihan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258
(1969), which contained highly critical indictments of the
capability of the military legal system to produce justice.
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its exclusion from the Federal judiciary.23

jt is not a

“court of the United States" within the meaning of the
definitional statute.21*

It is not a participant in the

Judicial Conference of the United States.25

it is "not a

part of the judiciary at all," according to an Influential
writer.26
Judicialization in the Courts
of Military Review
While the Court of Military Appeals is now a legis
lative court, the Courts of Military Review continue in an
uncertain status.

Expectedly, the Intermediate appellate

courts did not attempt to exert extraordinary relief or
writ power until the superior military court had approached
the subject.

Interpretations of their authority by the

Courts of Military Review occurred in the context of the
Military Justice Act of 1968.

Effective August 1, 1969,

23This status was reaffirmed In the Supreme Court’s
most recent direct opinion on the subject:
"Military
courts are legislative courts5 their jurisdiction is inde
pendent of Art. Ill judicial power." Paris! v. Davidson,
405 U.S. 34, 41, n. 72^28 U.S.C. sec. 451 (1970).
"The term 'courts of
the United States' includes . . . any court created by Act
of Congress the judges of which are entitled to hold office
during good behavior."
2^28 U.S.C. sec. 331 (1970). Participation is by
courts designated as constitutional courts.
2^Wright, Federal Courts., p. 34. The source Is a
principal text for law school courses on the judiciary;
thus, such an impression of the military court of last
resort is communicated to many prospective attorneys.
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each service’s boards .of review were renamed as Courts of
Military Review with the same jurisdiction.

None of the

proposals leading to the 1968 act brought any reported
discussion of the status of the intermediate tribunals as
either legislative courts or administrative panels.

Pre

sumably, the subject was omitted because the courts were
thought to be .unaffected by the traditional classifica
tions of adjudicatory institutions.
Less than two months after the Army Court of Mili
tary Review gained that title, a unanimous three-judge
panel asserted that the Court was "a court established by
Congress" and was therefore eligible to grant the writ
sought by the petitioner in the pending case.2?

Counsel

for the United States argued that the Court was an admin
istrative body established by the Judge Advocate General,
not a legislative court established by Congress.

The Army

panel’s principal substantiation for the decision was a
clause in the Supreme Court's Noyd v. Bond opinion issued
three months earlier.

There Justice John Marshall Harlan

by obiter dicta had described the Air Force board of review
as "the appellate military tribunal Congress has estab
lished to oversee the administration of criminal justice
2?United States v.. Dolby. (ACMR 1969). Unpublished
in Court-Martial Reports. b.ut‘ summarized in The Criminal Law
Reporter, 6 (October 22,. 196.9), 20.63-64. As a prisoner,
Dolby, sought a writ of habeas corpus. Facts of the case
are unavailable because the hase was not published in full.
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In the petitioner's branch of the Armed Services."28

The

Army judges read this definition as confirmation from the
nation's highest court that the boards of review were estab
lished by Congress.

Designation of the boards as "courts"

was Interpreted as implying Congressional intent to enhance
the judicial stature of the intermediate appellate tri
bunals.

Further, the Army judges evaluated the act of the

Judge Advocate General in "establishing" the Court of Mili
tary Review as a ministerial task, performed without inde
pendent discretion, in compliance with Congressional man
date ,
It Is possible to speculate regarding the motiva
tion of the Army court in engaging In judicial activism, a
role alien to the intermediate tribunals, the performance
of which was previously confined to the narrowly defined
tasks of appellate review under the Uniform Code.

Perhaps

the Supreme Court in Noyd invited the Intermediate courts
to exercise extraordinary relief powers.

A brief review

of Noyd is necessary to establish the context of Justice
Harlan's remark quoted above.

Convicted by court-martial,

Air Force Captain Noyd was ordered confined pending appel
late review.

He immediately secured habeas corpus relief

from a Federal district :court,. but the Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court by. holding that Noyd ha.d not
exhausted all his opportunities for relief available In
28395 U.S. 683, 686 (1969).
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the military legal system.29

The Supreme Court agreed,

citing principally the power of the Court of Military
Appeals to grant a writ of habeas corpus.

More importantly

for the issue of power of the intermediate appellate tri
bunals, Justice Harlan, writing for the 8-1 majority, con
tinued in a footnote:
The Government suggests that petitioner should also
be required to exhaust a second remedy allegedly
afforded him within the military system.
It is said
that Captain Noyd should have requested the Air Force
Board of Review to release him pending the exhaustion
of his rights of appeal.
The Government, however,
cites no decision of a Board of Review which asserts
the power to grant emergency interlocutory relief prior
to the Board's consideration of a case on its merits;
nor are we referred to any statute which unequivocally
grants this authority.
In the absence of any attempt
by the Boards of Review to assert such a power, we do
not believe that petitioner may properly be required
to exhaust a remedy which may not exist.30
The Court seemed to recommend that the boards of review
(and their successors, the Courts of Military Review) exer
cise writs powers.

At a minimum, the possibility for such

judicial action was left open by not being specifically
precluded.

The ambivalent position of the United States

is noteworthy.

Before the Supreme Court, the government

endorsed writs power for the intermediate appellate courts.
A few months later before the Army Court panel considering
just such an action, the government counsel advocated the
opposite.

Nevertheless, the arguments were consistent in

2^Noyd v. Bond, 285 P. Supp. 785 (D.N.M. 1968) and
Noyd v. Bond, *102 F. 2d l»4l (10th Cir. 1968).
3O395 U.S. 683, 698, n. 11 (1969).
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that each was designed to block the claim of the Individual
military member in the pending litigation.
Thus, for the first time in history a military
intermediate appellate court declared that it possessed
powers beyond those conferred in its charter.

The effect

of the Army panel's assertion in United States v, Dolby
remained to be determined through future actions of the
Court of Military Review.

Because of the significance of

the question, the next petition for extraordinary relief
was docketed for hearing by the full bench of the Court.
In contrast to the unanimity of the three-judge panel in
Dolby, the eleven judges in Draughon prepared six opinions.
On the crucial issue of writs power, they divided seven to
four in the affirmative.

Of the four, three opposed the

Court’s considering its extraordinary relief powers in the
pending case because they held the claim to be unjustified.
^ United States v. Draughon, 42 CMR 447 (ACMR 1970).
Convicted in 1968 on charges of desertion and forgery,
Draughon petitioned the Army Court of Military Review late
in 1969 for appropriate relief in the nature of coram nobis.
He argued that the forgery conviction should be overturned
because factually it was not service connected, in terms of
the United States Supreme Court decision in 0'Callihan v.
Parker in June, 1969. He sought to have his case reopened
to obtain dismissal of that charge and to have the sentence
reassessed based only on the. legally permissible conviction
for desertion. The Army Court agreed that the conviction
on the forgery charge was inappropriate under the O'Calli
han decision. The' Court, then inquired into its. authority
to provide relief; that is,: did it have power to issue the
appropriate writ? Finding in the affirmative, the Court
then decided that in the pending case a writ was unwarranted
because the O'Callihan rule was not applicable to cases
closed prior to the date of the Supreme Court decision.
Thus, Draughon won the lega] point but lost his desired
relief.
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Consequently, in a future case these same three Judges
might have accepted the activist position.

The other

Judge filed a full dissent in which he argued that the
Court was an administrative element of the Office of the
Judge Advocate General.

Because these opinions reveal

much about conflicting interpretations of the question
of legislative court status for the Courts of Military
Review, detailed analysis is appropriate.
In Draughon as in Dolby, the United States position
was that the Court of Military Review was not a court estab
lished under either Article I or Article III of the Consti
tution.

The majority rejected these arguments by deter

mining that the Court was established by Congress through
the conferring of jurisdiction to perform appellate review
under Article 66 of the Uniform Code.

Three extracts from

the majority opinion reflect the reasoning leading to the
affirmation of extraordinary relief power.
Congress has ordained the scope of appellate power to
be performed by the Court, clothed it with judicial
functions and judicial power as well as expressly con
ferring on this Court appellate fact-finding power.
The constitutional premise of this Court's statutory
existence is founded on Article I of the Constitution.
This Court exists by the same authority as civil courts
of the United States.
[T]he Court of Military Review Is a court established
by Act of Congress and as such Is possessed of the
authority declared in the All Writs Act. . . .32

3 2I b i d . , p.

452.
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The author of the Dolby opinion repeated in a concurrence
reasoning he had advanced in the previous landmark case.
Again he relied on the Supreme Court's comment in Noyd and
on the interpretation of Article 66 as evidence of Congres
sional establishment of the Court of Military Review.

His

purpose was to counter the concurring opinion of two judges
who considered extraordinary relief power confined to cases
already on the Court's docket.
The dissenting opinion in Draughon, ineffective in
persuading the Army Court, provided a precedent for the
unanimous decision by the three-judge Coast Guard Court of
Military Review to reject writs power.33

The two opinions

in combination enumerated approximately twenty reasons
against Article I status for the appellate courts.

In

essence, the arguments represented a traditionalist atti
tude to subordinate the military legal system under the
Judge Advocate General and the command hierarchy.

The

Draughon dissenter denied that in Article 66 Congress had
created a court, in terms of the All Writs Act.

Counter

ing the majority view that the Judge Advocate General's
33Combest v. Bender, 43 CMR 899 (CGCMR 1971).
Combest sought a writ of habeas corpus to gain release
from what he contended was illegal punishment and confine
ment . The Court determined that it had no authority to con
sider his plea.
Interestingly, the Coast Guard tribunal
assumed that it did have s.uch power in disposing of its
first petition for extraordinary relief. Without reaching
the substance of the writs, argument, the Court found that
the petition was without merit and dismissed it. In re
Teske, 42 CMR 945 (CGCMR 1970).
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action In "establishing" the Court was ministerial, the
dissenting judge insisted that "unless and until he takes
such action, there is no Court of Military

R e v i e w . "34

this interpretation, the Court was a creature of executive
action and consequently powerless to Issue writs.

Addi

tionally, the Court had no power to issue rules of pro
cedure and practice, to issue subpoenas, to enforce its
judgments, or to determine the qualifications of attorneys
practicing before i t .
The Coast Guard Court added to the Army dissenter's
itemization of reasons leading to rejection of extraordinary
relief power.

The Combest opinion compared the judicial

attributes of the Court of Military Appeals and the Courts
of Military Review.

Distinctions were seen in the wording

used by Congress in enacting authorization statutes.
,r[W]hile Congress had Indicated in 1950 that it, was estab
lishing the Court of Military Appeals, in 1968 it refrained
from saying it, was establishing the courts of military
review.

"35

in the view of the Coast Guard judges, absence

of any Congressional consideration of a legislative declara
tion of the Courts of Military Review to be Article I courts
was sufficient to preclude any other interpretation.

The

Army judges reasoned that intent was shown in Article 66
3^United States! v.' Draughon, 42 CMR 447, 458.
35combest v. Bender, 43 CMR 899, 902.
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which gave appellate Jurisdiction to the Courts.

Among

the other negative reasons cited by the Army dissenter
and the Coast Guard panel was the nature of Judicial
appointments.

Judges were assigned to the Courts by the

Judge Advocate General of each military department.

No

tenure is prescribed by statute5 only the administrative
policy of each service provides for an average assignment
of four years duration at the headquarters.
be removed at any time without cause.

A Judge can

Salaries are not

immune from reduction.
As noted above, the Air Force Court of Military
Review concurred with the Army Court in declaring its
status to be that of a legislative court.

Instead of

deliberating at length on the major arguments, the Air
Force Court adopted the reasoning of the majority in
Draughon.

n[T]he creation by Congress of a military appel

late court system with power to oversee appropriate aspects
of the administration of military justice gave to these
appellate courts whatever powers are necessary or appro
priate in aid of their jurisdiction."36

Despite their

willingness to accept petitions for extraordinary relief,
both the Air Force and Army Courts have granted very few
of the desired writs.37
^ Gagnon v. United States, 42 CMR 1035 (AFCMR 1970).
Petitioner’s plea for a writ of habeas corpus was denied.
■^As noted, the desired writs were denied in Dolby,
Draughon, and Gagnon. Similar dispositions occurred in
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The Navy Court of Military Review has not as yet
published an opinion on its authority to issue writs for
extraordinary relief.
explain this fact.

No substantive evidence exists to

Presumably, the issue has not been

raised in an appropriate case in such a manner as to demand
a forthright decision by the Navy tribunal.

Even this

explanation is somewhat implausible when considering that
appropriate cases have been brought to the other three
intermediate appellate courts.

In interviews two judges

of the Navy Court gave opposite opinions on the authority
of the Courts of Military Review to issue writs.

In the

view of Judge J. Fielding Jones, the Navy jurist with the
longest period of service, "the Navy boards of review and
the Court have always assumed that the All Writs Act

was

applicable and usable in the protection of their juris
diction."

Further, the military courts were created by

act of Congress; therefore, they are legislative courts.38
Judge Louis L. Milano expressed the converse in commenting
on a hypothetical

c a s e . 39

jt is impossible, of course, to

predict the action of the Navy Court when and if it is
the following Army cases: United States v. Gwaltney»
CMR 536 (ACMR 1970). and United States v. Dickison.
43 CMR 599 (ACMR 1970)..
3®Letter, Arlington, Virginia, March 28, 197.3*
Judge Jones, a civilian, served on Navy intermediate appel
late tribunals from 1951 until. July, 1972.
^interview, Washington, D. C., December 12, 1972.

127
presented an unavoidable, controversy requiring a definitive
statement on the nature of Its creation.

The tradition of

Naval law is essentially conservative; accordingly, the
Court might take a position of self-restraint similar to
that by the Coast Guard Court.
External support for the position asserted by the
Army and Air Force Courts is essentially nonexistent.
Since the landmark decisions, Congress has enacted no
legislation affecting the Courts' status.

The Court of

Military Appeals has declined the opportunity to give its
opinion on the issue.

Despite these reactions, the most

potentially significant development is a footnote comment
by the United States Supreme Court in a 1972 opinion.
The Court of Military Appeals has not displayed
activism in behalf of the intermediate courts which it
exerted for itself in 1966.

The author of the principal

concurring opinion in Draughon urged "recognition by the
United States Court of Military Appeals and by the Federal
courts of extraordinary powers which the Courts of Military
Review possess."
forthcoming.

However, explicit approval has not been

The Court of Military Appeals commented in a

197.1 opinion footnote, "We. express no opinion respecting
the application of 28 U.S.C'.' sec. 1651(a) [the All Writs
Act] to Courts of Military. Review"."*^

Despite their.

^°Heriderson v. Wondolowski, 21 USCMA 63, 64, n. 1
and 44 CMR 117 (1971).
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reluctance to decide the' merits of the question of para
mount Importance to the intermediate courts, the three
civilian judges have written approvingly of the Courts of
Military Review.
In the military Justice system courts of military
review occupy a position that is comparable in many
ways to the status of the United States Courts of
Appeals in the Federal court structure.
Our decision emphatically is without any intention
to depreciate the status of members of the Courts of
Military Review. We have many reasons for desiring
that they maintain the prestige that should accompany
their important appellate function,^1
These generally laudatory comments contrast with an evalua
tion of the performance of the boards of review included
in an opinion eight years earlier.

A Navy board was sharply

criticized for deciding a constitutional question, namely,
the adequacy of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

u[T]he

board of review would have been well advised had it declined
to make that decision, leaving it for higher competent
review authority."**2
Not only have the judges of the Court of Military
Appeals declined to support legislative court status for
the intermediate courts through their judicial opinions,
but they have also been similarly hesitant .In their roles
^ United States v.. Chl'lcote, 20 USCMA 283, 287 and
43 CMR 123j 127 (197DThese- remarks occurred in an
opinion invalidating a procedure of the Courts of Military
Review whereby a decision of a three-judge panel could be
reconsidered en banc.
lip

.

United States v. Culp, 14 USCMA 199, 201 and
33 CMR 411, 413 (1963).
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as members of the Code Committee..

In their 1971 Annual

Report issued with the Judge Advocates General, they urged
Congress to consider legislation specifying the extraordi
nary relief powers of the Court of Military Appeals, the
Courts of Military Review, and the military judges who
preside over courts-martial . ^

However, the Code Committee

declined to provide specific recommendations for the scope
of legislation on writs powers.

This failure perhaps indi

cates an inability of the legal system officials to agree
on a draft text on the controversial- topic.

Provisions

relating to extraordinary relief powers were Included in
military statute amendments Introduced In the Ninety-second
and Ninety-third Congresses.^

Prospects for early enact

ment are dim; not even preliminary preparations by committee
staffs have been begun on these bills.
Despite the hesitancy of Congress and of the Court
of Military Appeals to extend writs powers to the inter
mediate courts, dicta in a footnote of a 1972 opinion by
the Supreme Court may be sufficiently broad and open-ended
to support future judicializatlon.

Justice Potter Stewart

**3u s c m A-JAG Annual Report, 1971* p. 1.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, S. 2172,. 92,d Cong., 1st
sess., 1971; House and Senate.,, H.R. 291 and S. 987, 93d
Cong., 1st sess., 1973*
^ L e t t e r from Frank M. Slatinshek,. chief counsel,
Committee, bn Armed Services.,-. House of Representatives.,
June 15, 1973; and, letter, from T. Edward Braswell,- Jr.,
chief counsel, Committee on Armed Services, Senate.,
August 15, 1973.
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wrote for the Court, "Military courts are legislative
courts.

. . ."**6

This brief sentence was cited above as

evidence that the Court of Military Appeals Is now unques
tionably a legislative court. **7

The remaining query 13 how

this sentence applies to the Courts of Military Review.
Logically, the intermediate appellate courts are included
in Justice Stewart's definition of "military courts."
Therefore, the Courts of Military Review must be "courts
established by act of Congress" and thereby eligible to
exercise all the inherent powers of such courts.

This

interpretation is supported by a statement of Justice
Harry Blackmun in the most recent Supreme Court decision
affecting military law. °

In dealing with the issue of

retroactive application of 0'Callihan v. Parker, the Court
said, "[T]he decision there . . . certainly was not based
on any conviction that the court-martial lacks fundamental
integrity in its truth-determining process."

Further,

"Nothing said in O'Callihan indicates that the major pur
pose of that decision was to remedy a defect in the truthdetermining process in the military trial."**9

These 1973

compliments to the military legal system conform with the
^ Parlsi v. Davids on,- ,405. U.S. 34, 41, n. 7 (1972).
47p. 117, n. 23., .above..
^ G o s a v. May den, United States Law Week, 41 (June 26,
1973),- 5075.
Ibid., pp. 5079-80..
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view that the Supreme Court is encouraging the Judicializatlon of the military tribunals.

Because of the recency of

Parisi and Gosa, the Courts of Military Review have not
published decisions interpreting the effect of the dicta.
As Supreme Court opinion seems to support enhance
ment of the judicial character of the military appellate
courts, so too does the unofficial comment of observers.
One of the means suggested for increasing the effective
ness and prestige of the Courts of Military Review is
through active exercise of extraordinary relief power.
For example, commentators with opposite fundamental views
on military law reach the same conclusion concerning writs
power.

A frequent critic of the quality of military law

and of command influence stated that the Courts of Mili
tary Review will achieve greater independence from com
mand control by granting "equitable and extraordinary
relief in any situation involving a serviceman."5°

An

active-duty Army attorney, in analyzing the intermediate
courts' powers under the All Writs Act, suggested that the
Courts of Military Review conceivably have broader powers
than those possessed by the Court of Military Appeals.51
The latter Court has defined its authority as being limited
5°Sherman, "Civilianization of Military Law," p. 103.
^Thomas M. Rankin, "The All Writs Act and the Mili
tary Justice System," Military Law Review, 53 (Summer,
1971) j 103—355•

to cases properly before it or which may eventually reach
it.^

That is, the Court will apply its extraordinary

relief power only to its defined jurisdiction under
Article 67 of the Uniform Code.

Based on the same stand

ard, the Courts of Military Review have a potentially
greater opportunity to exercise All Writs Act power
because their jurisdiction is more extensive than is that
of the Court of Military Appeals.

The additional source

of cases for the intermediate courts is Article 69 which
authorizes the Judge Advocate General to refer for formal
review any general court-martial case not automatically
qualifying for Article 66 review.

These cases involve

sentences of less than one year and, thus, are not subjects
for routine docketing with the Courts of Military Review.
Most importantly, these cases are not reviewable by the
Court of Military Appeals.

Thus, the Courts of Military

review have exclusive jurisdiction.

The Army commentator

emphasised the potential impact of writs power exercised
by the intermediate courts.

"Assumption by military appel

late courts of authority conferred by the All Writs Act
radically alters the nature and scope of legal redress
available within the military, judicial system, "53

Pre

sumably, all the opportunities for relief within military
-^United States v.': Bevilacqua, 18 USCMA 10,. 39 CMR
10 (1968); and, United States, v. Snyder, 18 USCMA 480, 40
CMR 192 (1969)53Rankin, "All Writs Act and the Military," p. 133.

133
courts must be exhausted before a petitioner enters the
Federal judiciary.

This is the broad meaning of the

Supreme Court's Noyd ruling.
Persons associated with the military legal system
typically assert the judicial character of the Courts of
Military Review and of their predecessor boards of review.
Comments made during the past decade, particularly, have
emphasized the independence of the tribunals and have cited
the protections afforded the military defendant through
automatic review of his conviction.

At least in public

forums, both civilian and military observers have agreed
that the boards and Courts perform judicial tasks.

Despite

their possible subjective opinions, these participants iri
and observers of the appellate process have insisted that
the tribunals are judicial rather than administrative
institutions.

Among the published appraisals are the

following two comments.

A former member of an Air Force

board of review noted that "[bjoards of review are judi
cial bodies, analogous to appellate courts in the Federal
system."^

a

civilian attorney with military legal expe

rience described the tribunals as "in fact courts, although
not 'courts' in the sense of being established under
article III of the United States Constitution."55

The

•^Biddle, "Air Force'. Boards," p. 12.
■^Delmar Karlen, "Civilian and Military Justice at
the Appellate Level," Wisconsin Law Review, 1968 (No. 3)j
786. For similar evaluations, see, Charles M. Schiesser
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current chief judges of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Courts
in interviews all affirmed the judicial character of their
respective institutions and emphasized their personal
desire to enhance the prestige of the military judiciary.56
Thus, the persons associated with the military appellate
process believe that they are performing a genuine judi
cial function.

Perhaps their attitudes regarding the

nature of the system are more important in assuring jus
tice on a daily basis than would be a definitive Congres
sional classification of these tribunals as legislative
courts.
An assessment
From this analysis of official and unofficial
positions on the major question of authority of the Courts
of Military Review, what conclusions can be developed?
Arguments on each side are convincing.

By strict con

struction of Article 66, the Courts most probably are
not legislative courts simply because Congress has not
so stated.

However, the activist position is supportable

because the Courts, normatively, should be legislative
and Daniel H. Benson, "Modern Military Justice," Catholic
University Law Review, 19 (Summer, 1970), 489-519; and,
Roger M. Currier and Irvin: M. Kent, "The Boards of Review
of the Armed Services," Vanderbilt Law Review, 6 (February,
1953), 241-50.
-^Interviews with. Chief Judges Kenneth J. Hodson,
Falls Church, Virginia, December 11, 1972; Gale E. Krouse,
and Robert S. Amery, both in Washington, D.C., December 12,
1972.

courts with all attendant powers.

The basis for this view

is the need Cor the intermediate appellate courts in the
largest criminal jurisdiction under the national govern
ment to have all powers necessary to ensure the fair and
complete administration of justice to the military defend
ant.

Further, the weight of United States Supreme Court

dicta is on the side of judicialization.

Assumption of

'

extraordinary relief power is another step in the progres
sion by the military appellate courts toward the equivalent
of full judicial status.

The issue could be settled by a

brief Congressional declaration, similar to that passed in
1968 clarifying the position of the United States Court of
Military Appeals.

Because such an enactment is improbable

in the near term, supporters of judicialization will have
to be content with a somewhat ambiguous "judge-made" law.
This inquiry into the nature of the Courts of Mili
tary Review can be placed in perspective by again consider
ing adjudicatory institutions arrayed along a continuum,
ranging from the most informal administrative hearing pro
cedure to constitutional courts.

Since their advent as

a statutory organization in 1920 the military appellate
tribunals have moved in increments along the continuum
from the outer limits of administrative agencies toward a
middle position of legislative courts.

The Uniform Code

of 1950 removed the boards from the purely advisory admin
istrative classification.

Until 1969 the boards functioned
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In a zone of uncertainty— neither truly judicial, nor truly
administrative.

With their new name as Courts of Military

Review and with a spirit of judicial activism, at least In
the Army and Air Force Courts, the tribunals have advanced
to the classification of legislative courts.

Perhaps In

1972 the United States Supreme Court confirmed the status
which two of the four Courts sought.
On the assumption that the Courts of Military
Review are the equivalent of appellate courts in the recog
nized judiciaries, the next task Is to compare their judi
cial characteristics and the actions of their judges with
those features of their more established counterparts.

CHAPTER VII
COMPARATIVE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
Analysis of historical materials and of legislative
and judicial determinations suggests that the Courts of
Military Review are, at least cte facto, judicial institu
tions.

The same conclusion is derived from comparison of

quantitative data on the decision-making processes and
intracourt judicial behavior from the military and civil
ian intermediate appellate courts.

Examination of processes

and relationships within courts has become the principal
research technique of political scientists studying the
American national and state judiciaries.

However, as

analyzed in Chapter II, the prevailing behavioral method
ology is not completely applicable to this inquiry.

The

chief limitations are insufficiency of data on the military
judges and the small number of en banc decisions from which
to gain impressions of behavior of the complete court.
Nevertheless, certain comparisons can be made of the Courts
of Military Review and their counterparts.
Comparison of dispositions ■
The quality of Justice provided by military appellate
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courts can be estimated, from comparison of rates of affir
mation and reversals among the two national criminal court
systems.

The most valid comparison can be made from data

on the frequency of affirmed cases.

Composite rates for

the eleven Courts of Appeals and for the four Courts of
Military Review are remarkably similar— 82.0 per cent in
the civilian courts and 85-8 per cent in the military
courts.

These data for the period 1962-1971 reveal that

convictions in either national trial system are upheld in
about the same percentages in the initial appellate review.
An even closer percentage results from comparison of rates
of reversal of convictions in the two systems.

For the

same decade, 1^.3 per cent of the military appellants
received 3ome modification in the verdict or sentence
adjudged in their trial; 15-^ per cent of the appellants
in the Courts of Appeals obtained reversals of their con
victions.

Because of variations in the methods of report

ing reversals, the second comparison is probably less pre
cise than is the first.
These conclusions are based on data arranged in the
following manner.

Disposition of criminal cases by the

eleven civilian and four military courts is reported yearly.1
1Annual Report of P.'S. Courts, Table B-l, U.S.
Courts of Appeals, Cases. .Commenced and Terminated; and
USCMA-JAG Annual Report, 196.2-1971* Data for each, of the
four military courts were not published consistently before
1962. Since 1962 the composite figures omit data for four
years in which dispositions by the Coast Guard Court were
not reported.
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For the Courts of Appeals the actual numbers are published
in each category:

disposed of, affirmed, and reversed.2

In the Courts of Appeals a reversal of a conviction is
essentially the only method for granting relief to an appel
lant.

In the military courts relief is provided through

reversal of the conviction and reduction of the sentence.
Accordingly, data for action by three of the four military
*
courts are based on the number of cases in which the ver
dict or sentence or both were modified.

Completely con

sistent data are unavailable because the Navy Court of
Military Review dispositions are based on modification of
verdicts only; the number of reduced sentences is not
reported.

For purposes of over-all comparison, the number

of cases affirmed by each of the military courts was deter
mined to be the difference in the total number of cases
heard minus the number modified.
Despite reporting differences, the comparison
revealed by the consolidation of all civilian and all mili
tary data remains meaningful.

A conclusion can be validly

drawn that the rate of modification of trial court judg
ments Is not appreciably different in the two jurisdic
tions.

Further, the observation can be made that the mili

tary courts are acting much, the same as the Courts of
Appeals in applying standards of justice.

Conversely, the

2In addition to affirming or reversing a conviction,
Courts of Appeals dispose of cases through dismissal and
"other methods." Those categories Involve very few cases.
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military courts are not acting as agencies of the executive
hierarchy imposing unwavering decisions favorable to the
government.
The trend In the number of cases ulTJ.rincd In the
military courts during the 1962-1.971 decade corresponds
with that computed for a much shorter period by a 1972
Defense Department study group investigating the admin
istration of the Uniform Code.

The percentages are 85.8

for the decade and 83.4 based on 529 cases— one month's
output by the Army and Navy Courts and six months' by the
Air Force Court.^

This data source compares with 55,027

cases for the ten-year period used in the computation
prepared for this study.
Comparison of composite rates of cases affirmed by
the civilian courts with corresponding data of the separate
military courts reveals patterns suggestive of judicial
independence.

Among the eleven Courts of Appeals the per

centage of cases affirmed generally increased during the
decade— from a low of 76.6 per cent in 1962 to a high of
85.2 per cent in 1967•

The upper range was dominant in

succeeding years with the figure for 1969 and 1961 being
1 per cent or less below the high point.

The rate of

^U.S., Department :of Defense, Report of the Task
Force on the Adminlstrati'ori of Military Justice in the
Armed Forces, 1972, vol. 3, p. 2bk.
This report doesnot
include data from the Coast Guard Courtj however, the dif
ference is insignificant because of the very small number
of cases considered on appellate review in that service.

affirmation oJ’ convictions by both thu Air Force and Army
Courts of MUltary Review followed a curve with the low
point midway of the decade.

In 1968 each of the two mili

tary tribunals affirmed a lower percentage of cases than
in any other year in the period of examination— 78.3 per
cent by the Air Force Court and 49-5 Per cent by the Army
Court.

Only the Navy Court exhibited a steady rate of

affirming convictions, a range of less than 4 per cent
between the extremes during the decade.

The total number

of cases decided by the Coast Guard Court was approximately
6 per cent of the number processed by the Air Force Court,
the least active of the other three military appellate tri
bunals.

Therefore, comparison of the Coast Guard statis

tics with those of the other courts is essentially mean
ingless because of the great variation in the size of the
data source.
Comparisons among the composite rates for the mili
tary courts are significant only to a limited extent.

For

example, the ten-year average rate of affirmation by con
viction by the Army Court is 64.4 per cent and by the Air
Force Court is 91-9 per cent.

The explanation for the dis

parity is the policy in the Air Force criminal justice
system to limit sentence reductions by the appellate courts.
The objective is to permit an administrative determination
of clemency based on the convicted individual's prospects
for rehabilitation and restoration to active military duty.

J >\2
Only in the latter portion of the decade under study here
did the Army establish extensive rehabilitation programs
for its prisoners.

Consequently, sentences were reduced

by the appellate court as a kind of clemency action. **
As has been shown, in disposing of cases the mili
tary appellate courts as a composite entity perform quite
similarly to the Courts of Appeals.

This comparable

behavior is evident also in dissents within the courts of
the two jurisdictions.

Both sets of data point to the con

clusion that the military appellate tribunals function as
judicial institutions.

Additional analysis of more com

plete data perhaps would substantiate the projection.
Comparison of dissents
Analysis of dissents on collegial courts became in
the 196O's a common approach to study of the judiciary.
However, methods of analysis for the United States Supreme
Court are not directly applicable to lower appellate courts
because of J.uua stable membership and a smaller percentage
of controversial cases in the lower courts.

These same

limitations prevent application of sophisticated quantita
tive techniques to the military intermediate appellate tri
bunals .
Study of dissent on the Supreme Court and on the
^Hearings on Constitutional Rights of Military
Personnel, 1962, p. 960. Presumably, the same procedure
was in effect throughout the 1962-197’i period.

Courts of Appeals has been conducted with a higher degree
of reliability than comparable research Into the Courts of
Military Review because of the completeness of data.

All

formal opinions of the two civilian courts are published;
in contrast, since the establishment in 1951 of the mili
tary tribunals, only about 2.9 per cent of their dispo
sitions have been published.

Nevertheless, this relatively

small number of published decisions contains practically
all the dissents from the four courts.

Thus, the dissent

behavior trends can be established with sufficient accuracy
although all dissenting opinions are not readily available
for review and tabulation.

The dearth of published

opinions is the result of the military courts' procedure
in disposing of cases.

Because all convictions in which

the sentence is one year or more confinement must be
reviewed by the intermediate courts, a significant per
centage of cases involve no disputed points of fact or
errors in law.

These cases are affirmed without comment

in a unanimous per curiam opinion.

The number of such

dispositions varies among the four courts and over the
period of their operation.

The Air Force Court, the only

tribunal on which data are available, prepared an almost
equal number of full opinion and per curiam dispositions
during fiscal years 1967 through 1971-^

The relationship

^Unpublished annual statistical summary provided
to the writer by the Commissioner, Air Force Court of Mili
tary Review, 1972.
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between the number of written opinions and standard format
affirmations is heavily weighted toward the latter in the
Army and Navy Courts because of their significantly larger
case loads.

For example, one estimate is that an opinion

is written in only 12 per cent of the cases reviewed by
the Army Court.^
Procedures vary among the four services in the
selection of full opinions to be published in Court-Mart1al
Reports.

Criteria for publication are the significance of

the point of law interpreted and the precedent potential.
The decision to publish is made by nonjudicial personnel.
Interestingly, under the original procedures governing the
Navy boards of review the three members of each board, if
they were in full agreement, could direct that an opinion
be published.^

In later years their power, as that of

judges of other tribunals, became advisory.

Thus, the data

base of opinions available consists of less than 3 per cent
of the total dispositions but the great majority of all
nonunanimous opinions.
opinions published are:

The percentages by service of
Air Force, 5-35 Army, 4.1; Navy,

0.8; and Coast Guard, a disproportionately high 43*7 per
cent of its comparatively few. dispositions.
^Karlen, "Civilian and Military Justice," p. 802.
^Draft instructions from Office of the Judge Advo
cate General; copy provided' to the writer by Judge J. Field
ing Jones of the Navy Court of Military Review, 1973-

145
Based on data as described, dissent occurred In
4.9 per cent of the published decisions of the four mili
tary Intermediate appellate tribunals from their founding
in 1951 through early 1972.
Courts are:

Rates for the individual

Navy, 7*3 per cent; Army, 5.4; Air Force,

3.4; and Coast Guard, 1.4.

An explanation of these per

centages is necessary to ensure accurate interpretation.
The dissent rate in Navy cases is the highest of the four
Courts because the number of reported Navy opinions is
low.

Only about 24 per cent as many Navy as Army cases

have been published during the twenty-one years of opera
tion of the tribunals.

Consequently, the number of unani

mous Army cases dilutes the impact of the highest actual
number of dissents among the four Courts.
of cases with dissents are:

The raw numbers

Army, 162; Air Force, 65;

Navy, 53; and Coast Guard, 4.
These figures can be compared with data for other
national and state appellate courts.

The results provide

evidence of relatively parallel intracourt behavior on the
military and civilian tribunals.

The conclusion to be

reached from this analysis is that the military courts
have functioned in a manner, quite similar to that of the
recognized judicial institutions.
Goldman reported data on rates of dissent in the
eleven Courts of Appeals during the period of fiscal years
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1962 through 1964.®

Further computation from his tabula

tion reveals a composite rate of dissent of 8.0 per cent.
The range of percentages of nonunanimous opinions from
among the eleven Courts extends from a high of 15-5 per
cent to a low of 2.8 per cent.

Inclusion of all appellate

cases regardless of subject matter in this tabulation
probably increased the rate of dissent over that for a
sample containing criminal litigation only.

Thus, an even

closer comparison would be expected If data were available
to evaluate the criminal dispositions of the military and
civilian appellate courts.
the dissent rates are:

Based on present Information,

military, 4.9 per cent; civilian,

8.0 per cent.
Dissent rates based on criminal cases only have
been computed for state supreme courts by Canon and Jaros.9
In order to control for the number of judges on the courts
of various size in their data base, the two political scien
tists calculated an Index of D i s s e n t . T h i s was necessary
®Sheldon Goldman, "Conflict and Consensus in the
United States Courts of Appeals," Wisconsin Law Review,
1968 (No. 2), 464.
9a complete data presentation is in Bradley C.
Canon and Dean Jaros, "State. Supreme Courts: Some Com
parative Data," State Government, 42 (Autumn, 1969)3
260-64.
%

^ A s developed by
Dissent is expressed: ID
Dissent, Da is the actual
dissent occurs, and De is
portion of cases In which

Canon and Jaros, the Index of
= Da/De where ID is the Index of
proportion of cases in which
the statistically expected pro
dissent occurs, based on the
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because the statistical probability of dissent Increases
with the number of judges on each court.
was computed
and for the

An Index value

for each of the fourmilitary appellate

courts

composite of the four usingthe Canon and Jaros

method.
Canon and Jaros found that a principal factor in
the rate of dissent on state supreme courts was the pres
ence of an intermediate appellate court which filtered
cases to the highest court.

Supreme courts in states with

an intermediate appellate tribunal recorded dissent at
about twice the rate of those courts which hear appeals
directly from trial courts.

The Courts of Military Review

are similar to the supreme courts of the approximately
thirty states which do not have intermediate tribunals.
The Criminal

Index of Dissent for these state courts was

7.I .11

compares very closely with the Index of 6.5

This

mean actual number of judges hearing cases. De = l-2/2n ,
where n equals the mean number of judges hearing cases
rounded to the nearest whole number. This explanation is
provided In each of the articles by Canon and Jaros. For
example, see "Dissent on State Supreme Courts: The Dif
ferential Significance of Characteristics of Judges,"
Midwest Journal of Political Science, 15 (May, 1971), 330-31
and n. 30. Their studies were based on 7,880 cases scien
tifically selected from decisions of the fifty-six high
courts of the states. The additional six courts are the
Court of Criminal Appeals in Texas and in Oklahoma, deci
sions of which are not reviewable by the state, supreme
court in each state; and two! divisions each In the supreme
courts, of Missouri and Washington by which most cases are
adjudged.
•^Canon and Jaros, "External Variables, Institu
tional Structure and Dissent on State Supreme Courts,"
Polity, 3 (Winter, 1970), 192-93-
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for the four Courts of Military Review.

The Index of a

number of Individual state supreme courts falls in the
same range.

For example, the Index for the supreme court

of Utah coincides with the composite military figure, 7.1.
Other courts are:
sas, 7-2.

1P

Kentucky, 6.8; Alabama, 6.4; and Arkan-

Separate calculations of an Index of Dissent

for each of the Courts of Military Review yield the fol
lowing:

Navy, 9-6; Army, 7.2; Air Force, 4.6; and Coast

Guard, 1.9.
Confirmation by the Canon and Jaros generalization
regarding the effect of intermediate appellate courts on
dissent behavior of the highest court In a Jurisdiction is
provided In the military appellate system.

The Index of

Dissent for the Court of Military Appeals for the 1971-1972
term is 14.0, which Is more than twice the Index value of
the composite data of the four Courts of Military Review.
A complete record of dissents on the Court of Military
Appeals has not been published and was not computed as
part of the present study . ^
Additional data on state supreme court dissent
behavior have been reported by Glick and V i n e s . T h e i r
12

Canon and Jaros, "State Supreme Courts," p. 364.

■^Stephen L. Buesche'r and Donald N. Zillman, "The
Court of Military Appeals: A Survey of Recent Decisions,"
Military Law Review, 59 (Winter, 1973), 175•^Henry Robert Glick and Kenneth N. Vines, State
Court :-Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1973)» P- 79-
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source is the complete output of state supreme courts in
1966.

In that year the courts of nineteen states had dis

sent rates of 7.4 per cent or less, the same range as the
twenty-one-year average for each of the four military
courts.

The Glick and Vines data are not as refined as

those prepared by Canon and Jaros in that criminal cases
are not isolated and no distinction is made for the pres
ence of intermediate court filtering.
The paucity of dissent in Courts of Military
Review corresponds with the findings of Richardson and
Vines in a study of the Courts of Appeals in three cir
cuits on specific litigation subjects.1^

"[D]lssent is

simply not a frequent decision making pattern in the courts
of appeals."1^

Their observations regarding the correla

tion of eri banc hearings with dissent are corroborated in
•data on the Courts of Military Review.

Not only is dis

sent more likely to occur statistically on a court panel
of five or more judges, but also the procedure for con
vening a court en banc in both jurisdictions brings the
most controversial issues to hearings before expanded
benches.

Although the Army boards of review occasionally

met jointly to decide a case,, the procedure was not
authorized in the Uniform Co.de until 1969-

None of the

other service tribunals heard cases before combined boards.
^ The Politics of Federal Courts, pp. 123 and 134-41.
l6Ibid., p. 136.
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Under the authorization, for en banc procedures enacted in
1968, the Judge Advocates General promulgated rules which
permitted full-bench reconsideration of panel decisions
upon the motion of either party in the case.

Further, the

Courts followed an Internal operating policy of circulat
ing draft opinions of a three-judge panel among the entire
Court membership.

Upon the request of any judge, an

en banc hearing would be conducted to supersede the panel
decision.

As a result of these arrangements, the number

of en banc decisions increased markedly in 1969-1971.
Predictably, approximately one quarter of all nonunanimous
decisions in the history of the Army appellate tribunal
were reported in 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 7 1 - The other Courts did not
experience such a significant increase in number of dis
sents .
The Court of Military Appeals invalidated in 1970
both procedures under which a panel decision could be
reconsidered.1®

The effect of the action by the highest

military court was to reduce the number of en banc hear
ings by the intermediate courts.
number of dissents declined.

Simultaneously, the

The reduction is evident in

1^This comparison is. based on the number of cases
with dissents reported in Court -Mart i al Reports., Vol. 42
(197.0). and Vol. 43 (197.0-197.1)'*
l8United States v. Ch'ilcote, 20 USCMA 283, 43 CMR
123 (1.970) and United States, v. Wheeler, 20 USCMA 595, 44
CMR 25 (197D.
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dispositions by the Army Court in 1971-1972 when only nine
nonunanimous cases were reported in contrast to the fortyfour such cases during the previous eighteen months.
additional effect of the Chilcote decision was the conver
sion by the Air Force Court in mid-1971 to a permanent
en banc arrangement.

The associated factor in the change

was a simultaneous reduction in the number of authorized
judgeships on the Air Force Court.

Although the reduced

number still provided for two panels, one judgeship was
vacant throughout most of 1971-1972.

Therefore, the Court

operated with five Judges participating in every decision.
The occurrence of dissent on the three largest of
the military tribunals has been distributed somewhat unevenly
throughout the history of the courts.

The greatest con

sistency existed in the Army tribunals, with the exception
of the previously described series of en banc decisions in
1970-1971.

During the first six years of operation by the

Air Force boards of review, dissenting opinions were
written in approximately 5 per cent of the cases.

How

ever, during 1957 through 1967 only five nonunanimous
cases were published.

No explanation is available for

this rather abrupt change in' judicial behavior.
Perhaps the most unexplainable contradiction exists
regarding dissent on the Navy, boards of review during the
■^Eight nonunanimous cases were reported in CourtMartial Reports, Vol. 44 (1971-1972) and one such case In
Vol. 45 (1971-1972).
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1951-1956 period.

The twenty, volumes of Court-Martial

Reports covering those years contain 399 Navy decisions,
only five of which include dissents.

This contrast with

the relatively vigorous dissenting behavior on the Army
and Air Force boards of review led to an official query
to the Navy Judge Advocate General by a subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee in 1956.

The Navy's

senior legal officer denied a rumor that he had directed
the boards of review to refrain from writing dissents.
Dissents appear in approximately 25 percent [sic] of
the cases on which opinions are written and this is
entirely to be expected and meets with my endorsement
because if there were no dissents out of the boards of
review I would incline to the view that the individual
members were not giving the cases their undivided judi
cial attention. There are bound to be dissents. This
is a healthy situation.20
Based on dissents in slightly more than 1 per cent of the
cases published during the period, the quoted dissent rate
of 25 per cent seems implausible.
Analysis of the substance of dissents in military
decisions reveals a majority in each of the tribunals
favoring the individual rather than the government.

Thus,

the dissenters1 viewpoint was more liberal than was that
adopted by the majority in each nonunanimous opinion.

The

difference between the views ranged from complete disagree
ment on questions of guilt to recommendations for lesser
20Memorandum from Rear Admiral Ira H. Nunn, .April 30,.
1956, printed in Hearings on H.R. 6583 (1956), p.' 8656.
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sentences than those imposed by the majority.

The extent

of the libertarian view among the dissenters ranged from
67*2 per cent on the Navy Court to 5^.3 per cent on the Air
Force Court.

No direct comparison can be made between the

policy direction present in military and civilian courts.
No researcher has reported the trend in criminal cases
heard by the Courts of Appeals.

However, a logical

assumption is that dissents there would also favor the
convicted defendant because of the approximately 82 per
cent of the dispositions which affirm trial court judgments.
Characteristics of judges
The quantitative comparisons of decision-making
trends and of dissent behavior contribute to confirmation
of the hypothesis that military appellate courts are in
fact judicial institutions.

However, other kinds of com

parisons are impossible because of lack of data on mili
tary judges.

For example, one political scientist has

sought to correlate dissent behavior of United States
Supreme Court justices with four background characteristics
of individual members.21.

Similar inquiries have been con

ducted into personal traits and attributes of the judges
21S. Sidney Ulmer, "Dissent Behavior and the Social
Background of Supreme Court Justices," Journal of Politics.
32 (August, 1970), 580-98. See, also, Joel B. Grossman,
"Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making," Harvard
Law Review, 79 (June. 1966), 1551-6lf.
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of the Courts of Appeals.22

The previously cited work by

Canon and Jaros contains a study of the effect of personal
background on state supreme court justices' voting behav
ior.2^

Comparable study of the military judiciary cannot

be accomplished because for practical purposes the Judges
are anonymous.

The introductory pages of practically

any volume of judicial opinions include identification of
the judges serving on the courts issuing the published
decisions.

Courts-Martial Reports, the series containing

opinions from the four intermediate appellate courts, is
an exception; the names of the military appellate judges
are not published in the,volumes.

Thus, the researcher

can compile only a potentially incomplete list of last
names as signed on opinions.

Conceivably, none of the

decisions in which a given judge participated may have
been published.
Although data on the background and professional
experience of individual judges are unavailable, a com
posite profile of these men can be assembled from general
pp

For example, Sheldon Goldman, "Voting Behavior
on the United States Courts, of Appeals, 1961-1964," Ameri
can Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 374-83.
The same author has written "Judicial Appointments to the
United States Court of Appeals," Wisconsin Law Review. 1967
(Winter, 1967), 186-214, and "Characteristics of Eisenhower
and Kennedy Appointeea'-to the" Lower Federal Courts," Western
Political Quarterly. 18 (December, 1965), 755-62,.
23"Dissent 0n State Supreme Courts: The Differen
tial Significance of Characteristics of Judges," pp. 322-46.
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descriptions.

Members of the boards and Courts in the

Air Force and Army participated In military legal affairs
almost exclusively before appointment to the appellate
tribunals.

During the first decade of operation of the

Navy and Coast Guard boards, some members alternated
between legal and operational military duties.

Typical

positions in which appellate judges served Included most
of the activities of the military departments’ legal
agency.

Probably a majority of these duties were unrelated

to criminal law; the other fields involved contracts, pro
curement, and International law.

Common duties within the

criminal justice system were service as a trial judge and
as prosecution or defense counsel.

Many officers were the

staff attorney for a major commander, and In that capacity
they prepared the convening authority review of courtmartial convictions.

Only a few military appellate judges

had any experience in a judgeship in a civilian jurisdic
tion.

These individuals served on the boards of review In

the early 1950's.
Judges of the four Courts of Military Review who
were serving In mid-1973 attained their positions through
a variety of professional assignments.

Most spent the

majority of their previous duty in appointments related
2^Data for this profile were developed from the
Hodson, Krouse, and Amery interviews, the Jones letter,
and random testimony to Congressional committees.

to the criminal justice system.

A common stepping stone

to the appellate bench was an appellate counsel position
in which lawyers appear before the Courts of Military
Review and the Court of Military Appeals.

Regardless of

the actual positions held by the judges, all have been
socialized in the military judicial environment.

However,

this background includes an earlier socialization in the
norms and ethics of the legal profession developed in their
law school education.

(Some of the more senior officers

attended law school while on active military duty.

It is

open to speculation whether their socialization is different
from that of the judges who followed the more common
sequence of education and then military duty.)

Of the

fifteen current members of the Army Court all hold the
grade of colonel, with the exception of one lieutenant
colonel and the chief judge who is a retired major general
recalled to active duty.

All five members of the Air Force

Court hold the grades of either colonel or lieutenant
colonel.

The predominant grades of members of the Navy

and Coast Guard Courts is captain.

However, these two

Courts have judges with a greater variety of status.
the ten Navy judges, two are. retired officers.

Of

Similarly,

one of the five Coast Guard Judges is retired from that
service.

Although these three men are currently serving

in a civilian capacity, their, backgrounds are comparable
to those pf the active-duty: military members.

The only
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civilian without extensive military experience currently
serving on any of the four tribunals is the Coast Guard
chief judge who has been a member of that bench since its
organization in 1951.
A civilian attorney was appointed to each of the
seven original Navy boards of review in 1951.

However,

each was succeeded upon his voluntary retirement or resig
nation by a military lawyer.

Availability of Navy attorneys

with criminal justice experience was the reason for both
the initial appointment and subsequent phasing-out of
civilian judges.

Under the Articles for the Government

of the Navy very few lawyers were needed to administer the
judicial and disciplinary systemj practically all functions
were performed by the unit commander.

With implementation

of the Uniform Code, the Navy had insufficient experienced
criminal lawyers to serve in all positions requiring such
individuals under the new statute.

Accordingly, civilian

lawyers specializing in criminal practice were appointed
to the new appellate review tribunals.

During the ensuing

years as more Navy lawyers gained experience in criminal
justice affairs the civilian judges were replaced with
military offleers.^5
One advantage of civilian membership on the appel
late courts is the continuity of service.

Civilian judges

on the Navy Court served, in effect, under an indefinite
^ j o n e s letter.
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tenure appointment.

In contrast, military judges on each

of the tribunals have averaged between three and four years
duty.
From available evidence, a characteristic of the
judges throughout the history of the military intermediate
appellate courts has been their personal adoption of judi
cial attitudes.

As a member of the boards or Courts, each

individual apparently recognized his responsibility to act
as an impartial judge of the facts affecting the liberty
and reputation of the convicted individual.

Most regarded

a judgeship as a position of prestige within the military
and considered themselves to be the equivalent of Federal
appellate judges, although they certainly recognized the
lack of many of the positive attributes of that status.
Additionally, the Independence of the judges individually
and of the Courts collectively has been emphasized by com
mentators.

Official policy on the subject Is typified by

a statement from the Navy Judge Advocate General at the
time of organization of the boards of review.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice contemplates
that in the review of cases within their cognizance
the Boards of Review shall be free of all coercion.
^Interviews with Earl A. Morgan, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, March 13, 1973; Claiborne Dameron, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, March 15 > 1973; and Myron L. Birnbaum, Washing
ton, D.C., December 12, 197.2, all of whom were members of
Air Force boards of review, during the 1950's.
Interview
with Abraham Nemrow, a judge of the Army Court of Military
Review in the late 1960*s, Falls Church, Virginia, Decem
ber 11, 1972, and March 28, 1973. Hodson, Krouse, and
Amery interviews. Jones letter.
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This applies, of course, not only to outside influences
upon the Boards but to all relationships between indi
vidual members of a particular Board.27
Although complete voting data on individual judges
are unavailable, sufficient information exists to suggest
that background influences work in similar fashion on both
military and civilian Judges.

For example, tabulation of

dissenting votes cast by each military judge reveals a
rather fixed pattern of behavior.

Most of the dissenters

consistently supported either the appellant or the govern
ment.

The Navy judge with the greatest number of dissents

deviated only once from supporting the individual.

Similar

consistency exists in the votes of the frequent dissenters
on the.'Army and Air Force tribunals.

With more complete

voting statistics and information on the social and pro
fessional backgrounds of the judges, perhaps explanations
could be suggested for the seeming predilection of a given
jurist to support the claim of the appellant rather than
of the government in controversial litigation.
An assessment
This examination of judicial process and intra
court behavior has developed support for the hypothesis
that the military intermediate appellate courts are judi
cial institutions.

Quantitative comparisons of the features

^Memorandum from the Judge Advocate General, United
States Navy [Rear Admiral G., L. Russellj, subject:
Boards
of Review, February 21, 1951.
Copy provided to the writer
by Judge Jones.
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of the military courts and their counterparts in the state
and Federal judiciaries haive revealed substantial simi
larities.

Members of military appellate tribunals have

performed and expressed attitudes suggestive of the con
clusion that the personnel are cte facto Judges and the
institutions are de facto courts.

This evidence comple

ments legislative and judicial actions which have enabled
the military courts to progress along the continuum toward
legislative court status.

CHAPTER VIII
THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION— PROSPECTS
FOR FURTHER JUDICIALIZATION
Judiclalization of the military legal system, and
particularly of the intermediate appellate courts, is an
ongoing process.

As change to date occurred through an

erratic and tortuous evolution, predictably future achieve
ments will be the product of slow and irregular movement.
The only reliable supposition is that a separate military
law jurisdiction will continue to exist in the United
States.

Since enactment in 1968 of amendments to the Uni

form Code, numerous recommendations for further revision
have been advanced by Congressmen, official and unofficial
study groups, and influential individuals.

Although pas

sage of any of their plans is unlikely in the near future,
these proposals are significant indicators of continuing
trends in the transition of military legal institutions
and procedures.
Supreme Court review of
military decisions
Despite reductions in the jurisdiction of military
courts since 1955 > the existence of separate tribunals and
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criminal statutes for the armed forces Is so embedded In
American law as to be permanent.1

It is improbable that

Congress by positive legislation or the Supreme Court by
Interpretation of the Constitution would require the
prosecution of all military-related crimes by servicemen
in Federal courts of general jurisdiction.

Moreover, in

several opinions the Court has emphasized the validity of
the separation, as in a 1972 decision citing the "basic
principles of comity that must prevail between the civil
ian and the military judicial systems."2

The dual struc

tures preclude review of military judicial decisions by a
civilian court until all military remedies have been com
pleted. ^

The precedent for Supreme Court recognition of

separate military law was developed more than a century
ago.

In 1857 the Court ruled that courts-martial were

not established under Article III of the Constitution.2*
Six years later the Court stated that It lacked jurisdic
tion to review by certiorari the decisions of military
^-Three decisions of the Supreme Court have limited
military jurisdiction: United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955)•> prohibited prosecution of dis
charged servicemen for crimes! committed while subject to
the Uniform Code; Reid v.. Covert,. 354 U.S. 1 (1957), pro
hibited prosecution of civilians in peacetime; and 0 1Callihan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 25.8 (1969) » prohibited prosecution
of servicemen commiting crimes not service-connected occur
ring off government property.
2Parisi v, Davidson, .405 U.S. 34, 46 (1972).
3Noyd v. Bond, 395. U.S. 683 (1969).
^Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (U.S. 1857)-
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courts.^

The relationship was summarized by the Court:

"Military law, like state law, is a Jurisprudence which
exists separate and apart from the law which governs in
our federal Judicial establishment.

This Court has played

no role in its development.

In a 1962 speech Chief

. . ."^

Justice Earl Warren remarked, "[X]t could hardly be expected
that the regular federal Judiciary would play a large role
in regulating the military's treatment of its own person
nel.

The considerations militating against such inter

vention remain strong.
Contrasting with the precedents for continued
separation of military and civilian adjudicatory systems
are two recently published proposals to abolish, in effect,
the military legal system as it has historically existed.
The functions would be transferred to civilian control under
the Jurisdiction of the general Federal courts.

The less

detailed of the two plans is that of a civilian law profes
sor who has frequently criticized existing military legal
procedures.®

He urged that civilian prosecution and judg

ment of military crimes be implemented through modification
5e x parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 2^3 (U.S. 1863).
6Burns v. Wilson, 3^6. U.S. 137, 1^0 (1953).
7"The Bill of Rights, and the Military," Mew York
University Law Review, 37 (April, 1962), 188.
®Edward F. Sherman, "Military Justice Without Mili
tary Control," Yale Law Journal, 82 (June, 1973), 1398-1425.
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of methods used In Great Britain, West Germany, and Sweden,
A retired Army lawyer insisted that command Influence; and
associated abuses can be eliminated only by "completely
removing [the legal system] from the operational control
of the military departments" and placing it in "the hands
of civilian administrators, preferably under the control
of the Attorney General of the United States."9

Civilian

trial lawyers, judges, and legal administrators would
replace military officers in every position throughout the
trial and appellate structure.

The military commander's

only duty would be to initiate criminal charges against
his subordinates.

Trial juries would continue to be com

posed of military personnel.

Such drastic dismantling of

the traditional system is improbable without massive expo
sure of gross injustice and misconduct within existing
Institutions.
Although dual systems predictably will continue,
a commonly supported reform is a method to bring military
court decisions under United States Supreme Court review.
The procedure is to provide a writ of certiorari from the
Court of Military Appeals to the Supreme Court.

Such legis

lation would give the highest court jurisdiction which it
ruled in 1863 it did not possess.

Certiorari would enable

the Supreme Court to accept for examination military cases
on the same basis as any Federal or state litigation.

At

^West, "A History of Command Influence," pp. 153-54.
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present, a military member must be denied desired relief
by the two military appellate courts before he can petition
for a writ of habeas corpus from the lowest Federal court.
If the district and appellate courts reject his plea, then
he can petition the Supreme Court for review.

Under the

proposed amendment, the Individual could approach the
Supreme Court immediately after denial of relief by the
Court of Military Appeals.
Certiorari to the Supreme Court can be authorized
by the addition of a one-sentence section to the United
States Code.10

This is the form of legislation introduced

in each of the past three Congresses.11

Support will

probably be forthcoming from the Code Committee— the judges
of the Court of Military Appeals and the Judge Advocates
General.

At the Committee’s direction a joint-service

Chapter 81 of title 28 of the United States Code
would be amended by adding at the end thereof a new section
to be numbered 1259: "Cases in the United States Court of
Military Appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
writ of certiorari." H.R. 291, A Bill to Protect the Con
stitutional Rights of Those Subject to the Military Justice
System, To Revise the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and
for Other Purposes, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, sec. 3*
Similar language is contained in essentially identical bills
in the same session, H.R. 316 and S. 987- Earlier legisla
tion which died without hearings included S. 4191, 91st Cong.,
2d sess., 1970; H.R. 579, ,9-2d Cong., 1st sess., 1971; and
S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971*
11For an explanation of the legislation, see remarks
by Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, 117 Cong. Rec. 5310 (1971)
and 119 Cong. Rec. S 3142 (daily edition, February 22, 1973).
See, also, Bayh, "The Military Justice Act of 1971: The
Need for Legislative Reform," American Criminal Law Review,
10 (July, 1971), 9-24.
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panel has studied the plan for two years.

Although the

effect of the revision is seemingly unambiguous, the over
cautious leaders of the military legal system have refrained
from recommending enactment of the certiorari

provision.

Late in 1972 the Army declared its concurrence in
the provision for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

The

other services were silent on the subject in their replies
to the same questionnaire from the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights.
An influential endorsement of certiorari has come
from Chief Judge Kenneth J. Hodson of the Army Court of
Military Review.

In his present position and as a former

Army Judge Advocate General, Major General Hodson among
military legal officials is perhaps the most progressive
3-2USCMA-JAG Annual Report, 1970, p. 2 and 1971,
p. 2. Perhaps the Code Committee reached agreement on the
proposal during 1972; the report for 1972 had not been pub
lished and distributed as of the date of this writing.
One
problem which the Committee was possibly considering con
cerns the opportunity for petitioning the Supreme Court by
the 90 per cent of convicted defendants whose cases are
presently beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Military
Appeals. In United States v. Bevilacqua, 18 USCMA 10, 39
CMR 10 (1968), the Court of Military Appeals defined its
extraordinary relief authority, as restricted to cases within
its jurisdiction under 10 ;U.S.C. sec. 867(b). Of course,
the vast majority of those cases outside the Courtrs juris
diction are unlikely to contain points of unsettled law on
which the Supreme Court would likely grant certiorari.
•^Question l-D-10. A copy of the Subcommittee
questionnaire and Departmental responses was provided to
the writer by Colonel Victor A. De Fiori, U. S. Army,
Director, Legislation and Selected Policies., Office of the
Assistant Secretary of. Defense— Manpower and Reserve Affairs,
December 27, 1972. The Coast Guard was not asked to reply
to this survey.
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and conscious of the need for judlclalizatlon.

In three

recent articles he urged adoption of the certiorari legis
lation to "bring military justice under the umbrella of
the Supreme Court . . . [because] that should remove mili
tary courts from the stigma of being an executive, or what
14
is worse, a political court."
Similar reasoning was used
In endorsements by a noted civilian attorney and by a mili
tary lawyer. ^-5
No specific opposition to the certiorari plan has
appeared in legal periodicals.

However, one Air Force

attorney counseled a moratorium on revision of military
legal institutions and procedures.

In citing the advance

ments under the Military Justice Act of 1968, he concluded,
"[I]t seems prudent to allow the system to mature fully
without the enactment of further changes at this time."16
Notably, authorization for direct review by the Supreme
Court of military appellate court decisions apparently
^"Courts-Martial and the Commander," San Diego Law
Review, 10 (December, 1972), 70. See, also, "The Manual
for Courts-Martlal: 1984," Military Law Review, 57 (Sum
mer, 1972), 11; and, "Military Justice: Time for Radical
Change?" Yale Law Journal, forthcoming (copy of draft pro
vided by Chief Judge Hodson to this writer).
l^Louis B. Nichols, "The Justice of Military Jus
tice,". W3JJ:iam_jmdLjyiar^
12 (Spring, 1971), 508;
and, Frank E. Barker, "Military -Law: A Separate System of
Jurisprudence," University of Cincinnati Law Review, 36
(Spring, 1967), 22&1
^Ge o r g e D. Schrader, "Military Justice: A System
for the Seventies," Air University Review, 23 (May-June,
1972), 49.
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was not considered in previous revisions of the military
criminal law statutes..

However, the lack of such Initia

tive Is explainable in that autonomy of the militarycontrolled system would be undermined by enactment of a
certiorari authorization.

Military traditionalists pre

sumably halted examination of the subject in public forums.
When viewed in terms of the enhancement of justice, the
benefits to be derived from the right to petition the
nation’s highest court seem uncontestable.

As pointed

out by Chief Judge Hodson, the provision for certiorari
should give the military tribunals a greater judicial
status.-1-?

Addition of the military jurisdiction as a

source of certiorari petitions to the Supreme Court prob
ably would not significantly increase its workload.

Thus,

no serious opposition should develop from this concern.
Since prospects for hearings on a comprehensive
military justice bill are minimal in the Ninety-third Con
gress (1973-19710

3

advocates of the certiorari plan might

well note the history of enactments in the late 1950's and
early I960's.

The Code Committee originally suggested a

composite seventeen-section bill.

After years of legisla

tive inaction, the sponsors introduced the principal amend
ments as separate bills, a number of which were passed.

A

similar process may be necessary to obtain enactment of the
one sentence pertaining to certiorari.

This method would

•^See, above, pp. 166-67 and n. 14.

169
probably be successful if the military leadership, the
judges of the Court of Military Appeals, and the influen
tial interest groups united in supporting passage.
Congressional proposals
for judicializatlon
Most of the substantive military law reforms pro
posed since 1968 were included in comprehensive bills intro
duced in the Ninety-second and Ninety-third Congresses by
Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana and Representative Charles
Bennett of Florida.3-®

The other major approach to military

law reform was sponsored by Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon
in the Ninety-first and Ninety-second Congresses.

His pro

posals were divided into thirteen separate bills, in con
trast to the omnibus bill of Senator Bayh and Representa
tive Bennett.^9

These bills will be the sources for the

following analysis of recommended revisions of the laws
governing appellate review.
l8S. 1127 and H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971
and S. 987 and H.R. 291, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973Repre
sentative Jonathan Bingham of New York introduced essen
tially the same bill as H.R. 316 in the Ninety-third Con
gress. Article 66 pertaining to appellate matters is
identical in all the bills cited.
^ S . 2171 through S. 2183, 92d Cong., 1st sess.,
1971S. 2172 pertains to appellate courts. As of July,
1973, Senator Hatfield had not introduced his bills in the
Ninety-third Congress.
^°For a summary of legislative proposals intro
duced through early-1971, see, Edward F. Sherman, "Congres
sional Proposals for Reform pf Military Law," American
Criminal Law Review, 10 (July, 1971), 25-^9.
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The objective of the Bayh-Bennett legislation is
elimination of command influence from military adjudica
tion, the same goal of reformers beginning with General
Ansell in 1918.

The commander of the convicted person has

historically performed the first review of court-martial
proceedings.

The task of ascertaining legal sufficiency

of the conviction and the appropriateness of the sentence
is accomplished on the advice of the commander's staff
lawyer.

According to Senator Bayh, "This procedure has

become for the most part, either a time-consuming formality
or an invitation [to the court-martial jury] to Impose the
maximum sentences so that the commander can reduce them."21
The proposed amendment abolishes the commander's review
and causes the record of every trial to be sent directly
to the Court of Military Review or to the Office of the
Judge Advocate General, depending upon sentence severity.
Jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate courts is not
increased by the plan; however, the Courts will probably
modify more sentences than at present since they will
assume the task of the commander.

A modification of the

Bayh-Bennett plan is advocated by Chief Judge Hodson who
recommended authorizing the. ^commander a clemency power
because that local officer is the best evaluator of the
convicted person's rehabilitation potential.22

A slightly

21117 Cong. Rec. 5305 (1971).
Op

"Courts-Martial and the Commander," p. 67.
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different approach was suggested by the Code Committee in
its 1971 legislative program.

Under its plan, the com

mander would retain power to mitigate a sentence but would
lose his current authority, to review a verdict.23
The Bayh-Bennett bill provides improvements in the
Courts of Military Review.

Nevertheless, a serious defi

ciency is the absence of a positive declaration of the
status of the tribunals as legislative courts.

Although

the wording providing for the establishment of the Courts
of Military Review is changed from that in the present
statute, the new language leaves open the possibility of
challenge to the Courts' status.

The Uniform Code now

reads, "Each Judge Advocate General shall establish a
Court of Military Review.

. . ."24

The proposed language

reads, "There is established in each service a Court of
Military Review.

. . ."25

This language contrasts with

the clause providing for establishment of the Court of
Military Appeals, which reads, "There is a United States
Court of Military Appeals established under article X of
the Constitution.

. . ."26

The distinction is evident

also in the language providing for the United States
2 3uscMA-JAG

Annual Report, 1971, P* 2.

2it10 U.S.C.

sec. 866(a) (1970).

25h.R. 291,

sec. 866(a).

2610 U.S.C.

sec. 867(a) (1970).

See, above, p. 114.
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Tax Court, the tribunal most recently given legislative
court status.

"There is hereby established, under article 1

of the Constitution of the United States, a court of record
to be known as the United States Tax Court."2?

Conse

quently, it is evident that the Courts of Military Review
would not attain unquestioned status as legislative courts
under the Bayh-Bennett bill.

A different kind of ambiguity

results from the establishment clause of the Hatfield bill,
which reads, "The President shall establish within each of
the armed services a Court of Military Review.

. . ."28

Although establishment by the President is more prestigious
than establishment by the Judge Advocate General, the judi
cial character of the Courts of Military Review is not
improved by this language.

The implication remains that

the Courts are creatures of the executive branch.
The precise wording of the establishment clause is
important in terms of the authority of the Courts under
the All Writs Act.

As analyzed in Chapter VI, above,

extraordinary relief writs can be Issued by "courts estab
lished by act of Congress."29

The Bayh-Bennett language

would probably meet that requirement; whereas, the Hatfield
language likely would not.

The writs question is further

2?26 U.S.C. sec. 7441 (1970)..
28S. 2172, sec. 866(a).
2928 U.S.C. sec. 1651(a)

(1970).
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complicated by a very persistent printing error.

In his

floor speeches introducing the omnibus bill in 1971 and
1973, Senator Bayh specifically stated that the Courts of
Military Review would have power to issue all writs and
cited such authority as derived from "article 66(i)" of
his bill.30

However, subsection (i) has never been printed

in the text of any of the bills introduced by Bayh, Bennett,
or Bingham.

Even the text of the bill printed in the

Congressional Record immediately following Bayh's 1971
speech concludes Section 866 with subsection (h).31

Thus,

the intent presumably is to confer all writs power on the
Courts of Military Review by a direct statement, rather
than to have that power assumed under the definition of
"courts established by act of Congress."

However, the

printing error must be corrected to ensure -the authoriza
tion.
Another ambiguity exists in the Bayh-Bennett bill
because of a drafting error.32

Military judges who preside

over trials are granted writs authority by the bill in Sec
tion 826(b).

Section 866(h) provides that "judges of the

Court of Military Review shall be. deemed military judges
3°117 Cong. Rec. 5310 .(1971) and 119 Cong, Rec.
S 3143 (February 22, 1973* daily edition).
31ll7 Cong. Rec. 5319 (1971).
3^This same error exists in all versions of the
Bayh-Bennett legislation.
For illustration purposes, see
H.R. 291, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973 In the sections cited
herein.

171*
for the purpose of section 836(a)(2)."

The error In the

middle digit.of the subsection number is an explainable
typographical substitution; however, the reference to sub
section (a)(2) is questionable since that clause authorizes
military judges to "rule finally on all motions."

There is

little reason for appellate military judges to possess that
authority only.

As with the dropping of Section 866(i),

this error exists in all printed texts of the bills from
1970 through 1973.

The Bayh-Bennett bill does not refer

to writs authority for the Court of Military Appeals, pre
sumably because such power has been confirmed by the
Supreme Court.

In contrast, the Hatfield bill grants such

authority to the highest military appellate court but makes
no provision for writs power for the intermediate courts.
As described above, support for enactment of writs
authority is rather general.
endorsed the plan.33

The Army has officially

The Code Committee, instead of recom

mending specifically that writs power be granted to the
Courts of Military Review, has deferred judgment on the
policy by merely suggesting that Congress "specify the
extent" to which each of the: military courts may entertain
petitions for extraordinary relief.3^

The granting of All

Writs. Act power to the Courts, of Military Review, would, in
^ S e n a t e Constitutional Rights Subcommittee ques
tionnaire, 1972, question I-D-10.
^ USCMA-JAG Annual Report, 1971, P- 1*
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effect, establish them as legislative courts.
Judicial attributes for the Courts of Military
Review are increased to a greater extent under the BayhBennett bill than under the Hatfield plan.

Both retain

the Judicialization actions of the Military Justice Act of
1968.

The Bayh-Bennett bill emphasizes the need for Judi

cial independence of the Courts.

Each Court is to be

located in the Office of the Judge Advocate General for
administrative support, but it is to "be otherwise inde
pendent of all other military command and control [in] the
performance of its Judicial function."

The two plans differ

on an important subject of Judicial prestige.

The Bayh-

Bennett bill grants authority to the Courts to prescribe
rules of procedure for practice before them and to estab
lish qualifications for attorneys admitted to their bar,
while the Hatfield bill directs the President to establish
rules of procedure and omits any provision for the Courts'
bar.

These two functions are typically performed by

courts themselves in most Jurisdictions.

Under present

law the Judge Advocates General handle all such adminis
trative matters.
The right of the' military courts to prescribe their
own operating methods and the', essential supplementary rules
to implement the Uniform Code is an important element of
Judicialization.

Judicial authority of the military appel

late courts could be increased by a grant to them of power
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to develop and promulgate appropriate directives.

The

Bayh-Bennett bill continues the present provision of the
Uniform Code which authorizes the President to prescribe
such rules.35

The document containing supplements to and

authoritative interpretations of the Code is the Manual
for Courts-Martial.36

Among the important subjects in the

document are rules of evidence, elements of proof of each
crime punishable under the statute., and the maximum penalty
for each crime.
A desirable alternative to the present method of
issuance of the necessary rules is to replace executive
action with judicial development and publication of such
regulations.

A logical agency to perform the task is a

military judicial conference, according to Army Chief Judge
H o d s o n .3 ?

To be chaired by the Chief Judge of the Court of

Military Appeals, the statutorily created conference of
representatives of all the military judiciaries would have
power to prescribe rules for the entire legal system.
Their principal product would be equivalent to the present
Manual for Courts-Martial.

The actual text of rules pre

pared under the new system probably would not differ in
3510 u.S.C. sec. 836 (1970).
3^The current edition of the document is the
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (revised
edition), issued as Executive. Order 11746, June 19, 1969.
3?Hodson interview and "Military Justice:
for Radical Change?" draft p. 2 6 .

Time
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significant degree from that at present because under both
methods the drafting would be performed by a Joint-scrvlce
team of lawyers.

However, the important point for pres

tige of the military courts is the authority for publi
cation.

As long as the Manual for Courts-Martial and the

rules for court procedure are published by executive branch
officials, the military courts will be deprived of a
characteristic possessed by constitutional and legislative
courts.
The subject of personnel for the Courts of Mili
tary Review is one on which all reformers have opinions.
Among the options proposed, those in the Bayh-Bennett bill
are perhaps least innovative.

The existing statute implies

that the Judge Advocate General will assign judges to the
Court of Military Review.

However, the personal partici

pation of the senior legal officer in each service is not
specifically required.

As noted in Chapter VII, assign

ments to the Courts are made through standard personnel
actions, with the chief judges having opportunity for rec
ommendation of specific individuals.

The Judge Advocate

General may exercise the right of final approval of a per
son selected by the personnel, staff.

Under the Bayh-

Bennett bill, the Judge Advocate General is directly
responsible for appointment of each judge.

It is realis

tic to expect that the actual mechanisms for selecting
prospective judges .will not change drastically under the
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revised language.

Notably, the Bayh-Bennett bill does not

provide a means of increasing the prestige of the Courts by
having the judges appointed by an official superior to the
Judge Advocates General.

Further, the bill does not specify

a tenure for the military appellate Judges, thereby per
mitting their service to be at the discretion of the mili
tary hierarchy as at present.
Presidential appointment Is recommended by several
authorities.

The Hatfield bill provides for such appoint

ment for a term of three years and sets eligibility as
experience in military judicial affairs for both military
and civilian judges.

The existing requirement of member

ship in the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court
of a state is retained.

For the military members, a minimum

grade of lieutenant colonel or commander Is specified; the
grade corresponds to a total of approximately eighteen
years active duty under present promotion policies.

Other

supporters of Presidential appointment are Edward F. Sher
man, a civilian attorney, and Chief Judge Hodson.
former recommended a three-year term.38

The

Army jurist

favored a four-year Presidential appointment for all mili
tary judges, both trial and appellate, as a means of
ensuring independence from command influence originating
■3Q
at any level of the hierarchy. J
38"civilIanization of Military Law," p. 103•
^Hodson interview and "Military Justice," p. 26.
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An additional method for accomplishing the goal of
prestige and independence is the establishment of judge
ships on the same basis as permanent professorships at the
United States Military Academy and the United States Air
Force Academy.

Officers appointed as academic department

heads are promoted to the grade of colonel and given tenure
until their voluntary retirement or resignation.

The offi

cer serving as dean of the faculty is promoted to the grade
of brigadier general and given similar indefinite tenure.1*0
Using this precedent, the chief judge of each Court could
be appointed by the President to the position which would
carry the grade of brigadier general and other judges
would receive permanent promotion to the grade of colonel.
Civilian judges would receive comparable salaries but
would relinquish civil service status.

This arrangement

for grade and tenure would remove incumbent judges from
the military promotion system and thereby eliminate the
need for periodic personnel ratings.

The patterning of

judicial appointments after the model of academy profes
sorships has not appeared in published proposals for mili
tary law reform.
Existing and suggested, legislation on Court of
Military Review judgeships must be evaluated in terms of
Supreme Court interpretations on the broader question of
1*°10 U.S.C. sec. 4335 and sec. 4336 (for the Army)
and sec. 9335 and sec. 9336 (for the Air Force).
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executive control of appointees performing Judicial func
tions.

As noted, neither the present statute nor the Bayh-

Bennett bill provides for tenure for appellate judges or
for procedures for their removal.
a removal method.

The Hatfield bill omits

In contrast, the existing statute and

the Bayh-Bennett bill do provide for tenure and a removal
procedure for judges of the Court of Military Appeals.
They serve for fifteen years and "may be removed by the
President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty
or malfeasance in office, or for mental or physical dlshi
ability, but for no other cause." 1 This difference in
status of judgeships on the two military appellate courts
illustrates a need for positive reforms if the intermediate
appellate courts are to obtain de jure recognition as legis
lative courts.
At present the judges of the Courts of Military
Review must be considered simply administrative appointees
serving at the pleasure of the Judge Advocates General.
If an appellate military judge were summarily dismissed
unquestionably without cause and then brought suit for
reinstatement, what would be. the Federal courts' judgmerit

II o

Based on Supreme .Court interpretations of Presi

dential power to remove appointees, the courts would have
^ 1 0 U.S.C. sec. 867(a)(2) (1970).
ii p

In this hypothetical case it must be recognised
that such a dismissal would not simultaneously terminate
the judge's military commission or civil service appointment.
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to determine initially the nature of the functions performed
by the appellate military

J u d g e .

**3

jf the courts found that

his task was indeed Judicial in nature, then the ruling
logically would be that such an unsubstantiated dismissal
was illegal, based on the Supreme Court's decision in
Wiener v. United States. I f

the courts determined the

function to be executive in nature, then the dismissed
appointee would have no recourse under the doctrine of
Myers v. United States.**5
Although differences exist between circumstances of
the specific appointment held by the appellant in Wiener
and the appellate military Judgeships, the two can be
classified as comparable for this analysis.

Thus, the

opinion must be that the Courts of Military Review perform
a Judicial function.

The Supreme Court's Wiener decision

emphasized that Judges must be immune from external coer
cion affecting their Judicial decisions.

Appellate mili

tary Judges, too, must be legally immune from improper
influence from their superiors in the executive branch.
This examination of the status of military Judgeships sug
gests that the Courts of Military Review inherently possess
^3it is assumed here 'that the constitutional
trine applies not only to the. President but .to other
cutive officials. Thus, by. extension the assumption
that the Judge Advocate General is constrained as is
President.
Iiii

357 U.S. 349 (195.8).
45272 U.S. 52 (1926).-
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an important judicial attribute.— independence— which, in
turn, enhances the quality of justice prevailing in the
legal system.

Independence could be further ensured

through specific provisions in the Uniform Code for judi
cial appointment, tenure, and removal procedures.

These

elements probably will be essential to a Congressional
declaration of legislative court status for the tribunals.
Other portions of the proposed bills provide addi
tional efforts at judicialization.

Both the Bayh-Bennett

and Hatfield bills alter the jurisdiction of the Courts of
Military Review.

Additionally, the recommendations of a

civilian reformer and of a 1972 Department of Defense study
group are for elimination of automatic appeals.

The Courts

of Military Review now receive cases in which the sentence
"affects a general or flag officer or extends to death,
dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman,
dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for
one year or m o r e . " ^

The least change would occur under

the Bayh-Bennett bill which deletes the portion of the
existing statute pertaining to automatic review of cases
involving general or flag o f f l e e r s . T h e number of such
cases is infinitesimal.
^610 U.S.C. sec. 866(b) (1970).
^Another inconsistency In the Bayh-Bennett bill is
the drafters' failure to revise the jurisdiction of the
Court of Military Appeals to reflect the deletion of auto
matic review of general officer cases. H.R. 291, sec.
867(b)(1 ).
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The case load of the Courts of Military Review
would increase markedly under the Hatfield bill revision
of appellate jurisdiction.

Instead of reviewing all cases

involving sentences of one year or more, the Courts would
consider all cases with sentences of four months or m o r e . ^
The magnitude of the increase can be estimated from data
for Fiscal 1971-

A total of 77,31^ courts-martial were

conducted by the four armed services; however, in the same
year the four appellate courts considered less than 10 per
iiO

cent of that number of cases. *

The bulk of the increase

would be in the review of special courts-martial in which
a bad-conduct discharge is not adjudged.

In the Army, for

example, in Fiscal 1971 approximately 96 per cent of the
special courts-martial did not result in sentences with
a punitive discharge.

The maximum confinement which can

be Imposed by a special court-martial is six

m o n t h s .

50

jf

it is assumed that one-third of the special courts-martial
resulted In sentences of between four and six months, then
8,500 cases would have been added to the docket of the Army
Court of Military Review under the Hatfield criterion.

This

estimated increase is more than two-and-one-half times the
actual number of cases reviewed.

Probably the great mass

S. 2171, sec. 866(b)..
^ usCMA-JAG Annual Report, 1971, P. 55010 U.S.C. sec. 819 (1970).

I8i»
of added cases would Involve no major questions, for adver
sary argument in an appeals court.
The Bayh-Bennett and Hatfield legislative proposals
provide a continuation of the role of the President in the
military legal system.

In a strict interpretation, even

the present limited participation by the chief executive
violates the concept of judicial independence for the mili
tary tribunals.

However, the reality of the President's

actually very limited authorized tasks and the tradition of
even this minimal Involvement probably precludes any effort
to eliminate the President from all responsibility in the
system.

Under Article. 71 of the Uniform Code the Presi

dent must approve all court-martial sentences extending
to death or Involving a general or flag officer.

He must

approve the sentence, or parts thereof, before the punish
ment may be imposed.

Significantly, the President cannot

overturn a verdict approved by the Court of Military Appeals.
The occasions in which Presidential action must occur are
extremely infrequent.

Presumably the death penalty cannot

now be Imposed by a military court-martial.

Thus, the only

cases coming to the President would be those in which a gen
eral or flag officer was prosecuted— a very rare occurrence.
Under Article 71(b) the Secretary of the military, department
must approve a sentence Involving dismissal of a commis
sioned (other than general or flag) officer before such
punishment can be imposed.

Conceivably, the President
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could exercise selective review of the actions of the
departmental official, a Presidential appointee, and direct
a specific disposition.

Presidential Intervention in any

other military case would have to be justified through
some inherent power in the chief executive as commanderin-chief of the armed forces.

Presidential actions affect

ing the sentence imposed by the military legal system would
not impinge upon the independence of the judicial institu
tions.

As presently established in statute, authorized

actions would not affect the courts' role in determining
a verdict through weighing of law and facts.

Reduction of

a sentence occurs frequently in civilian jurisdictions in
which the chief executive is authorized to grant clemency,
pardon, or parole, or to commute a sentence.
Unofficial proposals for
judiciallzation
Although different in significant details, the
Bayh-Bennett and Hatfield bills both represent a rather
limited departure from the traditional concept of mili
tary law and institutions.

A much greater range of view

is present in the many unofficial proposals for reform of
the Uniform Code.

A survey of these generally fragmentary

plans indicates the kinds of alternatives which Congress
will probably have to consider during any forthcoming amend
ing process.
Change in the jurisdiction of the Courts ‘of Military
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Review is a subject for potential disagreement between
reformers and the military departments.

Policy views

against expansion of the Courts’ jurisdiction were expressed
by each of the three services responding to the 1972 ques
tionnaire by the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights.

Their reactions were to a plan to grant, the Courts

discretion to accept petitions from appellants whose cases
did not qualify for automatic review.51
The Subcommittee inquiry pertained to a very minor
expansion of the jurisdiction through elective appeals.
In contrast, a civilian attorney proposed implementation
of a complete system of defendant-initiated appeals.

The

plan is based on two automatic administrative reviews of
trial records followed by a formal appeal if desired by
the defendant.

Cases qualifying for such elective appeals

include those with sentences of at least four months, as
in the Hatfield bill; however, the important difference
between the two plans is the elective rather than automatic appeals provision.
Expansion of the jurisdiction of the Court of Mili
tary Appeals has been proposed by an Army attorney.

At

present, the highest appellate court can accept petitions
^ Se n a t e Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,
questionnaire, 1972, question I-D-8.
52Sherman, "Civilianization of Military Law,"
pp. 102-103.
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from only those defendants whose cases have been ruled
upon by the Courts of Military Review.

The more liberal

plan permits the Court to grant petitions from any courtmartial regardless of the sentence imposed.
Defendant-initiated appeals would be required under
recommendations of the Task Force on the Administration of
Military Justice in the Armed Forces, a fourteen-member
panel appointed in 1972 by the Secretary of Defense . ^
According to the Task Force, the present system of auto
matic review "uses precious time and resources and is
believed, at least by some, to result too frequently in
perfunctory action."^5

Under its plan, appeals from gen

eral courts-martial and special courts-martial in which
a punitive discharge was adjudged would be heard by the
Court of Military Review only if the defense counsel pre
sented an assignment of errors to the Court.

Automatic

review would occur only in the very rare case involving a
general or flag officer or a death penalty.

The principal

justification for this recommendation by the task force
was the effect of judicialization on the military legal
system.
^Da n i e l h . Benson, ."The United States Court of
Military Appeals," Texas Tech. Law Review, 3 (Fall, 1971),
20-2 1 .
cL
J Report of the Task Force on Military Justice,
Vol. 2, pp. 7*1-78 and Vol. 1, pp. 92-9555Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 93-
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Historically, military codes were written to be
administered by laymen rather than by lawyers; today
courts-martial are almost totally managed by lawyers.
Clearly, some of the safeguards that were considered
necessary to prevent illegal influence of the courtmartial by the commander would not be required in a
system administered largely by lawyers. . . .56
The impact of the study on future Department of
Defense legislative programs is difficult to predict.
The military criminal justice system is frequently praised
for providing automatic review— either administrative or
judicial— of every court-martial conviction.57

Such

guarantees do not exist in any other Federal or state
jurisdiction.

But, as was described above, only 10 per

cent of the court-martial cases are now reviewed judi
cially by the intermediate appellate courts.

Therefore,

implementation of defendant-initiated reviews would not
reduce significantly the percentage of cases now heard
automatically.

In a comment made shortly after publication

of the Task Force report, the Chief Judge of the Air Force
Court of Military Review expressed concern that prejudicial
errors might not be detected in a system of defendantinitiated reviews.58
Elective rather than automatic appeals are supported
by an American Bar Association committee developing criminal
56Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 92.
57por example, see, Homer E. Moyer, Jr., "Proce
dural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages over the
Civilian Defendant," Maine Law Review, 22 (1970), 10 4-40.
^ A m e r y interview.
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appeals standards.

In many civilian jurisdictions the

number of elective appeals has increased dramatically
since i960.

Despite this trend, "substantial sentiment"

existed among a minority of the committee to establish
automatic appeals as a minimum standard for criminal pro
cedure statutes In state and Federal jurisdictions.59

jn

many states, automatic appeal is provided for only the
most serious crimes Involving lengthy sentences of con
finement.

Automatic appeals are the exception to the norm.

Numerous other plans have been advanced for changing
the Institutions and procedures of the military judicial
system.

Essentially all the proposals cause the military

procedures to correspond more directly with those of civil
ian jurisdictions.

Most of the suggested changes in the

appellate courts contribute to the objective of judlcialization.
The most extensive change in the structure of the
intermediate appellate courts which has been discussed Is
the creation of a single court to adjudicate all cases
regardless of service origin.

Located for administrative

purposes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
tribunal would be composed of judges from each of the four
services.

The joint court Issue was first raised officially

^American Bar Association, Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice.: Standards Relating to
Criminal Appeals, approved draft (New York: American Bar
Association, 1970), pp. 17-20.
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by the judges of the Court of Military Appeals.

The con

cept was discussed again during the 1962 hearings by the
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights.

At that

time the military departments opposed such a court.

The

Air Force's written response to the Subcommittee's 1962
questionnaire continues to be a typical objection.
Although such a system might be theoretically
feasible, it would'not be practicable. The diversity
of service problems and the respective areas unique
to each of the services render lawyers of each service
best qualified to review case3 pertaining to his ser
vice. 6°
Support for the joint-court plan has come from two civil
ian appellate judges.

Judge Ferguson of the Court of Mili

tary Appeals expressed his support to the Subcommittee in
1 9 6 2 . Judge Jones, who retired in 1972 after serving
on Navy tribunals since their creation in 1951, would staff
the all-service single court with civilian judges, who
could be retired military lawyers.

One statutory problem

in the creation of a joint court is the subordination of
the Coast Guard judiciary to a court organized under the
Department of Defense, which presently has no jurisdiction
over that service.

Obviously, some form of transfer would

^ Hearings on Constitutional Rights of Military
Personnel (1962)7 P* 595* Similar opinions were expressed
in 1972 interviews by Navy. Chief Judge Krouse and Myron L.
Birnbaum, a former member .of an Air Force board of review.
^ Ibid., p. 197.
/?p
Jones letter.

See, above, p. 90*.
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have to be arranged to place the Coast Guard legal system
under the Department of Defense rather than under the
Department of Transportation.

Despite the advantages for

judicialization In a Department of Defense Court of Mili
tary Review, it is doubtful that the individual military
services will consent to relinquish their present control
of criminal adjudication.
Further advancement by the Courts of Military
Review toward greater judicialization depends upon enhance
ment of the Court of Military Appeals.

Civilian reformers

have recommended that the highest military court be granted
Article III status and incorporated into the Federal judi
ciary.

If this ever occurs, then the intermediate appel

late courts logically could be given more attributes of
genuine legislative courts.
Two legal periodical writers advocated conferring
Article III classification on the Court of Military Appeals.
The precedent for conversion of an appellate court from
legislative to constitutional status exists in Congress1
transferring of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.^3
At present, the Court of Military Appeals meets the criteria
for Article III status defined by the Supreme Court.

The

classification depends on whether the court's "business
. . . there specified [in the statute creating the court]
^ 2 8 u.S.C. sec. 211 (1970). The transfer of status
occurred as a result of a 1958 statute.
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and its judges and judgments are allowed the independence
there [in Article III] expressly or impliedly made requi
site."^

However, the Court .of Military Appeals is defi

cient in one major prerequisite— appointment of its judges
for life tenure during good behavior.

On three occasions

the House of Representatives has approved life tenure,
only to see the Senate refuse to concur.

Each rejection

resulted from matters unrelated to the merits of the issue
of life tenure.

In addition to prestige, the benefits to

be derived from constitutional status are unquestioned
ability of the Court to declare unconstitutional sections
of the Uniform Code or of executive orders and, secondly,
a standard method for Supreme Court review of military
judicial decisions . ^5

Further, the judges of the Court of

Military Appeals would become equal members of the Federal
bench and, thereby, less susceptible to political pressure
through unfavorable Congressional tampering with their
authority, tenure, and salary as can now occur.

ft

If the

Court of Military Appeals were granted Article III status
and if Congress approved methods to link the military and
6iJGlidden v. Zdanok,. ,370 U.S. 530, 552 (1962).
^ T h e s e points are developed further, in John T.
Willis, "The Constitution, the United States Court of Mili
tary Appeals and the Future.,."- Military Law Review, 57 (Sum
mer, 1972), 27-97^ D a n i e l Patrick 0 'Hanlon, "The Military Judicial
System: Should It Be Brought Under Article III?" Law and
Social Order, 1972 (No. 2), 329-43.
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civilian legal systems, then the remaining appellate and
trial courts in the military could bo expected to receive
comparable enhancement.
Prospects for enactments
Frequently in the preceding chapters the prediction
has been made that enactment of comprehensive revision of
the Uniform Code is improbable in the near future.
substantiation exists for this conclusion?

What

The legisla

tive history of military statutes demonstrates the need
for substantial agreement on the desirability of reform
among the military departments, the interest groups, and
the general public.

It Is unlikely that such a conjunction

of pressure will develop In the next few years.

Cessation

of American military involvement in Indochina removes from
public attention the prosecution of servicemen for contro
versial crimes.

Termination of conscription eliminates

many of the circumstances of reluctant servicemen tried
for disobedience of orders, particularly those related to
combat.
One means available to. legislators to build public
and pressure group support, for military criminal justice
reforms is the introduction of bills.

The Bayh-Bennett

and Hatfield bills analyzed herein are only the most com
prehensive of the numerous pieces of legislation formally
filed in recent Congresses.

Sponsorship of amendments
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enables a legislator to develop a vehicle for expression
of his views on the need for Congressional action.

Speeches

before interested citizen groups and periodical articles
are methods for motivating public support.^7
However, a corresponding danger exists in that the
introduction of so many bills may overwhelm the capacity of
the executive and legislative branches to prepare for and
conduct hearings on the major proposals.

For example, in

the Ninety-second Congress seventy-six bills on military
legal matters were Introduced and referred to the House
Armed Services Committee.

Many were submitted to the

Department of Defense for feasibility study and policy
comment.

Because of the complexity of most bills, the

Department did not respond to any of the proposals.

An

additional reason for this particular delay was the diver
sion of staff to the eight-month study by the Department's
Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice.

The

Department awaited the results of its own study before
acting upon legislation referred by the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees.
Many of the same bills were introduced in the
current Ninety-third C o n g r e s s . 6®

Most were submitted

67jnterview with Peter Coogan, staff of Senator
Birch Bayh, Washington, D.C., December 11, 1972.

^Braswell letter.
As of August 15, 1973, no
schedule had been established for any hearings.
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to the Department of Defense for analysis.

According to

the sponsor of one of the principal bills, Representative
Bennett, "[H]opefully, replies will be received [from the
Department of Defense] for possible subcommittee considera69
tion during the 93rd Congress." * The next problem is the
scheduling of hearings in both the House and the Senate.
Senator Bayh evaluated the prospects as not very encour
aging for hearings in 1973.

Joint hearings by a sub

committee of the Armed Services Committee and the Subcom
mittee on Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary Committee,
as were held in 1966, are a probable arrangement for future
Senate study of military law legislation.

However, the

chairman of the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, Senator
Ervin, has given scheduling priority to hearings on bills
revising administrative discharge procedures.71

Even these

hearings are improbable in 1973? and possibly even in 1974.
Thus, immediate action of a comprehensive nature on
military legal reform is unlikely, if for no other reasons
than the mechanics of preparation of Department of Defense
policy positions and the scheduling of Congressional
^ L e t t e r from Representative Charles E. Bennett,
Washington, D.C., January 12, 1973.
7°Letter from Senator Birch Bayh, Washington, D.C.,
January 11, 1973.
710f course, Senator Ervin was occupied during
1973 with his chairmanship of the Senate Select Committee
on Presidential Campaign Activities. S. Res. 60, 93d Cong.,
1st sess., 1973*
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hearings.

Further delay will probably diminish public

interest in the legislation.

The model for future enact

ments will probably be that of the Military Justice Act of
1968 which emerged after fifteen years of rather persistent
effort by various interests.
Judicialization through
administrative actions
With no statutory revisions forthcoming, the Courts
of Military Review will be affected chiefly by judicializa
tion initiatives of the judicial and executive branches.
Perhaps the Navy and Coast Guard Courts will join their
Army and Air Force counterparts in declaring their power to
issue writs for extraordinary relief.

With a unified posi

tion on this important issue, the Courts will be more likely
to receive from the Court of Military Appeals the desired
endorsement of their status as legislative courts.

A

number of administrative changes were implemented in 1969
as a result of the Military Justice Act of 1968.

These

actions provide illustrations of judicialization through
administrative initiative..

The Courts of Military Review

are now accorded a respect not present during the years of
the boards of review.

Appellate, military judges wear Judi

cial robes and conduct sessions with counsel in courtrooms
befitting the status of an appellate court.

New rules of

practice and procedure issued by the Judge Advocates Gen
eral included sample forms for the submission of official
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documents to the Courts, pf Military Review.

Even the papers

prepared by the Judge Advocates General are addressed "To
the Honorable, the Judges of the United States [Navy] Court
of Military Review.11?2
Progress in Judicialization through administrative
change has been slow.

For example, many of the deficiencies

cited in the United States v. Draughon and Combest v. Bender
opinions as evidence of the nonjudicial character of the
tribunals could be corrected through actions within the
authority of the military departments.

Membership on the

Courts could be stabilized through implementation of a
specified tenure for Judges, who would be ineligible for
reassignment except for cause related to their Judicial
performance.

Judges should be removed from all relation

ships with the military command hierarchy during their Judi
cial assignment.
A second major area for improvement is in the pub
lication of Judicial opinions.

Court-Martial Reports con

tains all opinions of the Court of Military Appeals and
selected opinions of the four intermediate appellate courts.
Criteria for publication of a Court of Military Review
opinion include the importance and precedent potential.
However, the final decision on publication in each, military
department rests with personnel in the Office of the Judge
Advocate General rather than with the Judges themselves.
72/jo CMR xl-xlv (196.9).
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The best evidence that not all important decisions are
published is the omission of United States v. Dolby from
Court-Martial Reports.

The declaration that the Army

Court possessed extraordinary relief power undoubtedly
met the importance criterion.

Certainly not all Court of

Military Review opinions are worthy of publication.

If

the reason for highly selective publication is lack of '
space in the reporter series, then a solution is removal
of Court of Military Appeals opinions from Court-Martial
Reports.

Opinions of that tribunal are duplicated in two

reporters, both published by the same commercial firm.
Additionally, Courts of Military Review are not identified
on the cover of the volumes of Court-Martial Reports, the
contents of which are listed as the opinions of "The Judge
Advocates General of the Armed Forces and the United States
Court of Military Appeals."

Opinions of the Judge Advo

cates General have never been published in Court-Martial
Reports.

The wording perhaps originated with the assumption

that the original boards of review in 1951 were still advi
sory agencies for the Judge Advocates General.

As noted

above, the names of the judges, of the Courts of Military
Review are not printed in the' '.introductory pages of CourtMartial Reports.

Printed Instead are the names of the

Judge Advocates General of each military service since
the founding of that office.'.

Such vestiges of administra

tive subservience to the military command hierarchy detract
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from the Judicial status and authority of the Courts of
Military Review.
An assessment
The numerous proposals for revision of the Uniform
Code advanced since 1969 all contain as a principal objec
tive the increased Judicialization of the military criminal
Justice system.

Expectedly, the extent of reform varies

in the diverse legislation.

As did the proposals before

1968, these legislative efforts will form the foundation
for future enactments, although new amendments are, real
istically, several years distant.

Viewed in terms of

history, enactment of major elements of these proposals
will maintain the evolution of military adjudicatory
institutions and procedures.

This evolution continues to

move the intermediate appellate courts farther along the
continuum from executive to Judicial adjudication.

The

proposals demonstrate a recognition of the deficiencies
of executive adjudication pointed out by Roscoe Pound.
The goal of the reformers is to. continue the process of
providing "checks upon arbitrary, biased, or extra-legal
if not unlawful . . . action. . . ."73
73p0und, Justice According to L a w , p. 79..
above, p . 9 •

See,

CHAPTER IX
AN ASSESSMENT OF JUDICIAL EVOLUTION
The hypothesis of this work is that the Courts of
Military Review are evolving toward a status of genuine
Judicial institutions recognized in fact and law as legis
lative courts.

The foregoing analysis of the history of

military appellate methods, of legislative and Judicial
declarations, of Judicial behavior, and of contemporary
attitudes on Judicialization substantiates the hypothesis.
The research framework has been a descriptive analysis of
the advancement of military appellate institutions along
a continuum ranging from executive to Judicial adjudication.
The same format is applicable to study of any
adjudicatory institution in actual or potential transition
from executive to Judicial status.

In addition to the

military tribunals analyzed herein, two other specialized
courts of the national government have evolved over time
to fully recognized Judicial positions.

The predecessor

of the United States Customs Court was the Board of General
Appraisers in the Treasury Department.

The Customs Court .

is now a constitutional court and a full member of the
Federal Judiciary.

The predecessor of the United States
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Tax Court was the United States Board of Tax Appeals, a
component of the Treasury Department.

The Tax Court is

now a legislative court established under Article I of the
Constitution.

Conceivably continued transition could bring

it into the status of a constitutional court.

Although

each of these tribunals originated as an element of the
executive branch, each has terminated that subordination.
Other adjudicatory institutions of the executive depart
ments may undergo similar transformations severing former
direct administrative relationships.

The other model of

judicialization is that of the military intermediate appel
late courts.

In all probability these tribunals will remain

in some form of relationship with the military departments.
Nevertheless, these tribunals are attaining attributes of
genuine judicial Institutions while continuing as executive
entities.

The conclusion from these observations is that

the doctrine of separation of powers Is not a rigid prohi
bition on the existence within the executive branch of judi
cial Institutions.

All activities subordinate to an execu

tive department are not necessarily executive in character.
Conceivably other adjudicatory elements in the executive
branch will undergo judicialization similar to that occur
ring In the military courts.

The process by. which these

transformations progress involves Interactions among the
principal centers of authority In American government.

4

A final means of assessing the status of the Courts
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of Military Review is an evaluation against the standard
for appellate courts, developed by the American Bar Associa
tion.
The structure of appellate courts should be con
sonant with the purposes of appellate review, to wit:
(i) To protect defendants against prejudicial
legal error in the proceedings leading to convictions
and, within limits, against verdicts unsupported by
sufficient evidence;
(ii) Authoritatively to develop and refine the
substance and procedural doctrines and principles of
criminal law; and
(Hi)
To foster and maintain uniform, consistent
standards and practices in criminal processes.1
As presently constituted, the Courts of Military Review
accomplish satisfactorily the first purpose of appellate
review.

With the effects of judicialization, these Courts

are now able to identify and correct prejudicial errors
which in earlier years would have been ignored as legal
niceties by the command-dominated adjudicatory processes.
Because the intermediate appellate courts are empowered to
weigh evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and
determine controverted questions of fact, these tribunals
have greater opportunity than do most civilian courts to
reject verdicts unsupported by evidence.

The Courts of

Military Review have even been permitted by the Court of
Military Appeals to consider certain matters outside the
standard trial record.

For example, post-trial psychiatric

examinations have been used to determine that an accused
-1ABA Standards Relating to Criminal Appeals, p. 22.
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was incompetent to stand trial.2
However, the military intermediate appellate courts
are deficient in meeting the other two standards.

The

Court of Military Appeals has exercised most of the ini
tiative in developing and refining the substance and pro
cedural doctrines of criminal law under the Uniform Code.
In their new status as the equivalent of legislative courts,
perhaps each Court of Military Review will become more
effective in the task of doctrinal development.

Similarly,

the intermediate courts have not been particularly competent
in fostering and maintaining uniform, consistent standards
in military law.

Before 1969 the boards of review within

each service functioned independently with little, if any,
coordination of Interpretation.

Through the years as the

body of precedent from the Court of Military Appeals developed
substantively, the boards moved toward the objective of
greater consistency.

One positive result of the estab

lishment of the single Court of Military Review in each
service is the coordination of decisions, accomplished
through supervision by the chief judge and eii banc deci
sions in the most controversial cases.

Further progress

could be. made through the creation of a military judicial
conference as an administrat±ve aid to synchronization of
opinions of the four Courts.
2For example, see Uriite'.d States v. Gordon, *J2 CMR
799 (ACMR 1970).
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Military adjudicatory Institutions and procedures
are creations of a political system which produces outputs
through compromise.

Each statute affecting military crim

inal justice matters was the best obtainable in the situa
tion prevailing at the time of enactment.

Consequently,

the ideal system probably will never be developed through
acts of Congress, even if all the nonlegislative parties
agree on the elements of that ideal system.

The hope for

the future is that necessary improvements can be made by
the Judicial and administrative components of the military
departments.

An encouraging sign is that influential of fi-

cials are amenable to judicialization.

The traditionalist

military attitudes are waning; few leaders now consider the
strengthening of judicial institutions and procedures to be
an unwarranted infringement on the rights of commanders.
The opinion of General William C. Westmoreland, a former
Army Chief of Staff, is noteworthy:

"A military trial

should not have a dual function as an instrument of dis
cipline and as an instrument of justice.

It should be an

instrument of justice and in fulfilling this function, it
will promote discipline..
The public, the judiciary, the Congress, and, most
importantly, the military leadership have demonstrated a
newly acquired recognition that the fifty-year evolution
3"Military Justi.ce-.-A Commander's Viewpoint,"
American Criminal Law Review, 10 (July, 1971)» 8.

205

toward judicialization .of the military criminal justice
system will continue.

That evolution will take the mili

tary intermediate appellate courts farther toward the
ultimate point on the adjudicatory continuum— unquestioned
status as legislative courts of the United States.
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